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Abstract 
My thesis defends the cognitive value of a close reading of literary fiction which I believe has 
been overlooked in the philosophical literature. I first outline an account of literary fiction in 
terms of the standard features of both literature and fiction. The diverse philosophical 
positions which hold that reading literary fiction ‘improves the mind’ attribute some 
significance to literariness but do not say how the literary features of literary fiction help to 
develop cognitive gain. An explanation is required in order to meet anti-cognitivist 
scepticism. I rule out the view that cognitive gain is irrelevant to our aesthetic appreciation of 
literature. My thesis locates cognitive gain in the Verstehen tradition and identifies five 
relevant senses of ‘understanding’ as the cognitive value at stake. The case is made that 
reading literary fiction as literature stimulates the relevant senses of understanding; in the 
course of the discussion I meet objections from elitism and subjectivity. I argue that a 
reader’s engagement with literary devices stimulates the five senses of understanding and 
supply examples from: irony, particular detail and precise phrasing, metaphor, play with 
perspective, ambiguity and repetition. Contrary to the contention that dominates the current 
debate, that a reader gains knowledge from fiction, I argue that it is the way readers gain 
understanding from literature that is more significant to cognitive value. Finally, I argue that 
the relevant senses of understanding may be transferred to an extra-textual context and so 
bridge the gap between understanding the text and understanding the world beyond the text.    
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Preface 
 
The Philosopher of Literature’s Dilemma 
 
It is widespread practice for philosophers of literature to draw on literary examples to 
illustrate an aspect of their philosophy. Here the philosopher of literature faces the horns of 
a dilemma: too literary an approach presents one set of difficulties while a deficit in 
literary examples presents another set.  
There are numerous problems with a philosopher of literature taking too literary an 
approach in addition to appearing unjustifiably self-indulgent in offering a lengthy 
treatment of one’s favourite literary work. One problem is that particular literary examples 
are hyper-specific and so cannot justify the general kind of analysis typical of philosophy. 
One cannot argue from the premise that ‘X is the case in a particular sonnet’ to the 
conclusion that ‘X is generally the case in literature’. It seems that the best literary 
examples can provide is evidence that there is at least one case where such and such is true. 
Another problem is that extensive work on a literary example brings the writing closer to 
literary criticism and increases the chances that the philosophical point is lost. 
 My main contention in what follows is that the cognitive gain in reading literary fiction 
comes from the process of closely reading a literary fictional text rather than in gaining 
any specific propositional content from the work. As this is my philosophical thesis, one 
grounded in my own experience as a reader, I hope I may be excused some sojourns into 
particular literary examples by way of evidence.  
The choice of specific examples is not always relevant in technical papers in aesthetics. 
David Lewis’s argument in his paper ‘Truth in Fiction’ (1978) is not affected by his choice 
of Sherlock Holmes rather than another fictional character about which there is something 
true in a given fiction. Yet when an investigation becomes broader and concerns reading 
practices then specific examples from one’s experience as a reader become more 
important. Taking too theoretical a line in these studies makes the philosopher of literature 
removed from the subject matter under discussion where his or her argument may work in 
theory but bear little relation to widespread reading practices. I do not intend to brighten 
the night sky with insights on any given literary text - only to show that, in at least some 
significant cases, the process of close analysis is fruitful and equips me with cognitive 
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skills that prove useful in an extra-literary setting. In grounding my thesis in what I take to 
be common reading practices of literary fiction, I seek to avoid the overly theoretical horn 
of the dilemma. Overall, I seek instead to offer an in depth and systematic account of one 
aspect of reading literary fiction.  
Philosophers of literature tend to draw on the work of Dickens, Cervantes, Tolstoy, Proust 
or Musil but such works do not lend themselves to a convenient digest. I draw on 
Shakespeare in much of the text that follows because it is readily available and many 
people are familiar with the works. There is also helpful concision which enables me to 
make the point without excessive quotation. That Shakespeare wrote plays to be performed 
rather than to be pored over does not detract from the fact that these texts yield to close 
analysis in the same way that other literary texts yield to close analysis. 
I take the following examples of effective practice in the philosophy of literature as 
guidelines. There will be times when I only need to cite an example of a certain kind of 
literary work, without exegesis, to make my point. Stacie Friend uses this approach to good 
effect in her paper ‘Fiction as a Genre’ (2012):   
Many works of New Journalism, or creative non-fiction more generally, use true 
stories for their purposes, such as entertainment. Truman Capote’s In Cold Blood 
(1965) provides a good example, since Capote was clear that his purpose was to 
show that journalism could deploy literary forms… (Friend 2012: 184) 
On other occasions, I may need to quote a passage in full and draw the attention of the 
reader to an aspect of the text or context. Catherine Wilson quotes two verses from Meng 
Chiao’s poem ‘Apricots Die Young’ in her paper ‘Grief and the Poet’ (2013: 80-81) as an 
example of an elegiac work that has the capacity to move the reader without the reader 
knowing whether the poem refers to imaginary or actual loss. In this case, the reader of 
literature is left to do the literary work in his or her own time, that is to read the whole 
piece and gauge whether they are moved by the poem or not. More often than not, I shall 
quote from a literary fictional work and offer some close reading as this is the basis of my 
argument.  In this respect I adopt Eileen John’s approach in her paper ‘Reading Fiction and 
Conceptual Knowledge: Philosophical Thought in Literary Context’(1998: 336-340) where 
there is extensive analysis of Grace Paley’s short story ‘Wants’ in order to show how a 
specific work of literary fiction can give rise to philosophical reflection.  
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Background 
 
Imagine watching a production of Shakespeare’s Othello and commenting afterwards that 
the production made you understand love in a new and illuminating way. Unbeknownst to 
you, the person you address these comments to is Socrates who probes further. ‘Many 
people think - at least before they think about it - that literature helps us to understand 
something better’, he begins, ‘but can this really be the case?’ ‘Surely if there is cognitive 
gain then a specialist source such as scientific psychology should be our preferred point of 
reference’. Socrates might question what it was exactly that we learn about love: that 
lovers in the opening buds of their relationship enjoy heightened emotions. ‘Surely we 
know this fact already from direct experience or from reliable testimony. Does watching 
this conjecture played out or described in a poem or in a novel prove anything and if it 
does then what is it about literature that contributes to the reader’s cognitive gain?’ 
Two conversations motivated my research. On the first occasion, a philosophy of mind 
student, while arguing vociferously against anomalous monism, claimed that one does not 
learn anything about the mental state of someone about to commit murder by reading or 
listening to Macbeth’s dagger soliloquy. In the second conversation, a scientifically 
minded colleague argued that reading literary fiction never provides one with a worthwhile 
explanation, unlike other academic disciplines. I was struck by how unfairly the case 
against literary fiction was made in these cases: all fictions were grouped together and 
painted in the same neutral wash, there seemed to be naivety over standard practices of 
how to read literary fiction and propositional knowledge was the sole extent of the 
cognitive value recognised.  This position, exemplified by Stolnitz’s seminal article (1992), 
is my main target in what follows although I shall counter those who think that the reader’s 
cognitive gain has no bearing on their valuing literature. A third target is those 
philosophers of literature who do not pay sufficient heed to the role ‘literariness’ plays in 
our valuing the cognitive power of reading literary fiction. 
One upshot of taking the literariness of literary fiction seriously is that the landscape of the 
traditional debate over whether the reader gains cognitively from reading literary fiction is 
changed.  I am aware that we appreciate literary fiction for multiple ends. For example, in 
August 1914 Shakespeare’s Henry V was performed in Stratford-upon-Avon to raise 
money for the Allied war effort and to raise people’s spirits. In 1944 the same play was 
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released as a film, starring Laurence Olivier, as a patriotic morale boost. I believe that one 
of these ends is cognitive gain and seek to understand this process more clearly.  
In what follows I defend the thesis that: 
The reader is encouraged to exercise certain cognitive capacities that constitute distinctive 
forms of ‘understanding’ from his or her close analysis and interpretation of a work of 
literary fiction qua literature (as opposed to qua fiction) which in turn puts the reader at 
an advantage when interpreting the world beyond the literary work.  
  
[10] 
 
Chapter One: Literary Fiction as a 
Subgenre of Both Literature and Fiction 
 
There is a tendency in the philosophy of literature, less conspicuous in the philosophy of 
fiction, to use the terms ‘literature’ and ‘fiction’ casually. The terms appear to track an 
important distinction; one recognised by publishers, librarians, booksellers as well as any 
reader who expects a different kind of read from the shelf marked ‘literature’ than from the 
shelf marked ‘fiction’.1 The problem is that in running the concepts ‘literature’ and 
‘fiction’  together,  no distinction is drawn between arguments that are sound only if the 
concept ‘literature’ is employed and arguments that are sound only if the concept ‘fiction’ 
is employed. As a result, the conclusions of such arguments are taken to apply 
indiscriminately to both literature and fiction, to the potential detriment of both. Some 
work needs to be done in order to determine what the conceptual relations are between 
literature, fiction and literary fiction. Once this is in place I can investigate the claim that 
the cognitive gain from reading literary fiction is generated from a reader’s engagement 
with literary fiction qua literature and not, as is too often assumed, qua fiction. 
 
There is a tradition which takes all literature to be fictional by definition (Todorov 1973:7).  
Yet it is not clear why we should accept that all literature is fiction given that many non-
fictional works are read and admired as literature. The variety of works considered 
‘literary’ include works based on fact but fictionalised in their presentation such as Arthur 
Miller’s The Crucible or Thomas Hardy’s poetry on the death of his wife. There are, in 
addition, non-fictions admired for their literary qualities such as: Descartes’ Meditations, 
Gibbon’s Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, some of George Orwell’s essays and The 
Song of Solomon. The latter list are works that are classed as ‘literature’ but are not classed 
as ‘fiction’, while various novels by Dick Francis show that there are works classed as 
‘fiction’ that are not classed as ‘literature’. One can say, along with others (Lamarque 
2013: 525), that ‘literature’ and ‘fiction’ are not co-extensive terms.  
 
                                                          
1  ‘The library concept of literature’ is defended in (Pettersson 2012:197) but remains vague over what 
criteria librarians use: book size, popularity, the publisher’s classification? Institutional accounts of fiction 
and literature are vague in the same way. 
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The distinction between ‘literature’ and ‘fiction’ may be further recognised through 
contrasting the writing and reading practices associated with these categories. A budding 
author who sits down to write literature nurtures a different set of ambitions to one who sits 
down to write fiction whether the former accomplishes his or her literary ambitions or not. 
Morrissey negotiated his contract with Penguin Classics with the promise that his 
autobiography was ‘literature in the making’; an ambition reflected in the highly stylised 
opening pages. Similarly, a reader will opt for a work of literature with the expectation of 
taking on a more challenging read than is expected in ‘mere fiction’ which we enjoy with 
the same light inattention as a box of chocolates. In spite of the various distinctions 
between ‘literature’ and ‘fiction’, there are recurring cases in the philosophical literature of 
the terms being treated as co-extensive. Here are three examples. 
 
John Gibson frequently runs the terms literature and fiction together in Chapter Two of 
Fiction and the Weave of Life: 
 
…we can begin to see how we can accept the ‘fictionality’ of literature – that a 
fiction is, after all, just that – yet maintain without contradiction that literature 
offers the reader a vital encounter with her world.                                                                                                                                  
                                                                                                             (Gibson 2007: 74) 
 
Here, Gibson assumes that all literature is fiction. Examples are drawn in Fiction and the 
Weave of Life from literary works by, among others, Dostoevsky, Dickens and 
Shakespeare. For instance, Gibson argues that it is the literary language of Shakespeare’s 
Othello that conveys to the reader a sense of what racism is really like.
 
So, when Gibson 
talks about literature he seems to have fiction in mind and when he purports to be 
discussing fiction, it is various features of literary language which support his argument 
(Gibson 2007:73-80). 
 
A second example comes from Martha Nussbaum’s collection of essays, Love’s 
Knowledge. Nussbaum uses the terms ‘fiction’ and ‘literature’ interchangeably when she 
contrasts the full and fine detail of literary narratives to the nuts and bolts illustrations 
common in philosophy
2
: 
 
                                                          
2 A similar criticism of the ‘extremely schematic’ illustrations used in moral philosophy is made by Bernard 
Williams (1995: 217). This criticism applies whether the schematic illustration is fiction or non-fiction. For 
Williams the important criterion is that the example is chosen from telling experience.  
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Schematic philosophers’ examples almost always lack the particularity, the emotive 
appeal, the absorbing plottedness, the variety and indeterminacy, of good fiction; 
they lack, too, good fiction’s way of making the reader a participant and a friend; 
and we have argued that it is precisely in virtue of these structural characteristics 
that fiction can play the role it does in our reflective lives.                                                                               
   (Nussbaum 1992: 46) 
 
A similar point is made in a later essay, but this time with reference to literature: 
 
It could not be shown well even in a philosopher’s example, inasmuch as an 
example would lack the full specificity, and also the indeterminacy, of the literary 
case, its rich metaphors and pictures, its ways of telling us how characters come to 
see one another as this or that and come to attend to new aspects of their situation.    
                                 
                                                                                          (Nussbaum 1992: 160-161) 
 
In the first passage, Nussbaum lists what she claims are some features of fiction and in the 
second some features of literature. This is crucial to her subsequent argument, but she 
gives no theoretical basis for focussing on these features, or for classifying them as 
features of ‘fiction’ and of ‘the literary’ respectively. Some of the features mentioned 
(plottedness, indeterminacy) are arguably characteristic of fiction but not all literature, 
while others (particularity, rich metaphors and pictures) are arguably characteristic of 
literature but not all fiction. Yet the same assurance cannot be given to the other features 
listed. Nussbaum needs to be clearer about which properties belong to each category and 
needs to clarify the theoretical basis underpinning her selection. 
 
In a third case, Catherine Elgin defends the claim that novels, poetry and plays can aid our 
understanding when she says: 
 
Fiction helps. It highlights patterns, spells out implications, draws distinctions, and 
identifies possibilities we had not recognized in the welter of information before us.
                                                                                              
                                                                                                         (Elgin 1996: 189) 
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Yet it seems unlikely that she means any fiction:  Jeffrey Archer as well as Geoffrey 
Chaucer. Elgin’s argument, like those above, rests on certain features, in this case features 
of fiction. The four features, identified as promising a better understanding in the passage 
above, go well beyond any usual classification of fiction. Repeated motifs that highlight 
patterns, such as references to ‘nothing’ in King Lear, may more accurately be classified as 
a literary feature of a text as opposed to a fictional feature. Elgin, and others, might reply 
that ‘fiction’ is shorthand for ‘literary fiction’ in these contexts. This seems plausible but if 
objects are classified under two sortals then it is good methodological practice to clarify 
which sortal is relevant in order to avoid ambiguity. Or if both sortals are relevant, then it 
is good practice to distinguish in which way the claim may be made about each and give 
some account of the kind of relation that exists between sortals. Thus if I claim that nettle 
soup has health giving properties then I need to say whether it is owing to something in the 
nettles or because it is served as a soup or both. The same goes for the cognitive potential 
of literary fiction: one should specify whether we learn from a work as fiction, as literature, 
or both and if both how literary features stand in relation to fictional features.  
 
These three examples are parts of much longer defences of cognitive gain from reading 
literary fiction. ‘Cognitive gain’ and on occasion ‘cognitive power’, ‘cognitive advantage’, 
‘cognitive affordance’, ‘cognitive value’ appear in the following discussion as placeholder 
terms. The notion of cognitive gain is central to the thesis that I seek to defend in this 
project and a fuller treatment of this notion occurs in Chapter Three. At this early stage, I 
want to make two preliminary comments to give the reader some sense of what I have in 
mind. By ‘cognitive’ I mean, very broadly, what is related to thoughts and to the 
development of thoughts. By ‘gain’ I mean what the reader can do better, quicker and in 
the right direction as a result of reading literary fiction. Cognitive gain in the sense of 
developing one’s thinking in the right direction need not equate to the acquisition of new 
propositional knowledge. The cognitive gain referred to may be presented as the reader 
coming to a better understanding of X having read literary fiction Y. This is enough for 
now as I want to explain the conceptual model set out in this chapter.  
 
Four ‘super-genres’ are identifiable: fiction, non-fiction, literature and non-literature. As 
stated above, there are fictional texts that are not literary and literary texts that are not 
fictional. There are, of course, fictional texts that are literary; we shall refer to such texts as 
‘literary fiction’. The main aim of sections (1.1-1.3) is to provide a clear account of what is 
characteristic of texts which occupy this intersection between ‘literature’ and ‘fiction’. 
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Both terms are loose and any attempts at strict definitions in terms of necessary and 
sufficient conditions are fraught with counterexamples. The proliferation of such 
peripheral cases which resist easy categorisation motivates my defence of an anti-
essentialist account of both fiction and literature. By ‘anti-essentialist’ I mean a rejection of 
clear boundaries between concepts, specifiable in terms of necessary and sufficient 
conditions. The boundaries are vague and there is movement between super-genres, but as 
we shall see, that does not prevent an account of fiction, literature and literary fiction being 
offered.  A final word on methodology, this chapter is concerned with the categories of 
texts and in the course of what follows I refer to specific works which I take to be 
representative of these categories. I have tried to choose uncontroversial examples, unless 
controversy is required, but the argument is concerned with categorisation and does not 
rest exclusively on the examples cited. 
  
 
1.1 Fiction 
 
 
The aim of this section is to provide a plausible account of fiction before moving on to 
give a plausible account of literature. It is not always clear in the work of those defining 
fiction whether they have all fictional representations, printed works of fiction or 
individual fictional propositions in focus. I believe that whatever the specific endeavour 
the result in each case will have some bearing on what is meant when we call a text 
‘fiction’ which is my interest. Prima facie, it seems easier to account for fiction than 
literature; after all doesn’t ‘fiction’ just refer to what is made up? Defining fiction is not 
this straightforward; for one thing many fictional narratives refer to facts about things that 
are not made up and describe real people, places and events. In addition, some 
predominantly factual accounts contain fictional elements. Thucydides says:  
 
The speeches here represent what in my judgement it would have been most 
important for the individual speakers to say with regard to the current 
circumstances, while keeping as possible to the general sense of what was actually 
said. 
                                                      (History I. 22 trans. Rhodes 2014: 65 my italics). 
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Further, there are some narratives that are made up that do not constitute the kind of fiction 
I seek to elucidate; such narratives include lies, jokes, an unscrupulous CV, counterfactual 
or alternative histories, thought experiments in science or philosophy and legal fictions. 
 
Essentialist accounts of fiction, which seek a set of necessary and sufficient conditions on 
fiction, dominate recent discussion. The mainstream essentialist accounts of fiction state 
that a fiction (written or verbal) is an utterance where: 
 
a) There is a mandate that we imagine X where  
b) X is at most accidentally true.3 
 
Friend has argued against the essentialist view principally by the provision of counter-
examples. However, revealing what is problematic about the orthodox, essentialist view 
requires me to make an additional distinction, that (a) can be further divided into two 
constituent claims: 
 
(a
1
) There is a mandate. 
(a
2
) There is a distinct kind of imagination at work. 
 
(a
1
) is usually specified along Gricean lines (by Currie and others); though for Walton it is 
a matter of the requirements involved in playing a game of make-believe. A more 
significant point concerns (a
2
) as the essentialist needs to give an account of what is meant 
by ‘imagination’ in a way that shows a necessary link between imagination and fiction.  
 
Let us assume that, given the mandate, the imagination referred to is that of the reader of 
fiction and not the writer.
4
 There are candidate notions of what imagination might be: the 
experience of mental imagery, some form of simulation or make-believe.
5
 If imagination is 
taken in any of these three senses then it runs into Friend-type counter-examples. Friend’s 
principal criticism of the essentialist account is that the kinds of imagination specified are 
not particularly connected with fiction. Friend says that ‘[t]he invitation to imagine, 
                                                          
3 This account of fiction most famously occurs in Currie, G. (1990) The Nature of Fiction. New York: CUP, 
 p. 45; others follow viz. Lamarque, P. and Olsen, E. (1994) Truth, Fiction and Literature. Oxford: OUP; 
Davies, D. (1996) ‘Fictional Truth and Fictional Authors’ British Journal of Aesthetics, 36, pp. 43-55; 
Davies, D. (2001) ‘Fiction’ in Gaut, B. and McIver Lopes, D (eds.) The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics. 
London: Routledge pp. 263-74; Stock, K (2011) ‘Fictive Utterance and Imagining’. Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85, pp. 145-61. 
4
 In Currie’s terms, between ‘the recreative’ and ‘the creative’ imagination (Currie and Ravenscroft 2002: 9-
11). 
5
 For a detailed treatment of these kinds of imagination see (Friend 2008: 151-156). 
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whether explicit or not, is common to narrative works of non-fiction’ (Friend 2012: 183). 
Two examples are cited. The first is Ernest Shackleton’s South, an autobiographical 
account of the explorer’s failed expedition to Antarctica, in which the reader is invited to 
engage imaginatively with the story. The second is Simon Schama’s A History of Britain 
which explicitly invites the reader to imagine a setting and think about what it would be 
like to be present at one of Disraeli’s lavish parties. Friend’s examples act as a blueprint 
for this kind of counterexample.  
 
Kathleen Stock (2011, 2013) seeks to retrieve the essentialist account of fiction in light of 
Friend’s criticism with the following account of propositional imagining. 
  
For Thinker T to imagine that p requires that: 
 
i) T entertain the thought of p being the case and 
ii) either T does not believe p or inferentially connects p to other thoughts 
where there is at least one thought that T does not believe. 
 
Stock describes the relevant cognitive act in (i) as follows ‘…by imagining I don’t mean 
anything particularly full blooded,’ that is imagining need not ‘involve anything 
particularly experiential’ but ‘thinking of a certain case as being the case’ (Stock 2013: 
887). A simple conjunction is sufficient for the inferential connection referred to in (ii).  
So, if p is ‘I am typing’ then this statement is not sufficient for us to say ‘T imagines p’. 
However, if T thinks ‘I am typing’ and ‘I am on the moon’ then T is imagining. On Stock’s 
account, if a text gives rise to imagining then this is sufficient for that text to be fiction. 
 
However, Stock’s account does not offer a thorough enough explanation as to why a text 
counts as a fiction; this inadequacy applies to shorter as well as longer pieces. Take the 
case of an anti-dualist philosopher contemplating Descartes’ conceivability argument from 
the Sixth Meditation (Descartes 1968: 156). The philosopher is able to entertain the thought 
that dualism is the case but either does not believe dualism is the case or connects dualism 
to other thoughts that she does not believe such as God’s omnipotence or that what is 
conceivable is possible. Stock would have us count the conceivability argument as fiction 
according to criteria (i) and (ii) but this categorisation is surely overridden by the context 
and the presence of other features such as the philosophical principle that ‘if I clearly and 
distinctly understand X apart from Y (and vice versa) then X and Y are metaphysically 
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distinct and could exist apart’. I reach the judgement that Descartes’ conceivability 
argument is ‘an argument in the philosophy of mind’ rather than ‘a fiction’. At best Stock 
supplies a necessary but not a sufficient condition on fiction but her account does not 
include enough detail on what fictions have in common so does not count as a satisfactory 
way of determining what counts as fiction. An essentialist account of fiction may be 
retrieved with a better account of the imagination but at present imagining is ‘… a notion 
yet to be fully clarified’ (Walton 1990: 21) and the trail goes cold. 
 
Condition (b) above specifies that fiction is at most accidentally true and is simply a 
modifier of (a). Without (a) this modifier does not contribute anything relevant to genre 
fiction. Even if (a) were retrieved and the essentialist could point to a form of imagination 
exclusive to genre fiction, then it would still be unclear how (b) helps. Such a modifier 
would exclude works like Capote’s In Cold Blood, Defoe’s The Plague Years, Holocaust 
literature such as Elie Wiesel’s Night or autobiographical fiction such as Joyce’s Portrait 
of the Artist as a Young Man as these works conform to a stronger truth condition than 
being no more than accidentally true. Further, condition (b) allows too many marginal 
cases such as a scurrilous rumour that is invented, carries a mandate that it be imagined 
and which accidentally turns out to be true.   
 
The kind of marginal cases identified above might be dismissed as ‘fiction with non-
fictional elements’ or ‘non-fiction with fictional elements’, but to do so would be to miss 
an important point. At least two different kinds of judgements are made in the 
classification of fiction and non-fiction. The first concerns which passages in the text 
include made up narratives and which are factual. The second concerns whether the work 
as a whole is to be classified as fiction or non-fiction. Many marginal cases demonstrate 
that one cannot move smoothly from a first order judgement about individual passages to a 
second order judgement about fictionality (Friend 2012: 186). For instance, there are cases 
where most of the text is non-fiction, for example Truman Capote’s In Cold Blood and 
Seamus Deane’s Reading in the Dark, yet the works are classified as fiction. There are 
further instances where texts contain long passages of fiction but are categorised as non-
fiction: such as the kind of history described by Thucydides in the passage quoted earlier 
or The Song of Solomon. The upshot is that we need a procedure to judge whether the work 
as a whole is either a work of fiction or a work of non-fiction. This is not provided by a 
passage by passage analysis alone. Let us move on to Friend’s positive proposal as to the 
nature of fiction.  
[18] 
 
 
Underpinning Friend’s account is Walton’s distinction between standard, variable and 
contra-standard properties in his ‘Categories of Art’ (1970). I shall take a little time to 
elaborate this in order to make better sense of Friend’s account and to lay the foundations 
for my adopting an analogous strategy for literature in what follows. Walton argues that we 
perceive works of art within certain categories: that is we perceive them under a Gestalt; 
thus I view one object as an impressionist painting or hear sound as a sonata (Walton 1970: 
338-342). These categories of ‘impressionist painting’ or ‘sonata’ are characterised in 
terms of the properties of a work. Walton fluctuates between the terms ‘property’, 
‘characteristic’ and ‘feature’ in his paper. I shall keep the terms stable and opt for ‘feature’ 
as the most neutral term
6
. The features of a work are divided into three sorts: standard, 
variable and contra-standard with each playing a different role in our experience.  
 
A standard feature is a feature, the possession of which tends to place a work in a given 
category. For example, one voice imitating another tends to be a feature which places a 
piece of music in the category of fugue. A variable feature is a feature, the possession of 
which is irrelevant to the placing of a work in a given category. A fugue can be in two or 
three parts but this has no bearing on the piece’s standing as a fugue. A contra-standard 
feature is a feature, the possession of which tends to disqualify a work from a given 
category. Walton says such a feature may shock, disconcert or upset. The tone and mood of 
Mozart’s string quartet in G major are contra standard for a fugue, though the presence of 
standard fugal features leads to a final judgement that the piece is a fugue. It is important to 
note that the standard features of X are not the same as necessary conditions on X. The 
relevance of Walton’s distinction is that we can recognise a genre according to the 
presence of certain standard features and the absence of contra-standard features; some 
examples are cited in the next paragraph. Friend’s claim is that Walton’s account can be 
extended to cover fiction and non-fiction. According to the anti-essentialist account, we 
recognise a text as fiction according to the presence of a cluster of non-essential standard 
features and by the absence of contra-standard features of a genre. The variable features, 
such as the length of the text or the language that it is written in, have no bearing on the 
piece’s classification as fiction. 
 
Let us give some thought as to what these standard and contra-standard features of fiction 
might be. According to Friend, we recognise a work as fiction according to the standard 
                                                          
6  See (Scruton 1974: 29-30). 
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features where such standard features may be further categorised as internal to the text or 
external to the text. Examples of standard features that are internal to the text include 
‘…the use of linguistic or formal devices, stylistic choices, and structural properties (e.g. 
the inclusion of ‘once upon a time’, footnotes, first - or third - person narration, etc.)’ 
(Friend 2012: 189). First person narration is a standard feature of fiction but not science 
whereas a footnote is a contra standard feature of fiction but a standard feature in a 
scientific paper. This is not to say that fictional novels never contain footnotes or endnotes; 
David Foster Wallace’s novel Infinite Jest has ninety six pages of endnotes but is classified 
as fiction. One external standard feature of fiction is that substantial tracts in the work are 
made up and allow for poetic license. There are, in addition, contextual standard features 
which are derived from the circumstances surrounding a text. For instance, fiction tends to 
be written by an author who intended the work to be read as fiction. Authorial intention 
may be established through testimony if need be, such as an interview. Another external 
standard feature of fiction is that readers of fiction tend not to expect that the narrative in 
front of them describes anything in the world, though there may be detours into fact.
7
 
Features that run contra-standard to fiction include the persistent reporting of facts or 
writing created with the intention to be read as fact. 
 
Our seeing certain standard features indicates a work is in a given genre. The notion of 
genre plays an analogous role to Walton’s perceptual categories, giving Friend her 
conclusion that fiction is correctly classed as a genre.  An obvious worry with Friend’s 
view is that Walton puts his argument in terms of perceptual Gestalts and we do not 
perceive written works under perceptual Gestalts as we do a fresco or a fugue. Walton 
admits this in a footnote and advises some modifications: 
 
The aesthetic properties of works of literature are not happily called “perceptual”.  
For reasons connected with this it is sometimes awkward to treat literature together 
with the visual arts and music.  (The notion of perceiving a work in a category, to 
be introduced shortly, is not straightforwardly applicable to literary 
works.)…though I believe that the central points I make concerning them hold, 
with suitable modifications, for novels, plays, and poems as well.    
                                                                                 (Walton 1970: footnote to p.335) 
 
                                                          
7 Lamarque and Olsen discuss the case of proper names in fiction (1994: 79-82) and Stacie Friend has a 
forthcoming monograph on fact in fiction. 
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When I read Conan Doyle’s The Hound of the Baskervilles (1986) accompanied by 
Michael Kenna’s photographs of Dartmoor I understand the work to be one of ‘mystery 
and tension’ from registering details in the text as much as from looking at the eerie 
photographs.
8
 The textual details include: that the disappearance and death of Sir Charles 
Baskerville was surrounded by local rumour, his disappearance occurred after a nocturnal 
stroll down a yew-lined avenue and that cries were heard by one witness. In this example 
the reader’s sense of mystery and tension would be stimulated by symbolism and allusion 
in the absence of the photographs. Textual stimuli fit Walton’s four conditions on 
recognising a category as much as perceptual stimuli in that a text contains: i) the presence 
of a relatively large number of standard features and a minimum number of contra-
standard features of a given genre; ii) ‘comes off best’ when read as belonging to a certain 
category; iii) is written with the intention that it is thought of in a given way and iv) is 
produced in a society in which the category or genre convention is well established 
(Walton 1970: 357).    
 
In order for Friend to draw an analogy between viewing something under a perceptual 
Gestalt and reading a text as fiction, she needs to show that reading a text as fiction makes 
a difference to our understanding and evaluation.
 9
 This is discussed by Friend towards the 
end of her paper ‘Fiction as a Genre’ (2012: 198) when she asks us to read a passage from 
The Surgeon of Crowthorne first as a work of fiction and secondly as a work of non-
fiction. Friend argues that on the first reading the use of free indirect discourse seems 
natural, while on the second reading we may wonder how the author gained access to such 
privileged information (Friend 2012: 197-201). She concludes that engaging with a 
narrative as fiction is a different experience to engaging with a narrative as non-fiction.  
 
One accusation that may be levelled against this account of fiction is that it is circular: a 
text is fiction if it exhibits all of the features fictional texts possess. Yet in specifying what 
such features are and sorting them into those which are standard, contra-standard and 
variable, one points to phenomena outside the circle. Prototype theory works in much the 
same way in biology where we are happy that a description of bees in terms of the features 
most bees possess is not viciously circular. A second criticism is that the presence of 
standard features and the absence of contra-standard features together constitute a 
                                                          
8 I choose ‘mystery and tension’ here as it is Walton’s own example in his paper (1970: 335). 
9
 I won’t comment on the connection made between the classification of fiction and the appreciation and 
evaluation of fiction as it has no direct bearing on what is at stake here and is amply dealt with in (Friend 
2012:195-203). 
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necessary condition on fiction. Yet this is to change the meaning of necessary condition 
from a prerequisite without exception to a likely preponderance with exception. The likely 
preponderance of X in Y is not a necessary condition on Y.  
 
To sum up, Friend’s account of fiction enjoys twin benefits over mainstream essentialist 
accounts. First, it does not have the problems attendant on reducing fiction to a particular 
use of the imagination. Secondly, Friend pays attention to the wider culture of reading 
fiction. The ultimate success of the anti-essentialist account of fiction should be judged on 
whether this account tells us whether a text is a work of fiction or not. The anti-essentialist 
account does possess the resources to recognise correctly a work as a work of fiction. Pride 
and Prejudice is classed as fiction as the work exhibits some standard textual features of 
fiction: dialogue between made up characters, authorial intention to write fiction and the 
consistent categorisation of the work as fiction by Austen’s audience. There may be duck-
rabbit cases where texts can be read as fiction or non-fiction but these are generally sorted 
out in terms of which standard and contra-standard features predominate. In the next 
section, I shall adopt the same anti-essentialist strategy for literature.    
 
 
1.2 Literature 
 
 
A definition of ‘literature’ seems as fraught with imprecision as ‘fiction’. Both terms are as 
loose as they come yet we use both terms regularly without bafflement. The identification 
of what we take as particularly well written passages does not, on its own, tell us whether 
the text as a whole is a work of literature. Some authors, I have Wordsworth in mind, 
deliberately intersperse flat or neutral passages to act as a contrast to passages with greater 
aesthetic appeal. Further, it is not clear whether aesthetic appeal, whatever we take this to 
mean, is the only relevant criterion on our judgment of a work as ‘literature’. This section 
advances an anti-essentialist account of literature along the same lines as Friend’s anti-
essentialist account of fiction.       
 
In the preceding section on fiction, I argued (along with Friend) that reading a text is 
analogous to perceiving under a Gestalt in important respects. According to the Waltonian 
schema, outlined above, there is no worry about perceiving a single work of art under more 
than one Gestalt: ‘A Brahms sonata might be heard simultaneously as a piece of music, a 
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sonata, a romantic work, and a Brahmsian work’ (Walton 1970: 341). Along similar lines, 
there seems no reason why a text belonging to the category ‘fiction’ cannot be read at the 
same time as a text belonging to the category ‘literature’.  Joyce’s Portrait of the Artist as 
a Young Man may be read simultaneously as a work of literature, as a fiction, as 
autobiographical and as a Joycean work. 
 
An initial concern is that while the Waltonian standard and contra-standard features used in 
Friend’s account of fiction are descriptive rather than evaluative, ‘literature’ is often used 
as an evaluative term: 
 
Fiction is a species of language use (applied to names, sentences and discourses) 
and is neutral as to value. Literature, even in the narrowest sense applied to 
imaginative and creative writing, is a kind of discourse, essentially valued, which 
affords and invites a distinctive kind of appreciation.                                                       
                                                                                                   (Lamarque 2014: 69) 
 
‘Fiction’ is subject to some evaluation on some occasions. Karl May was condemned when 
his novels set in the Wild West, and reputedly based on fact, were revealed as fiction. In 
this instance, the disappointment of many readers extended beyond disappointment at 
being hoodwinked to dissatisfaction at being left with ‘mere fiction’. In another type of 
case, fiction may be criticised for containing factual inaccuracy. A novel set in Cambridge 
which contains the line ‘I left Magdalene College and walked across the road to the 
Fitzwilliam Museum’ contains a factual accuracy and one that would disturb a reader 
familiar with Cambridge’s geography. Let us also imagine that this detail served no 
purpose in the novel so could not be excused as ‘poetic license’. This type of case results in 
a kind of imaginative resistance, of a non-moral kind, which leads to a negative evaluation 
of the work. Genre convention plays a role in evaluation, which holds that if the novel is 
realist fiction and if a particular detail is wrong about the subject depicted then the novel 
may be criticised for containing an error. In this second example, the work is criticised for 
being ‘too fictional’ given the genre conventions of realist fiction.  
 
Nevertheless, it is true that describing a work as a work of ‘fiction’ is not usually 
evaluative but the kind of categorisation publishers use to help readers distinguish what is 
invented from what is fact; for instance, to differentiate ‘true crime’ from ‘detective 
fiction’.  In contrast, calling a work ‘literature’ is predominantly evaluative and involves 
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some form of aesthetic appreciation. This kind of literary appreciation seems distinct from 
personal preference; I may recognise a Henry James novel as literature without the work 
being to my taste. The upshot of this brief discussion is that I am loath to dismiss the 
evaluative aspect of literature as it captures something of the Gestalt of reading a text as a 
work of literature. 
 
The Waltonian schema captures the evaluative nature of literature in a way that avoids the 
pitfalls of any essentialist account. My argument is not that ‘widespread positive critical 
acclaim’ is a necessary condition on literature. For one thing a given work may be met 
initially with a frosty critical reception as was the case with F. Scott Fitzgerald’s The Great 
Gatsby. For another thing, works like Joyce’s Finnegans Wake may be subject to only 
select positive critical acclaim. A standard feature of a literary work is not a necessary 
condition on literature. Standard and contra-standard features affect the experience of 
perceiving a work of art, in this case reading a text as literature. The kind of standard 
features characteristic of the category ‘literature’ include: technical skill exhibited by the 
author, consistent positive critical appraisal, an expectation on the reader’s behalf that a 
greater degree of work is required than when reading genre fiction and that the text will 
explore some serious issues. Contra-standard features of literature include: clunking 
imagery and cliché as well as substantial tracts containing factual data. Variable features of 
literature, as with fiction, include the length or language of the script. Writing that is 
classed as ‘literature’ may be either fiction or non-fiction; the political speeches of Cicero 
or Burke are examples of literary non-fiction.  
 
An anti-essentialist account of literature sketches vague boundaries which allow for 
peripheral cases to move between the categories of ‘literature’ and ‘non-literature’. Two 
examples of such movement are ‘ex-literature’ and ‘literature in the making’. Two cases of 
ex-literature, where a work once classed as ‘literature’ no longer enjoys this status, may be 
some plays by George Bernard Shaw and some poetry by Elizabeth Barrett Browning. 
These cases admit that readers might initially misjudge a work; all that initially glitters is 
not of a gold standard. There are also strong sociological and contextual elements in the 
categorisation of a work as ‘literature’. Features that were deemed to be standard may, over 
time, turn into variable features. Romanticism may have once been taken as standard for 
literature, but dropped with the advent of modernism, thus romanticism now counts as a 
variable feature of literature. Further, the categorisation of a work as ‘literature’ may take 
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time to establish. Positive critical acclaim is a standard feature, though not a necessary 
condition, on a work being classed as ‘literature’. 
 
So far I have focussed on consistent positive critical appraisal as a standard feature of 
literature. Let us examine two more candidates. One way to progress is to ask what readers 
expect to find in a work of literature. Peter Lamarque, in a survey article on literature, says 
the following:   
 
First, as with all art, a fundamental expectation regarding a literary work (treated as 
such) is that the parts cohere, more or less, into a unifying whole, that there is a 
design or purposiveness in the elements. Note that this does not rule out the avant-
garde or ‘nouveau roman’, which rejects ‘closure’, and plays with disjointedness, 
for design can reside in apparent randomness. Second, it is expected, in line with 
the ‘moral seriousness’ requirement, that whatever the surface subject matter 
(narrative event or poetic metaphor) there will be underlying themes of a broadly 
human interest, indeed that reflection on the subject matter will elicit reflection, of 
an imaginative kind, on these broader themes. Third, there is an expectation that the 
work will reward a process of interpretation which reveals the literary interest in 
the work, notably by showing in detail how the themes are sustained or developed 
by the work’s elements and design. Finally, the value of the work, as a literary 
work, will emerge as a function of the three other features, that is, in relation to the 
rewards delivered by the works in these respects.                     
                                                                                                  (Lamarque 2013: 524)  
 
Lamarque identifies: coherence, design, morally serious subject matter, being the subject 
of interest, reflection, interpretation and value as candidate features of literature. There 
may be other candidates for standard features of literature, innovation is one, but we shall 
spend the rest of this section making clear what is meant by a ‘well written’ and ‘morally 
serious’ text. 
 
There are at least two important aspects to the judgement that ‘literature is well written’. 
The first concerns what is typical of the kind of writing and the second, related claim, 
concerns a positive judgement on how the writing is executed. Unlike a shopping list, 
casual diary entry or betting slip a ‘literary’ text tends to be complex. One term that has 
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gained currency in the philosophy of literature is ‘thick narrative’.10 I shall adopt John 
Gibson’s use of ‘thick description’ to mean ‘possessing an especially rich kind of 
descriptive content’ (Gibson 2011: 75). A text is made thicker by the prevalence of literary 
and narrative devices which may include: symbolism, irony, metaphor and allusion. One 
might think of thick description in terms of a marginalia test: consider two descriptions ‘A’ 
and ‘B’. Description ‘A’ is thicker than description ‘B’ if a reader can spot more literary 
devices and annotate the margins of text ‘A’ with more comments. Literary and narrative 
devices in sufficient proliferation turn the text into what has been termed a ‘thick 
description’ or ‘thick narrative’. 
 
There are no precise boundaries for literary or narrative devices (see the introduction to 
Chapter Four) and I should refer to specific texts in order to identify which devices have 
been used. Some thicker narratives will be richer in metaphors while others will not, hence 
‘the presence of rich metaphor’ is a standard feature of a literary work but not a necessary 
condition. The exact number of such devices counts as a variable feature of literature as 
would word count. A predominance of such devices, however, enables us to recognise a 
narrative as thicker or richer and this feature of ‘thick description’ tends to be standard in 
literary works. A thin, less demanding narrative counts as contra-standard to literature. 
When I say that a thick narrative is ‘well written’ I praise the artistry of the author in his or 
her choosing the right turn of phrase, an apt image or metaphor. 
 
Of course, some works of literature may consciously adopt a pared down counter-style 
with minimal literary and narrative devices. Raymond Carver, inspired by Hemingway, 
adopts such a style in his What Do We Talk About When we Talk About Love?
11
 On the 
other side of the coin is Hugh Walpole whose works are full of literary devices but are, 
arguably, not literature. Both cases suggest that the judgement over whether a work is 
literature or not is not solely judged on the presence of literary devices. In the case of 
Carver, this something more seems to be a creative and effective artistry on the author’s 
behalf; so creative artistry may be added to our list of standard features of literature. The 
fact that there is more than one standard feature of literature does not weaken the anti-
                                                          
10 Gilbert Ryle (1968, 2009) uses this term to describe action that involves more than bodily movement e.g. 
a wink to attract someone’s attention rather than because something has flown into your eye. Bernard 
Williams (2010) applies the term to concepts in ethics that carry both descriptive and evaluative meaning 
such as loyalty and gratitude. I use the term here in a different sense to describe a style of writing.  
11 For a discussion of Hemingway’s deliberate rejection of literary devices such as metaphor see (Lodge 
1977:155-159). 
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essentialist case. It is still fair to say that greater complexity and the presence of literary 
devices is a standard but non-essential feature of literature.   
 
Next, let us turn to what Lamarque terms ‘moral seriousness’. This candidate is a feature of 
the content of a literary work rather than a standard feature of literary style (such as the 
prevalence of figurative language). ‘Moral seriousness’ fits overtly moral themes such as 
remorse, revenge or retribution but the term ‘ethical seriousness’ is broader and covers all 
human thought and action.
12
 The term ‘thematic seriousness’ widens the scope further and 
is in keeping with what Lamarque argues elsewhere.
13
 Thematic seriousness is still not a 
necessary condition on literature, but a standard feature, as there may be a literary text that 
is not thematically serious such as closely-observed nature poetry. Robert Stecker gives us 
an idea of the kind of perennially important issues discussed in literature: ‘Conceptions 
concerning self-knowledge and our knowledge of others, the emotions, the springs of 
action, the nature of perception, of personal identity, of free will or determinism, of 
society, of time to mention just a few…’ (Stecker 1997: 285).14 Thematic seriousness 
works alongside the thickness of description to help distinguish the literary case from the 
non-literary case, which in turn may be fictional or non-fictional. One would expect a work 
of literature to have both a rich, descriptive quality and be about a perennially serious 
theme, whereas one would expect a work of philosophy to have the latter but not the 
former. In contrast, we would expect neither an especially rich descriptive quality nor any 
serious comment from a work of genre fiction. A Mills and Boon romance tends not to 
explore the nature of love, and an Agatha Christie novel tends not to explore the nature of 
death, in any serious way. These kinds of read are primarily concerned with telling a story. 
 
 As a result, one can say that a trivial subject matter or mere story telling tends to be a 
contra-standard feature of a work of literature. Some works of literature, like A Midsummer 
Night’s Dream or Tristram Shandy might appear to be thematically trivial but reveal 
greater depth on closer analysis. On one level, the former text can stimulate reflection on 
the theme that biology is stronger than reason. There is a further category of works that are 
sometimes included in literary canons, owing to their being particularly well written 
though not about a serious theme; the gentle irony of P. G. Wodehouse’s The Golf 
                                                          
12 See the discussion below in section (2.1) on ethical literary cognitivism, particularly the quotation from 
Iris Murdoch (1956: 39). 
13
 (Lamarque & Olsen 1994: 405). 
14
 Stecker advances a disjunctive account of literature (1996: 681-694) but is overly permissive in including 
the category of literature by association and his account leaves us wondering how we would recognise a work 
of literature as defined by his disjunction. One advantage of the Waltonian schema is being able to specify 
the standard features by which we can recognise a work as a work of literature. 
[27] 
 
Omnibus is an example. In the same way that one judges Mozart’s string quartet in G 
major as fugal because there is a preponderance of standard features of a fugue present, so 
Wodehouse’s use of language, that is, his turn of phrase in places, may justify a work 
being classed as ‘literature’ despite the general absence of serious themes.  In order to 
counter the thesis about literature advanced so far, one would need to point to an example 
of a text which is not subject to positive critical appraisal, was not intended to be read as 
literature, is not well written or about a serious theme, but is nevertheless classed as 
literature. Here are two such potential cases which I shall, nevertheless, resist.  
 
One example noted by Robert Stecker is ‘literature by association’, that is any writing by 
an especially talented author which lacks literary merit but may be of interest, for instance, 
in tracing the development of the author’s thought.15 The classification ‘literature by 
association’ seems to use the term ‘literature’ in an honorific sense in the absence of 
standard features and in the presence of contra-standard features of literature. For these 
reasons ‘literature by association’ is incompatible with the account of literature advanced 
here; although I understand why these kinds of document may be of interest.  A second 
example of a text that may exhibit some contra standard features of literature which are 
nevertheless classed as literature, are texts of cultural importance. One could imagine a 
work that is devoid of especially impressive narrative or literary techniques that is classed 
as literature because it is deemed of cultural importance; for example fragments of a play 
written in Cornish. Given that we do not have many plays written in Cornish, this is 
‘literary’ in the sense of being a rich and interesting example within this genre. In this case 
the use of ‘literature’, like the category of ‘literature by association’, is too far removed 
from the sense of literary we seek to give an account of here. ‘Literature’ in these cases is 
equivalent to saying ‘body of work’.16 
 
The standard and contra-standard features distinguished above give us a sense of the 
common ground between works of literature. In the same way that the anti-essentialist 
account of fiction provides a means of recognising fiction, so an anti-essentialist account of 
literature provides a means of recognising literature. As a consequence, we are in a 
position to offer a Friend-type summary of literature:   
 
                                                          
15 The term ‘literature by association’ first appears in Hirsch, E. D. ‘What isn’t Literature?’ in Hernandi, P. 
(ed.) 1978: What is Literature? Bloomington: Indiana University Press.        
16
 ‘Children’s literature’ is a further example though is complicated by the fact that such a phrase may refer 
to fiction written for children that is deemed particularly good. Indeed there may be some standard features of 
good children’s literature that are shared with literature intended for an older readership. 
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If we take a text to be literary, we shall expect it to have a careful arrangement of 
narrative and literary devices that contribute to greater complexity and coherence 
than in genre fiction, to engage the reader in a level of thoughtfulness about a 
perennially serious theme, to be the product of an author intending to write 
literature and to be read by those expecting to read literature. Such a work may be 
either fiction or non-fiction.     
  
Before we leave the subject of literature, I should mention a disparaging sense of ‘literary’ 
which equates with ‘excessively elaborate’ or even ‘pretentious’.  Literary devices are, 
according to this view, mere bells and whistles used to adorn a text. One version of this 
view is that such elaboration may be admired aesthetically while a less charitable version is 
that literary adornments act as a distraction to the substantive content of a text. The latter 
version is prominent in much analytic philosophy and sometimes comes under the name of 
‘the fallacy of rhetoric’. The fallacy of rhetoric maintains that the use of literary devices 
has no bearing on either the truth or the validity of an argument. This fallacy may prove 
useful to those who are easily persuaded by the power of words but there are two potential 
pitfalls. The first is to assume that ‘the truth and validity of an argument’ is the only 
cognitive potential available. Secondly, it is a bad inference to say that ‘there are some 
distracting literary devices so the use of all literary devices is distracting in communicating 
cognitive gain’. Literary devices may be illuminating rather than distracting and can form 
an integral part of a text rather than a mere adornment. The portrayal of Cordelia as a 
Christ figure in King Lear isn’t a pretention on the part of the playwright but rather a 
sophisticated characterisation of a key figure in this work. In this case the use of a literary 
device acts as a bell and whistle only in alerting the reader to issues of significant textual 
analysis. I do not find any disparaging account of the literary useful in determining what 
we mean by calling a text ‘literary’.  Let us move on to examine the relation between 
fiction and literature in the category ‘literary fiction’. 
 
 
1.3 Literary Fiction 
 
 
This chapter began by drawing attention to the widespread slippage between the categories 
of literature and fiction. So far, we have attempted to get a conceptual grip on these 
concepts by using Walton’s account of genre, as suggested by Friend. Walton’s model of 
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classification allows for a work to be seen in more than one category. This is the case with 
works of literary fiction which can be read in more than one category: as literature and as 
fiction. Literary fiction includes the set of works that exhibit the standard features of both 
literature and fiction and lack the contra-standard features of literature and fiction. For 
instance, Anna Karenina is an artfully constructed narrative, is thematically serious, 
subject to widespread positive critical acclaim, features made up characters and does not 
persistently communicate facts about the world and as such may be judged as a work of 
literary fiction. The category of literary fiction occupies the intersection between the set of 
works that are fiction and the set of works that are literature, and as such is a subgenre of 
both fiction and literature. I want to finish this chapter with two suggestions as to the 
implications of what has been argued. The first implication is a rejection of the view that 
literary fiction is a sub-genre of fiction in an equivalent way as erotica or sci-fi. The second 
implication is a re-organisation of arguments in the literary cognitivism, anti-cognitivism 
and non-cognitivism debate according to whether each argument concerns literary fiction 
qua literature or literary fiction qua fiction. 
 
First, a note on the terminology: ‘genre’, ‘super-genre’ and ‘sub-genre’. The term ‘genre’ 
is used in various senses: we may speak of fiction as one artistic genre among many, 
‘crime’, or ‘sci-fi’ as distinct genres of fiction, and ‘literary fiction’ as a further genre. On 
every account (Walton’s, Friend’s, and the above), there is a hierarchy of genres. To clarify 
the nature of this hierarchy, my proposal is that there are four ‘super-genres’: fiction, non-
fiction, literature and non-literature where the first and third category overlap to form an 
intersection termed ‘literary fiction’. The super-genre of fiction may be further sub-divided 
into many kinds, commonly referred to as ‘genres’, such as: crime, sci-fi, romance. As 
these categories are sub-divisions of fiction, I shall refer to them as ‘sub-genres’. I shall, 
therefore, maintain a distinction between the super-genre of fiction and sub-genres such as 
crime or romance. The fact that in popular usage ‘genre’ is the term used to refer to all 
these categories only muddies the river.  
 
The label ‘literary fiction’ tends to be counted as a sub-genre alongside other sub-genres. 
For example, Lamarque says the following: 
 
Not all works of the imagination are deemed to be ‘literature’ … and much popular 
fiction or drama or light verse would not be so classified.  Publishers have even 
come to recognise a particular genre of fiction as ‘literary fiction’, in contrast to 
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other genres, crime, fantasy, horror, war, science fiction, which are rarely classed as 
‘literature’.  What these other genres are thought to lack, as well as ‘fine writing,’ is 
a kind of moral seriousness which is taken as a further essential mark of 
‘imaginative literature’. 
                                                                          (Lamarque 2013: 521) 
 
This categorisation requires refinement in light of what has been argued above. Literary 
fiction cannot be an equivalent sub-genre to crime fiction as the latter can be either of a 
literary or non-literary nature. So a distinction must be recognised between ‘literary crime 
fiction’ and ‘non-literary crime fiction’. The distinction between ‘literary’ and ‘non-
literary’ applies to all sub-genres of fiction such as: works of eighteenth century fiction, 
fictional works by A.S. Byatt, romantic or science fictions.  
 
Awarding the status of ‘literary’ to a fiction refines the categorisation of that fiction. In 
recent years, the works of Philip K. Dick, J.G. Ballard and Kurt Vonnegut have been re-
categorised as literary fiction from science fiction; these works are literary science fictions. 
It is worth noting in passing, however, that in practice ‘literary fiction’ may occupy a 
separate section in a library or bookshop, variously called: ‘literary fiction’, ‘literature’ or 
‘classics’, which makes the category appear an equivalent sub-division to ‘crime fiction’ 
and the like. Instead, the term ‘literary fiction’ refers to a set of texts taken from various 
sub-genres of fiction which exhibit the standard features of literature and lack the contra-
standard features of literature.  Our account of literariness in terms of standard features 
does not impose any a priori limitations on which sub-genres of fiction yield literary 
works. Admittedly, it may be more difficult to write a work of literary merit if one’s 
agenda is to write a thriller full of suspense or a titillating work of erotic fiction, yet there 
are examples; Umberto Eco set himself the task of writing a thriller of literary worth in The 
Name of the Rose and Foucault’s Pendulum, and Georges Bataille’s Story of the Eye 
counts as an example of literary erotic fiction. 
  
The second implication has direct bearing on this project but can only be sketched briefly 
here. There is disagreement over whether literary fiction has cognitive gain (this is still a 
placeholder term). Three positions are distinguishable in the debate: the view that literary 
fiction affords cognitive gain (literary cognitivism), the view that it does not (literary anti-
cognitivism) and the view that whether it does or does not is irrelevant to the status of 
literary fiction as literary fiction (literary non-cognitivism). Given what is argued above, it 
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is incumbent on anyone defending any position to specify whether an argument over 
literary fiction applies to literary fiction as literature, as fiction or both. For instance, some 
cognitivists may want to defend the cognitive value of literary fiction as fiction by drawing 
a parallel between what is learnt from reading some genre fiction and what is gained from 
entertaining a thought experiment in philosophy.
17
 Another cognitivist may want to defend 
the cognitive power of literary fiction as literature by focussing on literary language.
18
 
Discussion of the fictional status of literary fiction predominates in the literary cognitivist 
debate though, as we shall see in the next section, literariness is a constant but undeveloped 
theme. In upshot, further work needs to be carried out in order to re-organise arguments in 
the literary cognitivism, anti-cognitivism and non-cognitivism debate according to the 
conceptual delineation set out above.  
 
In sum, I have defended Friend’s claim that ‘fiction’ and ‘non-fiction’ are categories 
defined in terms of standard and contra-standard features. Fiction may be further divided 
into sub-genres such as crime fiction, science fiction or romantic fiction. I have made the 
case that ‘literature’ and ‘non-literature’ are super-genres which are also best accounted for 
in terms of standard and contra-standard features. Literature may be further divided into 
literary fiction and literary non-fiction. Hence there is an intersection between the 
categories of fiction and literature which is known as ‘literary fiction’. Works that are 
classed in any of the distinguishable genres of fiction, such as science fiction, can be 
categorised as literary fiction as long as the work exhibits some standard features and lack 
of contra-standard features of literature. Literary fiction as a sub-genre of literature and of 
fiction entails that literary fiction stands in a different relation to fiction than genres such as 
romance or crime. One further implication is that cognitivist, anti-cognitivist and non-
cognitivist arguments applied to literary fiction need to specify whether the argument 
applies to literary fiction as literature or as fiction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
17 A summary of this kind of argument may be found in (Davies 2007: 157-163). 
18 For instance (Nussbaum 1992: 154-157).  
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Chapter Two: Literary Cognitivism, Anti-
cognitivism and Non-cognitivism 
The aesthetician Peter Kivy once recalled an incident from his childhood when, ill in bed 
and listening to a soap opera on the radio, his mother entered the room and threw a copy of 
Les Miserables at him rebuking ‘For God’s sake improve your mind!’ This is a basic 
expression of literary cognitivism, which is the view that reading a work of literary fiction 
will help the reader develop cognitively. I shall call those who are sceptical of the claim 
that a work of literary fiction will improve the reader’s mind ‘literary anti-cognitivists’. 
Further, I shall term those who think that any cognitive improvement from literary fiction 
is irrelevant to the appreciation of literary fiction ‘literary non-cognitivists’. In the course 
of this chapter I want to explore how the distinction drawn in the first chapter between 
literary fiction as fiction and literary fiction as literature applies to the three positions in 
turn. This chapter starts by examining what is meant by literary cognitivism in more detail 
before drawing attention to the fact that all of the mainstream strands of literary 
cognitivism attribute some role to the reader engaging with literary devices yet do not 
account for such a role in any substantial way. Subsequent chapters attend to this omission. 
I also want to show that literary anti-cognitivism is fundamentally a sceptical position. 
Finally, I shall reject the literary non-cognitivist position and attempt to show that 
cognitive engagement can and does contribute to the aesthetic appreciation of a text.  
 
2.1 LITERARY COGNITIVISM 
 
The question ‘Can one gain cognitively from reading literary fiction?’ is an enduring 
question in aesthetics. This endurance is, in part, down to the imprecise way the question is 
formulated. What does it mean to say that literature ‘improves your mind’ or ‘gets you 
somewhere cognitively’? The question of cognitive gain from the literary arts demands 
answers to two important questions: 
(a) What exactly is the cognitive gain in question? 
(b) What aspects of literary fiction are we referring to when we claim that literary fiction 
is able or not able to provide cognitive gain? 
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To declare my convictions from the start, I believe ‘understanding’ is the most promising 
candidate that fits the cognitive gain on offer (I elaborate on exactly which senses of 
understanding are pertinent in Chapter Three). Like most cognitivists I make a hedged 
sufficiency claim that literary fiction may stimulate cognitive gain. This sufficiency claim 
need not lessen the significance of the cognitive boon which is often referred to as a 
significant, even life changing, reward. Unlike most literary cognitivists, I shall argue that 
the reader’s engagement with literary devices such as metaphor, symbolism and irony does 
important work in stimulating the reader’s understanding. Let us start with a brief, critical 
introduction to the cognitivist tradition in aesthetics before we examine the variety of 
literary cognitivist accounts on offer.    
 
What is literary cognitivism? 
 
Full dress definitions of aesthetic cognitivism are thin on the ground but Cynthia Freeland 
offers the criteria set out below. These criteria provide a useful starting point for a 
discussion of literary cognitivism. 
1) Artworks stimulate cognitive activity that may teach us about the world. Some say 
artworks do this because they have representational (including expressive) content; 
others, because they function as symbols within a diversely structured system. 
2) The cognitive activity they stimulate is part and parcel of their functioning as 
artworks. 
3) As a result of this stimulation, we learn from artworks: we acquire fresh 
knowledge, our beliefs are refined, and our understanding is deepened. 
4) What we learn in this manner constitutes one of the main reasons we enjoy and 
value artworks in the first place.                                                           
                                                                                                      (Freeland 1997: 19) 
 
Freeland says in statement (1) that ‘artworks stimulate cognitive activity’. One advantage 
of this formulation is that it allows the discussion surrounding the artwork to count as 
potentially part of the cognitive gain. In my experience this is a significant part of finding 
literary fiction of cognitive benefit. The exact nature of the ‘cognitive activity that may 
teach us about the world’ referred to in statement (1) requires clarification and some 
suggestions are made as to the cognitive activity in statement (3). Of course, ‘cognitive 
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activity that may teach us about the world’ applies to all sorts of things that do not count as 
art. So we need to add, as Freeland does in statements (1-2), that the gain is a gain from 
artworks functioning as artworks.  
Freeland has all art forms in mind and not just the literary (I suggested what one might 
mean by ‘literary’ in Chapter One). So how distinctive does the cognitive gain from 
literary fiction need to be? It is likely given certain similarities between artistic media, 
representation and symbolism (from statement 1) that there are points of contact between 
literary fiction and other art forms. As a result, I do not need to commit to an exclusivist 
view that reading literary fiction is the only way to achieve the relevant cognitive gain. 
However, I have no ambition to defend the cognitive value of painting, sculpture, music, 
architecture, film, dance and so forth and am only interested in the literary arts here: plays, 
poems and literary prose (novels and short stories).  The interesting contrast is not between 
literature and other art forms but between art that leads to cognitive gain and art that does 
not. In particular, I am interested in what common features of the literary arts generate 
cognitive gain.  
I may not be an exclusivist when it comes to cognitive activity stimulated from reading 
literary fiction but I should still like to champion the advantages of reading literary fiction 
over other art forms in the context of the particular form of cognitive development 
distinguished later on (section 3.3). My argument rests on the proliferation of devices such 
as metaphor, irony and symbolism in literary fictional texts but I need a great deal longer 
to make the case that literary devices stimulate cognitive activity.  For now, I shall draw 
the reader’s attention to some advantages of literary fiction based on the pragmatics of 
engagement with literary fiction over other art forms. While it is standard practice to watch 
a film all the way through, it is not standard practice to read a novel in one sitting. This 
allows the reader more thinking time while engaging with the relevant literary text. The 
fact that literature is communicated through the written word, and less often through the 
spoken word, must dictate some parameters. Freeland remains open to the idea that non-
linguistic art forms can share the same cognitive potential as the linguistic (1997: 31-32). I 
am not convinced that this is the case. I may, for instance, gain cognitively from a critical 
engagement with some of Bob Dylan’s lyrics but this seems to work, in many cases, 
independent of the accompanying music and delivery. In fact the music and delivery may 
distract and so impede my reflection on what is stated.
19
 Further, I am not clear how the 
                                                          
19 There is a separate critical literature on this issue, which is beyond the scope of this project in: Kivy, P. 
(1988) Osmin’s Rage London: Cornell University Press and Bicknell, J. 2009: Why Music Moves Us 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
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plastic arts could feature literary devices like alliteration or dance take on the form of a 
sonnet.  If, on occasion, a distinctive cognitive benefit is to be found through engaging 
with these literary devices, as I go on to argue in Chapter Four, and if other art forms do 
not possess such devices, then one must conclude that these other art forms cannot convey 
this specific cognitive gain in the same way as the literary arts. 
So while some cognitive benefits of literature may be shared between literature and other 
things (film, gossip or hip hop), literature is a particularly significant source of cognitive 
benefits. This gives me a way to reject the observation that popular culture is just as 
effective (or perhaps more effective) at encouraging the kind of thoughtfulness that I have 
in mind: that EastEnders makes me think about revenge in as illuminating a way as Titus 
Andronicus. I believe that popular culture can be cognitively rewarding but maintain that 
literature has an advantage which I shall explain in the course of the next three chapters. 
The third criterion in Freeland’s list above suggests three main candidates for the 
‘cognitive activity’ referred to in the opening statement: gaining fresh knowledge, refining 
one’s belief, and deepening one’s understanding. Earlier in the paper Freeland offers a 
further list of cognitive advancement, typical of literary cognitivists, to include 
‘…understanding, insight, empathy, imagination, the creation and discovery of new 
perceptual schemas, new worlds, or new relationships among things’ (Freeland 1997: 13). 
This leaves us with a plethora of candidate notions which work in different ways. For 
example, learning p need not entail knowing p. I can learn to love pastrami or learn the 
false belief that the ‘moon is the same size as the sun’ where my learning these things does 
not count as knowledge. Conversely, knowing p does not entail learning p. I know that 
eggs are eggs, how I feel and how to breathe without learning these things. It is not clear 
what the relations are between learning something, acquiring knowledge, refining beliefs 
and deepening understanding. So Freeland’s statement (3) is a wholesale invitation to do 
some epistemology; my focus is on what it is for a reader to develop and deepen 
understanding (section 3.2).   
Criterion (4) states an implication of cognitivism, namely that cognitive gain increases our 
appreciation of art. Nothing about the claim that we may learn from the arts hangs on the 
claim that we value the arts because of such a cognitive benefit but I shall address this 
issue in section (2.3) as the view has provoked significant attention, most notably in the 
work of Peter Lamarque. For now let us leave Freeland’s account which has provided a 
useful prompt for discussion and turn to the variety of literary cognitivist accounts on 
offer.  
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Cognitive gain from fiction 
We have filled out our initial definition of literary cognitivism as ‘improving one’s mind’ 
by examining how Freeland’s four statements above apply in the literary case. Next, I 
would like to look at whether the promised ‘cognitive activity’, which we shall take to be 
‘a better understanding’, is developed by reading literary fiction as fiction or as literature. 
Next, I argue that both thought experiments in philosophy or science and counterfactual 
histories share the standard features of fiction, and provide cognitive gain so there are 
some forms of fiction that stimulate cognitive gain. However, I go on to suggest that the 
cognitive gain from literary fiction as literature is a more compelling source of cognitive 
gain than the cognitive gain from fiction and one that is underrepresented so worth further 
discussion. 
To recapitulate, the opening chapter established that we recognise a work as fiction 
according to certain standard features including the use of ‘once upon a time’, first or third 
person narration, the absence of facts and footnotes, substantial tracts in the work that are 
made up and poetic licence. There are, in addition, contextual standard features which are 
derived from the circumstances surrounding a text. For instance, fiction tends to be written 
by an author who intended the work to be read as fiction. In contrast, we recognise a work 
as literature according to a different set of standard features: we expect a literary text to 
have a careful arrangement of narrative and literary devices that contribute to a greater 
complexity and coherence than in genre fiction. We also expect a literary text to engage the 
reader in a level of thoughtfulness about a perennially serious theme, to be the product of 
an author intending to write literature and to be read by those expecting to read literature. 
Literary works may be either fiction or non-fiction.  
A thought experiment in philosophy or science is defined by one epistemologist as ‘…a 
process of reasoning carried out within the context of a well-articulated imaginary scenario 
in order to answer a specific question about a non-imaginary scenario’ (Gendler 2010: 56). 
As such, thought experiments share many of the standard features of fiction: the reader is 
required to entertain an imaginary scenario where the author intends the scenario to be read 
as fiction and not to be read as fact. Likewise, fiction and counterfactual history share 
many standard features; most notably that both are the product of the author’s imagination, 
are intended to be read as such and are not to be taken as true though they may bear factual 
content. When I imagine what would have had to happen for the Allies to lose the Second 
World War then I use my imagination, do not take this counterfactual history as factually 
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true but consider some relevant facts. So thought experiments and counterfactual history 
share many of the same features as fiction, but what of the cognitive gain? 
 
There are many different types of ‘well-articulated imaginary scenarios’ that bear cognitive 
advantage. Thought experiments in science tend to take a deductive form, as in the case of 
Galileo’s famous paradox of the cannon ball and the musket ball (a clear account of this 
thought experiment is given in Gendler 1998: 402-403). There are thought experiments in 
philosophy that follow a deductive structure; Gettier-type counter examples invite the 
thought experimenter to think of a case of justified true belief that does not count as 
knowledge (e.g. Dancy 1985: 27). In these cases, the thought experiment presents a 
transparent exception to a previously held rule or definition. Other thought experiments 
tease out our intuitions and in so doing enable the thought experimenter to determine how 
such intuitions may run contrary to his or her normal behaviour or views (e.g. the 
experience machine thought experiment in Nozick 1974: 42-45). In a third case, the 
cognitive gain of conceivability thought experiments rests on whether the thought 
experimenter succeeds in entertaining a fiction. Conceivability is generally taken to mean 
the establishment of something that cannot be known to be false a priori, that is to say p is 
conceivable if and only if not-p cannot be ruled out a priori (e.g. the existence of zombies 
in Chalmers 1996: 94).  In each case, whether the cognitive gain from the thought 
experiment relies on deduction, intuition or conceivability, the philosophical imagination 
gets to work on conceiving a fictional scenario and as a result the thought experimenter 
sees something in clearer terms. The role of thought experiments in our gaining knowledge 
is a subject for further discussion but I shall buy into a general optimism along with others 
writing on this subject (Sorensen 1992:109, 135-141; Davies 2007: 157-163). 
As regarding counterfactual history, Niall Ferguson offers a ‘double rationale for 
counterfactual analysis’ in his Virtual History (Ferguson 2011: 87).  Firstly, one 
understands the significance of an event better by imagining what would have happened if 
the event had not taken place. Some seminal histories use counterfactual history to this 
cognitive end; for instance, Robert Fogel in his Railroads and American Economic Growth 
(1964) and his Time on the Cross (1974). Secondly, one gains by imagining oneself in the 
decision-making process, entertaining ‘all the possibilities which contemporaries 
contemplated before the fact…’ Both advantages rely on the historian’s prior knowledge 
which is fed into his or her contemplation of the counterfactual scenario but rely crucially 
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on the historian entertaining a fictional state of affairs so counterfactual histories count as a 
case of cognitive gain based on fiction.  
 
The opening chapter asked the literary cognitivist to specify whether a reader learns from a 
work of literary fiction as fiction, as literature, or both and if both how literary features 
stand in relation to fictional features. So far we have shown that some fictions, thought 
experiments and counterfactual histories, allow the reader to develop cognitively. There is 
no reason why reading literary fiction cannot convey the same cognitive benefits from 
those outlined above. For example, D. H. Lawrence’s short story, which describes a child 
successfully tipping horses while in a trance, may be used as a Gettier type counter 
example (this example is cited in Sorensen 1992: 222-223). I may use Kazuo Ishiguro’s 
novel Never Let Me Go as a prompt to tease out my intuitions on human organ donation. 
Thirdly, I may cite Rat in Kenneth Grahame’s The Wind in the Willows as inconceivable in 
so far as nothing can be both small enough to escape down a burrow and at the same time 
be large enough to picnic on a chicken, row a boat and fire a pistol. In these cases I use 
literary fiction qua fiction to accrue the same cognitive benefits as thought experiments in 
philosophy. When Gaut admits that ‘…literature can share these goals in prescribing 
imaginings, and it too can be subject to the norms of imagining comprehensively, vividly, 
unsentimentally, and with fidelity to how things might be’ he is considering literary fiction 
under the concept of fiction (Gaut 2007: 152-153). The relevant cognitive gain, shared by 
thought experiments and literary fiction as fiction, can be achieved without the reader 
engaging with features standard to literature. Martha Nussbaum draws our attention to the 
lack of literary features on the part of philosophical thought experiments in her Love’s 
Knowledge (for example Nussbaum 1990: 46). Plato sets up the contrast between the man 
who seems just but who is unjust and the man who seems unjust but who is just in only a 
few lines (Republic 360e-362c) and without any of the literary effects of Jane Austen’s 
description of Mr. Wickham and Mr. Darcy in Pride and Prejudice. I want to investigate 
what literariness adds to cognitive gain.   
One might object at this point that it is possible to gain cognitively from literary fiction in 
some other way than from reading literary fiction as fiction or as literature. Let us put to 
one side any facts about the work; for instance my knowing that Hamlet has five acts. This 
kind of cognitive gain, tested in rudimentary literature examinations, is irrelevant here. For 
the same reason we may legitimately overlook the reader’s accruing facts from fiction. I 
may learn certain aspects of medieval history from Umberto Eco’s The Name of the Rose 
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given that the author is accurate in his account of events such as the Inquisition in the 
Occitan. There may be some propositions in literary fiction that merit belief because we 
recognise that we are intended to believe them, seem plausible (as part of a well-researched 
historical novel) and may subsequently be validated. Learning facts from fiction is a 
cognitive gain but not the sort of gain that is subject to the controversy under discussion. 
A third option gaining favour is that the cognitive reward at stake is generated from the 
fact that the fiction is a good story. Think of how our ancestors communicated to each 
other through story telling around the clan fire in the Pleistocene; a residue of these kinds 
of stories may be found in Ted Hughes’s How the Whale Became and Other Stories. This 
third claim has recently been defended by Kivy (‘Knowledge and novel knowledge: quelle 
différence?’ forthcoming) but has a longer history (e.g. Bettelheim 1975). Three different 
claims about cognitive gain may be made in this context: that we learn a new story, that we 
learn a new story that is especially thought provoking, or that skilled story tellers provoke 
their audience to further reflection. The first claim is banal while the second and third 
claims point to features standard in literature; namely that it is a standard feature of 
literature to raise serious themes and that it is a standard feature of literature to be well 
written. Bettelheim says in his introduction to The Uses of Enchantment: ‘The fairy tale 
could not have its psychological impact on the child were it not first and foremost a work 
of art’ (1975: 12) and ‘only the story itself permits an appreciation of its poetic qualities, 
and with it an understanding of how it enriches a responsive mind’ (1975: 19). It is 
incumbent on the cognitivist defending the cognitive benefits of literary fiction qua story to 
make it explicit what it is about serious, well written stories that stimulates cognitive gain. 
Is it a matter of form or content or something else? I attempt to answer this question in my 
investigation into literary devices so there is no merit in following the story-telling aspects 
of literary fiction further. 
 
Versions of literary cognitivism 
 
 
So far I have referred to ‘literary cognitivists’ in general. It is time to get specific in order 
to give an accurate survey of the variety of positions on offer. One can outline the main 
positions diagrammatically: 
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No position is bold enough to say that a particular cognitive gain is the sole boon achieved 
from reading literary fiction. The nature of the cognitive reward depends on the particular 
work and there is a great deal of variety amongst literary fictional texts. So while one poem 
may explore a concrete scenario, another piece may invite more abstract reflection. Such 
variety runs contrary to essentialism and cognitivists make mention of multiple gains:  
 
What literary art presents is designed to elicit a full response, sensuous, intellectual, 
and emotional, not separated but interfused.                                      
                                                                                                       (Walsh 1969:138) 
 
Not only does fiction impart knowledge of the real world, we are told, but it helps 
us to understand and come to terms with what would otherwise be baffling. It 
imparts insights, skills, and values of one sort or another, and in so doing helps us 
to see the world differently.                                                                        
                                                                                                      (Novitz 1987: 118) 
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Nevertheless, five main tensions exist between the various cognitive theses identified in 
the diagram above: 
 
 Whether the cognitive gain is propositional or non-propositional 
 Whether the cognitive gain refers to the specifics of a situation or makes an abstract 
comment 
 Whether the cognitive gain is classed as knowledge or classed as a cognitive 
advantage other than knowledge 
 Whether the cognitive gain is theoretical or practical 
 Whether the cognitive gain is predominantly from literary fiction as fiction or from 
literary fiction as literature. 
 
A full discussion of each is beyond the scope of this project and I am interested in pursuing 
the road least travelled in taking the final tension, between fiction and literature, as the 
focus for what follows. 
 
Let us examine each position to determine whether the source of cognitive gain is fiction, 
literature or both.  
 
Hypothetical literary cognitivism 
 
Hypothetical literary cognitivism is the view that we gain hypothetical knowledge from 
reading literary fiction. Putnam’s cognitivist claim (1978) is that the gain from literary 
fiction is a theoretical knowledge of possibilities which is a kind of a priori knowledge:  
What I learn is to see the world as it looks to someone who is sure that hypothesis 
is correct.  I see what plausibility that hypothesis has; what it would be like if it 
were true; how someone could possibly think that it is true.  But all this is still not 
empirical knowledge.  Yet it is not correct to say that it is not knowledge at all; for 
being aware of a new interpretation of the facts, however repellent, of a 
construction that can – I now see – be put upon the facts, however perversely – is a 
kind of knowledge.  It is knowledge of a possibility.  It is conceptual knowledge. 
                                                                                                      (Putnam 1978:  90) 
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Putnam locates his discussion in the realm of moral value: Doris Lessing’s The Golden 
Notebook is cited as an example. This novel explores the moral complexities of being a 
woman with a social conscience in the twentieth century as ‘…might have been felt by one 
perfectly possible person in a perfectly definite period’ (Putnam 1978: 91). Knowledge of 
possibilities should not be dismissed as mere passive recognition of what could be the case.  
Putnam draws an analogy between a thoughtful reader of fiction and a mountain climber 
entertaining possible routes to a summit, in so far as both plan, re-enact and review in light 
of foreseen impediments (Putnam 1978: 85-86). Knowledge of possibilities extends to the 
reader’s thoughtful engagement with what motivates a particular view and what such a 
view is like for the person adopting it.  
There is a role for literary devices in Putnam’s cognitivism. For instance, Putnam attributes 
some role for vivid imagery, rich detail and play with perspective when he says: 
…literature often puts before us both extremely vividly and in extremely rich 
emotional detail why and how this seems to be so in different societies, in different 
times, and from different perspectives.                                            
                                                                                                        (Putnam 1978: 87) 
 
In a reply to an early draft of Nussbaum’s paper ‘Flawed Crystals’ Putnam argues that 
fiction and commentary on fiction should not be conflated. He maintains that it is the latter 
which shows some promise in being able to bridge the gap between the literary arts and 
moral philosophy as some commentaries on fiction require a further commentary from 
moral philosophy (1983: 199-200). So, in conclusion, hypothetical literary cognitivism is 
primarily based on a fiction that stimulates a reader to imagine what a world view might be 
but allows for a further role to be attributed to features standard in literature such as the 
presence of literary devices and critical commentary. 
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Conceptual literary cognitivism 
 
Conceptual literary cognitivism is the view that we can gain conceptual knowledge from 
reading literary fiction.  Eileen John seeks to explain how it is that: ‘Our response to a 
work of fiction can involve the pursuit of conceptual knowledge, where that pursuit is one 
form of philosophical activity’ (John 1998: 331).  A literary fictional work may encourage 
the reader to ask: what do we mean by this concept?  Imagine someone getting interested 
in philosophy through reading literary fiction that deals with issues such as respect for life, 
honesty, fairness, trustworthiness, suffering, freedom or dignity. The themes explored in 
literary fiction do not have to be overtly moral and may cover memories of a lost age or the 
exploration of a particular interest or passion. In the second half of John’s paper the 
following passage from Fiction, Truth and Literature is quoted directly and shows that 
there is agreement between Lamarque and Olsen (non-cognitivists) and John (cognitivist) 
that fiction can help think of previously unthought of scenarios and so help broaden the 
reader’s conceptual repertoire:  
…although we acknowledged in discussing the fictive stance that entertaining 
propositions in works of fiction and engaging imaginatively with them might help 
to extend conceptual resources – thinking of things previously unthought in ways 
previously untried – there is not much beyond this that the distinctively literary 
qualities of a work can add; in other words there is no specific aesthetic 
contribution to the idea of conceptual enrichment which is not already present in 
any activity where new situations are brought to mind. 
                                                         (Lamarque and Olsen 1994: 380-381 italics in original) 
What is at stake, and hence is one of John’s targets, is whether literary fiction as literature 
can add to conceptual engagement. In the passage quoted the co-authors take ‘literary’ as a 
synonym for ‘aesthetic’ and we should place this to one side until section (2.3) below. I am 
interested in how John defends the cognitive, not aesthetic, power of literature and its 
capacity to enhance the reader’s conceptual resources. 
John attributes a significant role to the literary features of literary fictional works when she 
says contra Lamarque and Olsen:  
On the one hand, it does not bother me to say that literature is in the same boat with 
anything that stimulates us cognitively in this way. But on the other hand, I take a 
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work’s ability to function in this way as contributing to its literary value, and I see 
the literary, aesthetic qualities of a work as contributing to its conceptually 
illuminating role.                                                                                                    
                                                                                                          (John 1998: 343)  
According to John, reading literary fiction demands an active engagement with the subject 
matter. At least four arguments are employed to this end towards the end of John’s paper 
(1998: 344-345): characterisation demands serious attention in literary fiction, full and 
compelling narrative context is helpful to cognitive ends, the reader of literary fiction is  
encouraged to look for evidence and justification and, lastly, tracing connections within the 
work works to cognitive advantage. 
In her treatment of Grace Paley’s short story ‘Wants’ John draws our attention to the 
writer’s use of ambiguity. The word ‘want’ appears repeatedly and ‘…can be read both in 
terms of wanting as desiring and wanting as lacking’  (John 1998: 337). Further the 
symbolism of the sycamore trees is identified by John as playing particular significance in 
our understanding the character’s state of mind, for instance ‘…by showing that she is 
open and responsive to signs of flourishing’ (1998: 344). For John, these cases of 
ambiguity and symbolism ‘…trigger thoughts that are relevant to conceptual questions’ 
(1998: 345). So John defends the role that interpretation of a literary source plays in the 
reader’s cognitive process: ‘the project of questioning, interpreting, and judging the nature 
of the characters or the events in a work of fiction is a central literary project…’ (1998: 
332). 
 
Humanistic literary cognitivism   
          
Humanistic literary cognitivism is the view that we gain knowledge of how people live and 
interact through reading literary fiction ‘…that literature presents the reader with an 
intimate and intellectually significant engagement with social and cultural reality’ (Gibson 
2007: 2).
20
 In contrast to the more theoretical approaches offered by Putnam and John, the 
literary humanist tradition within literary cognitivism acknowledges that literature grows 
out of a given culture and that reading that culture’s literature allows us to learn about 
                                                          
20 Gibson discusses the problem of how literary fiction qua literature and qua fiction can ever inform the 
reader about the actual world (2007: 37, 58) which is my theme for the final chapter. 
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actual human belief and action (Novitz 1987; Gibson 2007; Gaskin 2013; Harrison 2015). 
Travellers seeking to gain a better understanding of their host nation may choose to read 
that nation’s literature.  
Richard Gaskin makes the link between literary fiction and the world explicit in the 
following summary of literary humanism: 
(i) all works of literature constitutively bear on the world by virtue of employing 
terms that refer to real (principally universal, but also sometimes individual) 
entities; 
(ii) additionally, all works of literature constitutively bear on the world by virtue of 
making, or implying, true or false (principally general, but also sometimes 
particular) statements about the world; 
(iii) some works of literature have cognitive value in the sense that, of the true 
statements that these works make or imply, some can be known to be true, and 
of these knowable statements some are worth knowing; 
(iv) having cognitive value, in the sense of (i)-(iii), is essential to the aesthetic value 
of some works of literature.                                                               
                                                                                                 (Gaskin 2013: 63) 
 
For Gaskin, ‘literature’ provides ‘one mode of access to reality’ (2013: 284-285). The 
meaning of literature is fixed at the time of production and refers to the world in a way that 
may be judged as either true or false. The significant number of true statements in literature 
contributes to the reader’s cognitive gain and in so doing enhances the readers’ aesthetic 
experience.  
There is not a prominent role for literary fiction as fiction in Gaskin’s account. Fictions are 
fictionalised descriptions of reality, akin to our relaying of actual events but where the 
names and certain details are changed. These descriptions of fictionalised realities contrast 
with more imaginative fictions, perhaps one might refer to this category as ‘fantasy’, where 
every aspect of the story is invented. Post-colonial readings of The Tempest argue that the 
fictionalised dynamic between colonisers and colonised of the island inform us about the 
same dynamic outside the fiction; while the character of Ariel, ‘an airy spirit’, remains in 
the realm of fantasy. 
There is disagreement between Gibson and Gaskin over the role of literariness with the 
former attributing more of a role to the literariness of literary fiction than the latter (cf. 
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Gaskin 2013: 125). Gibson argues that literary language is important in generating 
cognitive effect in his example from Othello (2007: 73-80) where three metaphors 
prominent in the play help the reader towards a better understanding of racism: ‘an old 
Black ram is tupping your white ewe’ (I.1.87-90), ‘you’ll have your daughter covered with 
a Barbary horse’  (I.1.110-13), ‘your daughter, and the Moor, are now making the beast 
with two backs’ (I.1.115). For Gibson, literary fiction corresponds to the world beyond the 
fiction in an informative way and a contrived and carefully manipulated literary fiction is 
able to draw the reader’s attention to aspects of the world. However, there is only a thin 
account based on examples of how literary fiction as literature can help the reader gain a 
better understanding of the world. 
 
Practical literary cognitivism 
 
Practical literary cognitivism is the view that we can gain a skill or competence as a result 
of reading literary fiction. Candidate notions for this practical gain are legion, I shall focus 
on close reading later (section 3.3), but the ability to use our imagination is a favoured 
choice. Gregory Currie (1998) defended this line earlier in his career when he made the 
case that literary fiction provides a fitting, though not exclusive medium, to practise 
planning and reviewing our decision-making, mainly moral decision-making, through the 
entertaining of imaginary scenarios. The kind of planning involved in preparing for an 
interview or settling on the most effective strategy to ask someone out for a date are 
context dependent and suit a practical rather than theoretical model. Literary fiction as 
fiction plays a crucial role in exercising the imagination to enable the person imagining to 
practise skills that prove useful in non-imaginary scenarios. While it is possible that these 
practical responses may be rehearsed on scenarios that are actual but distant, the imaginary 
scenarios provided by fictional works are a convenient method to achieve the same reward.  
Currie does not make explicit reference to the role of literary devices in his 1998 paper but 
there is evidence that literary devices play some role in determining what counts as a ‘good 
fiction’ or competent story telling. For instance, in (1998: 170-171) there is mention of 
‘crucial junctures in narration’, ‘a well-made narrative, with illuminating commentary’ and 
the complexity of a given text. At the end of the paper Currie mentions the role of literary 
criticism when he says ‘the successful critic can help us rise to the imaginative occasion of 
the work, or else alert us to its spurious message’ (1998: 178). It is not made clear enough 
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how literary qualities of a ‘well-made narrative’ helps. I shall argue that it is the literariness 
of literary fiction that proves crucial in developing another set of skills associated with 
close reading. 
 
Emotional literary cognitivism 
 
Emotional literary cognitivism is the view that reading literary fiction can inform us about 
our own and other people’s emotional lives. This thesis runs contrary to the idea that 
genuine cognitive gain can only be: reasoned, explicit, clear, objective and unemotional. 
Emotional literary cognitivism takes the dichotomy between reason and emotion as false 
(Goodman 1976: 245-252; Damasio 1994: 139; Elgin 2008: 33-49) and in so doing allows 
the suggestive, opaque, open, personal style of writing prominent in literary fiction, to 
carry potential cognitive worth. To bring up the issue of emotion and cognitive gain from 
the arts is, of course, to catch a tiger by the tail and there is much to discuss. I shall limit 
my discussion to whether literary fiction as fiction or as literature has the more important 
role in emotional literary cognitivism and come down on the side of the latter. The reader 
may be informed about and by emotion in a number of different ways and I suggest the 
following three candidates. 
First, the reader is able to gain some knowledge of what it is like to experience an emotion, 
perhaps where a rare or complex emotion has not been experienced before. Damasio cites 
as an example ‘why Lady Macbeth should experience ecstasy as she leads her husband into 
a murderous rampage’ (Damasio 1994: 130). The claim here is not that the reader, having 
read about the emotion, knows exactly what experiencing the emotion is like, after all this 
may only be achievable through experience. The point is that the text allows the reader to 
gain a closer sense of what the emotion is like through eloquent description, perhaps in 
terms of drawing an illuminating comparison. I might describe the relief of finishing a 
gruelling day’s work as being like ‘taking off a heavy coat’. Even appropriate words such 
as ‘relief’ and ‘unburdened’ lack the power to communicate what it feels like enjoyed by 
the simile which compares one feeling with another.  
Secondly, a literary fictional text can stimulate the reader’s emotions in such a way as to 
direct cognitive reward. In her chapter ‘The Heart has its Reasons’ from Considered 
Judgment Catherine Elgin argues that the emotions: provide focus, lend a sense of salience, 
heighten awareness, redirect attention, sensitize readers to details that may have eluded 
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them, elicit sympathy, enable us to detect subtleties, nuances and intimations, move us to 
reclassify domains, provoke discovery, effect changes in emphasis and motivate us to 
adapt to context. This process of cognitive gain shows us what our emotions are capable of 
so fits the initial definition of ‘emotional literary cognitivism’ though any of the processes 
listed above works in a different way to the suggestions of Damasio and (as we shall see) 
Robinson.  
Thirdly, reading literary fiction can educate our emotions. The cognitive boon, identified 
by Jenefer Robinson, consists in the ability to feel appropriately and to develop a sensitive 
thoughtfulness in the reader. This may be achieved in at least two ways. The first way 
includes ‘careful description of the emotional states of characters and how these characters 
are educated by their emotions’. A novel does this by showing: the characters’ focus of 
attention, their thoughts about the situation on which they are focussed, how these thoughts 
reflect a character’s desires, interests and values, the affective appraisals they make, and 
how physiological states serve to maintain their focus of attention (2005: 158). Robinson 
gives some examples of how this occurs in Edith Wharton’s The Reef. For instance, that 
Darrow learns ‘- the peculiarities of shame and pride, love and fear’ which the reader 
learns concurrently as if led through the same emotional experiences as the character 
(2005: 166).
21
 The second way in which a work of literary fiction can educate the reader’s 
emotions is by encouraging the reader to focus and reflect on his or her emotions directly.  
A fiction could portray a scenario so powerfully so as to involve the reader in the narrative 
to such an extent that the reader is stimulated to think how he or she would react if faced 
with the same situation (2005: 177). 
Robinson cites the many advantages of gaining a sentimental education from literary 
fiction: ‘literature particularizes’ (2005: 166), the craft of the writer is central to the 
process of developing a sentimental education (2005: 178-179) for instance through his or 
her skilful use of free indirect discourse (2005: 180), subtle fine-grained description of 
‘hitherto unexplored blends of emotion, for which there are no handy folk-psychological 
descriptions’ (2005: 183) and formal and rhetorical strategies such as use of imagery and 
sentence structure (2005: 194). The following passage, illustrative of the advantages of 
learning about emotion from literary fiction, describes Darrow’s obsessive focus on 
Anna’s telegram received at the start of the novel when she asks him to postpone his visit: 
                                                          
21 The claim that the reader of literary fiction gains knowledge of other people’s experiences is discussed 
explicitly in the section immediately below. 
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All the way from Charing Cross to Dover the train had hammered the words of the 
telegram into George Darrow’s ears, ringing every change of irony on its 
commonplace syllables: rattling them out like a discharge of musketry, letting 
them, one by one, drip slowly and coldly into his brain, or shaking, tossing, 
transposing them like the dice in some game of the gods of malice; and now, as he 
emerged from his compartment at the pier, and stood facing the windswept 
platform and the angry sea beyond, they leapt out at him as if from the crest of the 
waves, stung and blinded him with a fresh fury of derision… 
                           (Quoted in Robinson 2005: 161) 
 
We learn what Darrow felt from this passage: a sense of feeling wounded, experiences of a 
slow percolation of suspicion, dejection and humiliation, unrest from churning thoughts, 
isolation and of not being in control. The reader gains knowledge of emotions experienced 
rather than beliefs held. Yet the status of the passage as fiction is not instrumental in the 
reader learning what the character feels: the same passage might appear in an 
autobiography to the same cognitive end. In contrast, the writing style is instrumental in 
conveying the cognitive gain. The use of onomatopoeia, simile, metaphor, pathetic fallacy 
and alliteration help convey the kind of intense emotion in question. It is the fact that 
Wharton likens the words of Anna’s telegram to: the hammered out rhythm of a train, a 
discharge of musketry, dripping liquid, a game of dice played by the gods of malice and 
stinging sea spray that conveys the relevant emotion. Yet it seems inadequate to merely 
cite that literary fiction plays a significant role in conveying emotional cognitive gain 
without some account of what is going on when this happens.  
 
Experiential literary cognitivism 
 
Experiential literary cognitivism is the view that we gain knowledge of other people’s 
experiences through reading literary fiction. The subject matter of this cognitive gain may 
share ground with emotional literary cognitivism though the scope of ‘experience’ is 
broader than that of ‘emotion’. One assumes that experiencing life as a woman in the army 
has more to it than emotion. David Lodge says in his Consciousness and the Novel (2002) 
that: ‘The novel is arguably man’s most successful effort to describe the experience of 
individual human beings moving through space and time’ (Lodge 2002:10). A lengthier 
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version of this form of literary cognitivism based on experiential knowledge may be found 
in Dorothy Walsh’s Literature and Knowledge (1969). Walsh argues that literary fictional 
descriptions of say: falling in love suddenly, falling out of love, being poor and lonely in a 
big city or experiencing the lure of danger (Walsh 1969: 100), convey something of what 
the actual experience is like to the reader. While the reader’s experience can never be the 
same as the actual experience, the virtual literary experience allows space for reflection:  
The virtual experience presented in literary art is far more available for realization 
than actual life experience.  It is not simply that it will “stand still to be examined” 
…[but is] elaborated and developed in point of subtlety and in point of complexity.     
                                                                                                          (Walsh 1969: 90) 
In this quotation Walsh identifies a positive role for fiction qua virtual experience in so far 
as the fiction allows the reader to reflect on what is going on without the pressures of 
reacting as we need to in a real life scenario. For instance, we can put a book down and go 
away and think about the significance of a certain event but we cannot put life on pause in 
the same way. Nevertheless, not all genre fiction is equally effective in communicating 
experiential knowledge. One of the most interesting arguments put forward by Walsh 
focuses on the authenticity of transferring actual human experience to a literary virtual 
experience. Walsh argues that it is the author’s perceptiveness and ‘skill of transference’ 
that assists the cognitive gain and helps avoid representations that do not ring true. In 
upshot, a representative form of literary cognitivism needs to include the authentic 
conveyance of human experience. 
I believe this allows for some role for features standard in literature. Lodge buys into the 
philosophical literature on qualia, the raw felt quality of subjective experience. What is 
striking is his citing of literary devices to communicate knowledge of experience: first 
person, present tense narration (Lodge 2002: 11, 35), the richness of language (2002: 12, 
18), metaphor and simile (2002: 13), ‘repetition, alliteration, antithesis, and chiasmus’ 
together with free indirect style (2002: 37). Some mention of literary devices occurs in 
Walsh’s Literature and Knowledge and an important role is attributed to literary language 
to present kinds of experiences in such a way as to ‘evoke the sensuous, the emotional and 
the intellectual, with equal facility’ (Walsh 1969: 36).  Walsh also admits that figures of 
speech and first and third person narratives perform a role in the reader gaining 
experiential knowledge (1969: 63). So while experiential literary cognitivism shows that it 
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is unwise to distance the cognitive gain from the fictional status of literary fiction 
altogether, there is a significant role for the literary. 
 
Ethical literary cognitivism 
 
Ethical literary cognitivism is the view that we gain knowledge of how we should act 
through reading literary fiction (Diamond 1991, 1996; Nussbaum 1992; Crary 2007; 
Hamalainen 2015). For example, many of Shakespeare’s ‘problem plays’ have overtly 
ethical themes; in the final act of The Tempest a chastened Prospero declares: ‘…the rarer 
action is in virtue than in vengeance’ (V. 1, 27-30) and Caliban’s parting lines include: ‘I’ll 
be wise hereafter, and seek for grace’ (V. 1. 294-295). I choose ‘ethical’ over ‘moral’ to 
signify the breadth of what might be covered; the distinction between ethical and moral is 
made elsewhere (Williams 2010: 7-8; Wollheim 1984: 198). One of the best descriptions 
of what falls under the broad heading of ‘ethical’ is given in the following passage by Iris 
Murdoch:  
When we apprehend and assess other people we do not consider only their 
solutions to specifiable practical problems, we consider something more elusive 
which may be called their total vision of life, as shown in their mode of speech or 
silence, their choice of words, their assessment of others, their conception of their 
own lives, what they think attractive or praise-worthy, what they think funny: in 
short, the configurations of their thought which show continually in their reactions 
and conversation.                                                                                
                                                                                                     (Murdoch 1956: 39) 
Ethical literary cognitivism is awarded prominence in the diagram above as exponents 
make a case based on any or all of the previously identified cognitive theses: knowledge of 
plausible possibilities, conceptual knowledge, knowledge of how humans think and act, the 
exercise of certain skills (such as our imagination), the training of readers’ emotional 
sensibilities and acquaintance with human experience. In fact, ethical literary cognitivism 
can seem like an all too hasty default position in literary cognitive circles where the 
discussion assumes an ethical turn before we have really clarified what is going on when I 
learn something from literary fiction. I shall take the question ‘What is the cognitive gain 
from literary fiction?’ to be a separate and logically prior question to ‘Does literary fiction 
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give us moral knowledge?’ We need to investigate the first question, which is the remit in 
this project, in order to make a judgement on the second. As a result, I shall not be side-
tracked into the respective merits and demerits of the role of literary examples in moral 
philosophy (e.g. Young 2001: 98-103) but maintain my focus on whether readers gain 
cognitively from literary fiction as fiction or literature. 
Literary fiction is at an advantage in communicating a better understanding of our own and 
other people’s ethical views by its depth and details. In contrast to abstract moral 
philosophy or short schematic thought experiments such as the trolley problem, literary 
fiction gives us the bigger, more humanising picture. Yet, cannot such a picture also be 
sketched autobiographically where an author conveys the complexity and nuance of a real 
life ethical dilemma by providing a full rather than partial sketch? I think the answer is yes 
and so the fictional status does not seem crucially important in the communication of any 
advantage by literary fiction examples. That is not to say that the fictional status of a story 
used to illustrate an ethical concern is irrelevant; there may be advantages in being able to 
add detail at will without concern for historical accuracy. Take the story of Gauguin from 
Bernard Williams’s paper ‘Moral luck’ (1981: 22-26); here Williams says that it doesn’t 
matter to his argument whether the real Gauguin was motivated in the way described. It 
does not matter whether the same dynamic ever existed between real people rather than 
fictional characters. Any benefits of literary fiction for ethical knowledge lie in the depth 
and detail of the account. 
Martha Nussbaum makes the point that such depth and detail are standard features of 
literary fiction. Nussbaum argues in Love’s Knowledge (1992) that ethical understanding 
‘…involves emotional as well as intellectual activity and gives a certain type of priority to 
the perception of particular people and situations, rather than to abstract rules…further, 
that this ethical conception finds its most appropriate expression and statement in certain 
forms usually considered literary rather than philosophical’ (1992: ix). Martha Nussbaum 
makes the case that literary fiction qua literature is especially rich and complex (see 
passages already quoted in Chapter One). During her discussion the following literary 
devices receive specific treatment: particular detail (1992: 38-39), fine detailed description 
(1992: 36, 85, 95), full description (1992: 160-161), different points of view (1992: 32), 
imagery (1992: 150-151), richness of language (1992: 154) and metaphor (1992: 157). We 
are then in the same position as when we read other accounts of literary cognitivism and 
require an explanation as to what the exact benefits of literary devices are in this context. 
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The presence of literary devices may yield cognitive benefits that exist independently of 
the ethical context.   
 
In upshot, it is not my intention to separate cognitive gain from the fictional status of 
literary fiction completely. There are instances when literary fiction as fiction supplies 
some cognitive benefits: in helping to entertain possibilities, in allowing a writer’s or 
reader’s imagination to explore human emotions, experiences and ethical attitudes. Yet I 
have shown that in each cognitivist position that there is an important, but underdeveloped, 
role for the literary. It is more often than not a reader’s engagement with a standard feature 
of literary fiction as literature that is responsible for the cognitive gain at stake. While non-
fictions can generally do the same cognitive job as fictions, it is not the case that non-
literature can do the same job as literature. I maintain that if I were to set you a creative 
writing task: to communicate something about your personal life to an audience that does 
not know you, you would exercise significant craft and deliberation over how the story is 
told (its tone, symbolism and choice of simile). Despite the prevalence and importance of 
literary fiction qua literature, no systematic attempt has been made to date to link these 
standard features of literature to cognitive gain which, in my view, is an oversight and one 
I attempt to rectify in this project. 
 
 
2.2 LITERARY ANTI-COGNITIVISM 
 
‘Literary anti-cognitivism’ is the denial of one or more form of literary cognitivism and is, 
consequently, relative to whatever cognitivism is affirmed. There are two distinctive styles 
of literary anti-cognitivism: those that are directly hostile to any literary cognitivist thesis 
and those that are sceptical. A hostile version of literary anti-cognitivism holds that reading 
literary fiction positively detracts from the reader gaining cognitively whereas a sceptical 
version of anti-cognitivism makes the more general claim that any particular literary 
cognitivist argument does not sound plausible. One motivation for hostile literary 
cognitivism is that literary fiction can decrease or destroy understanding by numbing the 
readers’ sensibilities and by providing an attractive mirage behind which nothing 
substantial is to be found. We may reach for a metaphor as a matter of habit or as a quick 
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substitute for rigorous investigation. Yet hostile literary anti-cognitivism is not as 
interesting as it sounds.  
 
Hostile literary anti-cognitivism is false if taken as a general claim about all literary fiction 
as we do learn some things from reading: the meaning of words, stories and, occasionally, 
facts about the world. We can concede hostile literary cognitivism, as a hedged sufficiency 
claim, as literary fictions can sometimes numb or hide cognitive advance. Of course, there 
might be other factors at play when cognitive advantage is numbed such as a lack of 
thoughtfulness in the author or lack of maturity in the reader. This said, I am still left 
wondering what is going on when the reader succeeds in learning something from reading 
literary fiction and whether the gain is all that it is dressed up to be? Sceptical literary 
cognitivism is the view that cognitivist accounts seem dubious in important respects. I shall 
take time in this section to highlight the main concerns. The reader should note that the 
view that our learning from literary fiction has no bearing on our valuing literary fiction is 
a different claim to either hostile or sceptical forms of anti-cognitivism and is labelled 
‘literary non-cognitivism’ and dealt with separately in section (2.3).    
   
Anti-cognitivist arguments have been waged against literary fiction as fiction and against 
literary fiction as literature. In the former case the standard criticism states that given 
fiction is a figment of the author’s imagination and that imagination is not a reliable source 
of knowledge then a fictional text is not a reliable source of knowledge (Plato Republic 
377 d-e; Lamarque 1996: 105; Diffey 1997: 31-32; Graham 1997: 47-48; Hepola 2014: 80, 
86). At best, the reader gains knowledge when what is imagined coincides with whatever is 
the case in the world beyond the text. The standard rebuttal is twofold. First, that 
‘knowledge’ is too narrow a scope for what should be considered as the appropriate 
cognitive gain from fiction. Secondly, that there are fictions, such as counterfactual history 
and certain thought experiments in science and philosophy, which yield cognitive benefit. I 
shall elaborate on ‘understanding’ as the cognitive gain at stake in the next chapter (section 
3.2).  
 
In this section, I limit my discussion of the anti-cognitivist challenge to literary fiction as 
literature and spend some time establishing literary anti-cognitivism as a sceptical position 
that raises challenges rather than a consistently worked through philosophy. Literary anti-
cognitivism against literary fiction as literature has received less attention than arguments 
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directed at fiction yet enjoys an unbroken tradition from Plato to the present day.
22
 The 
contention holds that literary devices are merely rhetorical devices that either do not add 
anything of cognitive worth or, worse still, deceive the unwitting into thinking something 
worthwhile has been stated when it has not. Plato wages the most famous attack on poets 
arguing that the expert is always worth consulting over the poet (Ion 540 a-c), that the 
literary arts appeal to the emotions as opposed to reason (Ion 535c-536d) and that literary 
criticism suffers from much the same flaws (Protagoras 347c). 
 
I shall not dwell on all Plato’s arguments as his target is more specifically the kind of 
moral education that promotes a study of poets such as Homer and Hesiod as viable 
sources of moral guidance in and of themselves: ‘… once it is appreciated that the poets 
are central to the educational apparatus [of ancient Greece], the successive criticisms of 
poetry fall into place’ (Havelock 1963:13).  The unifying thought through Plato’s 
criticisms of the literary arts is that they are the product of irrationality.  It is as if literary 
works are written under a spell of inspiration where the words are not the poet’s own but 
those of the muse striking at will: 
So I soon made up my mind about the poets too: I decided that it was not wisdom 
that enabled them to write their poetry, but a kind of instinct or inspiration, such as 
you find in seers and prophets who deliver all their sublime messages without 
knowing in the least what they mean.  It seemed clear to me that the poets were in 
much the same case; and I also observed that the very fact that they were poets 
made them think that they had a perfect understanding of all other subjects, of 
which they were totally ignorant.            
                                                              (Apology 22c trans. Tredennick 1954, 1987) 
 
One consequence of prioritising what sounds sweetest to the ear over knowledge is that the 
author loses focus on the latter. Reciters, actors and literary critics who were contemporary 
to Plato were referred to as ‘Rhapsodes’ and are criticised for promoting the art of 
persuasion (Ion 540d-540e). In addition, the Sophists used poetic tropes to their own 
                                                          
22 Some notable cases include: Augustine’s Confessions Book 1 Sections 16 and 18; Hobbes’s Leviathan 
Chapter  4, Section 13 which cites metaphor as ‘an abuse of speech’; Locke’s warning against rhetoric in his 
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding III. 10. 34; these passages present anti-cognitivist arguments 
against literary fiction qua literature. 
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persuasive ends to turn the attention of the unwary (Protagoras 320c-328d).  In its most 
dangerous form rhetoric is the chosen means of deception by unscrupulous politicians (The 
Republic 488d; 493b; 495e).  In a more innocent form it is the way someone who lacks 
knowledge of a given subject proceeds.  On his diplomatic mission to Rome in 155 BC, 
Carneades commended justice in his first oration but argued on the very next day that 
justice was a problematic notion, leaving his audience none the wiser as to his moral thesis.  
In such a circumstance the style or fluency of how a moral argument is presented drops out 
as irrelevant to the truth or validity of the argument. Exposure to too much of this kind of 
address is not educative but potentially corrosive to reasoned judgement. 
Plato’s legacy is found in contemporary statements of literary anti-cognitivism; take the 
following passage from Gregory Currie’s essay ‘Creativity and the Insight That Literature 
Brings’: 
 
[Literary] style may serve purposes that are the opposite of knowledge-enhancing.  
I suggest that one of the reasons we enjoy complexity in fiction – and hence one 
reason we find complexity in successful fiction – is that it provides the kind of 
distraction that lowers vigilance, helping thereby to generate an illusion of learning.  
Paradoxically, the sheer complexity of great narrative art, so often taken as a sign 
of cognitive richness and subtlety, may increase its power to spread ignorance and 
error. 
                                    (Currie 2014: 51-52) 
 
Currie’s anti-cognitivism, like many we shall meet, is sceptical and cautionary rather than 
argumentatively persuasive.  The anti-cognitivist challenge is often that cognitivists clarify 
or elaborate their view.  Like many literary anti-cognitivists Currie takes the cognitive gain 
at stake to be truth or knowledge; science and history are the usual models of epistemic 
success.
23
 While science and history are epistemic success stories, it strikes me as 
misguided to conceive them as the only forms of cognitive gain and I shall continue to use 
the placeholder term ‘understanding’ in what follows.  Unlike those anti-cognitivists who 
focus on fiction, Currie has the literariness of literary fiction in his sights in the extract 
above which makes his position directly antithetical to my own.  The emphasis on 
literariness refreshes and reconfigures the traditional anti-cognitivist versus cognitivist 
debate and I shall present the strongest arguments against the cognitive potential of literary 
fiction as literature, leaving objections to literary fiction as fiction to one side.  These anti-
                                                          
23 A further example may be found in the seminal paper by Jerome Stolnitz (1992: 191- 192). 
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cognitivist concerns are arranged in three waves of doubt: about the writer of literature, 
about the literary text and about the reception of literary fiction.  Each concern identifies 
what needs to be met if my literary cognitivism is to be judged successful. 
 
One of the strongest arguments against the cognitive potential of literary fiction as 
literature is termed the ‘no-expertise’ argument in Carroll’s survey (2007: 28) and is waged 
against artists as a whole in the following formulation: 
 
Consider the way in which someone becomes an artist.  They study their craft and 
the materials of their medium.  Painters learn about perspective and color theory; 
poets, prosody; musicians, scales; photographers, lenses; film-makers, editing; and 
so forth.  The expertise involves mastering the tools of their trade and discovering 
the formal opportunities they have betoken.  Artists as such, it is charged, have no 
special expertise in any branch of knowledge other than that pertaining to their 
artform and its medium.                                                                                            
                                                                                                         (Carroll 2007: 28) 
 
Two sides of the same anti-cognitivist coin are: that the craft of the artist has no bearing on 
specialist knowledge and that specialist knowledge is not affected in any beneficial way by 
conveying that knowledge through an artistic medium. The argument has a long history, 
Socrates’s questioning of Ion elicited the somewhat obvious admission that the skill of the 
poet does not concern the technicalities of seafaring, medicine, herdsmanship or spinning 
wool and in each case we would consult an expert in these fields.  So, the rhetorical 
question runs, what is the literary author’s expertise?  The answer is of course that writers 
of literature are expert at writing literature.  The follow up question is what has the skill of 
writing literature got to do with understanding something other than literature?  My 
contention is that the distinctive standard features of literary writing can contribute a great 
deal to the reader’s understanding of the world outside the text. However, in Plato’s eyes 
the artistry of a wordsmith is equivalent to the craft of a blacksmith or silversmith in 
manipulating aspects of the world to meet practical demands more effectively.  Of course 
some facility with language is desirable in communicating arguments of proven substance, 
all agree on this, but this facility in communication is not where the cognitive work is 
carried out.  It is not so much that the writer of literary fiction has no expertise but that the 
expertise is irrelevant to gaining a better understanding of the subject matter so we should 
change the name of the criticism to ‘the no relevant expertise argument’. Further, any skill 
[58] 
 
in writing style seems compatible with the art of persuading a naïve reader, perhaps by 
appealing to the readers’ emotions.  In sum, the ‘no relevant expertise’ argument 
challenges the literary cognitivist to explain how any skill at writing in a literary style aids 
cognitive gain. 
 
Next, to anti-cognitivist arguments aimed at the literary fictional text.  Cognitivists claim 
that the reader is able to gain a better understanding not just of the text but of the world 
beyond the text and that an understanding of the literary text helps an understanding of the 
world.  How do the literary aspects of literary fiction help in this respect? The opacity of 
literary language, the critic would allege, gets in the way of the pragmatics of 
communicating facts in the clearest way possible:   
 
In literary works, opacity is an asset – it is sought, and it enriches character identity 
– while in referential discourses opacity is a weakness, to be minimised, and merely 
clouds personal characterisation.                                              (Lamarque 2014: 78) 
 
Literary language seems too slippery, ambiguous and multi-faceted to help get a clear grip 
on what should be checked against the world; if indeed checking is the right way to 
proceed (I address this issue in Chapter Five). The criticism runs that literary writing 
complicates and confuses what is asserted and as a consequence leads to an entertaining 
bedazzlement rather than the clarity required in understanding something better.  What 
exactly is meant to be taken from a literary description that enables us to understand 
something in the world, for instance, through checking against past or future experience?  
The concern is that literary writing besets rather than aids cognitive advance.  
 
Two related charges are made by Stolnitz (1992). If one buys into the cognitivist model 
that a literary text supplies working hypotheses of sorts that can be checked against the 
world, a problem arises as to how general or specific such hypotheses are meant to be.  
Stolnitz famously gives his summary of Pride and Prejudice as ‘stubborn pride and 
ignorant prejudice keep attractive people apart’ (Stolnitz 1992: 193). This kind of summary 
while not false leaves too much detail out ˗ but how much detail needs to be included?  
Stolnitz takes as a second example, later on in his paper, Dostoevsky’s Crime and 
Punishment and speculates over the hypothesis that would be tested against extra-textual 
reality: 
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The criminal [some criminals?] [all criminals?] [criminals in St. Petersburg?] 
[criminals who kill old moneylenders] [criminals who kill old money lenders and 
come under the influence of saintly prostitutes?] desires to be caught and punished.  
                                                            
                                                                                                      (Stolnitz 1992: 199) 
 
It is a standard feature of literary fiction qua literature to include an amount of detail but 
what is not clear is how much of this detail feeds into the cognitive gain promised nor what 
hypothesis the reader is meant to check against the world outside the literary fiction.  
Thirdly, Stolnitz points out that the same literary work may contain contradictory 
statements.  Take as an example, the nurse’s interrogation of Phaedra in Euripides’s 
Hippolytus where two opposite speeches are presented over the course of a few pages. At 
first the nurse rails against Phaedra’s love for Hippolytus (lines 244-256) before arguing 
that passion is good (lines 432-470). In addition, one might expect contradictions between 
literary works given that, unlike the sciences, literary art is not usually a collaborative but 
rather an individual enterprise.  The problem is that literary fiction qua literature (or indeed 
qua fiction) offers no way of resolving a contradiction; such work is done outside the 
literary fiction.  Hypotheses extracted from or arising out of literary fiction are 
unfalsifiable by any means related to reading literary fiction which is a hallmark of 
methodological error rather than cognitive potential. 
 
A battery of literary anti-cognitivist arguments applies to the reception of literary fictional 
works.  In his paper ‘On the Historical Triviality of Art’ (1991) Stolnitz asks why literary 
art among other artistic genres tends to lack influence on society.  Of course there are 
discrete examples of low-brow literary influences (see Schama 1989: 174-182) and 
isolated examples of high-brow literary art having social effect: Rousseau’s Confessions 
gets a mention in Schama’s study of the French Revolution, Goethe’s The Sorrows of 
Young Werther famously led to a rash of suicides, then there is the social influence of 
novels by Gogol, Dostoevsky, Fielding, Dickens and Lawrence. The sceptical concern is 
that we would expect more social influence from literary fiction if literary fiction supplied 
cognitive gain of any importance: 
 
Think, if you will, of the countless critiques of other novels and plays that have 
revealed the motivations and feelings of their characters with a subtlety and 
refinement to which a good deal of academic psychology hardly aspires.  These 
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critiques enthusiastically promise and would deliver the deepest truths of human 
nature.  They presuppose and endorse artistic cognitivism.  They become the 
subjects of vigorous study and lively debate within literary criticism.  Then think, 
finally, that they do all this without so much as creating a ripple extra-murally, in 
professional psychology or anywhere else.                       (Stolnitz 1992: 194) 
                                                                                 
While a cognitivist might concede a lack of social influence, lack of social influence by 
itself does not indicate a lack of cognitive merit; after all analytic philosophy exerts little 
social influence.  
 
One possible explanation for literature’s lack of influence, suggested by anti-cognitivists, 
is that the cognitive gain given to the reader is trivial in the philosophical sense of being 
uninformative (Stolnitz 1992: 194, 200). What we learn may be uninformative in at least 
two ways: first, what we come to know may be so crushingly obvious that it would be easy 
to find out without recourse to literary fiction, or secondly that the reader may be in 
possession of the knowledge already. Carroll offers a cognitivist response to the first 
alternative with his accusation that ‘it is really the skeptic who has rendered the insights … 
banal by means of his paraphrase’ (1997: 36). According to this line of argument, every 
paraphrase is banal as far as it is a popular, telescoped summation: that summer is warmer 
than winter. In the case of literary fiction, the last lines of Thackeray’s Vanity Fair 
constitute a paraphrase: ‘Ah! Vanitas Vanitatum!  Which of us is happy in this world?  
Which of us has his desire?  Or, having it, is satisfied? …’ (Thackeray 1994: 689).  
However any judgement as to whether this statement is crushingly obvious on its own 
ignores the preceding 688 pages in which the theme of vanity is explored, rendering the 
charge of banality unfair. Carroll’s counter provides useful advice on how to read a work 
of literature: ‘don’t judge a book by its paraphrase’, but does not meet the anti-cognitivist 
challenge that works of literature when taken as a whole state the crushingly obvious: that 
Vanity Fair is trivial rather than its paraphrase. 
 
The anti-cognitivist challenge that literary fiction merely tells us what we know already is 
hard to comment on without knowledge of what we know already which one would need 
to specify in individual cases. Stolnitz puts forward an unfair dichotomy between what we 
might learn from literature and what we might learn from life arguing that there is much 
we do not need to learn from literature as we can just gain knowledge ‘by living and 
learning’ (Stolnitz 1992: 196). The cognitivist should reply that learning from literary 
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fiction is not an alternative to learning from life but part of it. Reading about a shared 
experience may help draw attention to details missed in the course of living the experience. 
Stolnitz’s target seems to be any pompous form of cognitivism that promises grand truths 
but the cognitivist does not need to claim that literature supplies grand truths. Nevertheless, 
we are still left wondering why literary fiction exerts a limited social influence. 
 
A final anti-cognitivist concern relating to readers of literary fiction was rehearsed in a 
moral context in the early twentieth century debate about studying literature at degree level 
(Eagleton 2008: 15-46).  In brief, the thought runs that if literary fiction is effective in 
promoting understanding then we would expect avid readers of literary fiction to enjoy 
better understanding than people who do not read literary fiction: 
 
It seems a pretty anodyne truth that art can “enhance understanding” and there are 
no doubt even senses of the phrase that do not imply the acquisition of belief.  But 
it does prompt a question for all such knowledge-based cognitive theories: how is 
this “illumination” or “enhanced” understanding manifested?  Would we expect 
that those immersed in the great works of literature understand people and the 
world better than those who are not so well read?  Yet there seems no evidence that 
such readers are especially knowledgeable about human traits, as are psychologists, 
or social scientists, or even philosophers. Literary critics are not sought out as 
experts or advisers on human affairs.                                    
                                             (Lamarque 2007: 21) 
 
I have a worry about how broad statements such as ‘those well versed in literature should 
enjoy a better understanding of people and the world’ can be tested.  Broad statements such 
as ‘if fresh air is good for the health then we would expect those working outdoors to be 
healthier’ are fraught with ceteris paribus clauses involving genetics, nutrition and socio-
economic factors which makes an empirical test difficult.  Members of the set of readers of 
literary fiction may also be members of other sets such as ‘professional academics’, 
‘sensitive types’ or ‘educated’ which will affect the result.  Yet an empirical test is what 
anti-cognitivists seem to demand. Gregory Currie again: 
 
There is such a thing as getting it right in plumbing, lion-taming, and other 
respectable practical skills, and such a thing as confirmation that the learner has 
[62] 
 
gotten it right.  The sensitivity training purportedly offered by literature cannot be 
treated as a mysterious exception to this.                                             
                                                                                                          (Currie 2014: 44) 
 
To comment on what would count as a tenable empirical study for my thesis is a project 
for another time and all I seek to do here is to acknowledge the anti-cognitivist call for 
empirical evidence. However, I would like to make some comment on two recent empirical 
studies that come nearest to the cognitive thesis developed here; namely Evan Kidd’s and 
Emanuele Castano’s paper ‘Reading Literary Fiction Improves Theory of Mind’ (2013) 
and Emy Koopman’s paper ‘Empathetic reactions after reading: The role of genre, 
personal factors and affective responses’ (2015). Both studies accept the difference 
between literary fiction and popular fiction. Kidd and Castano assume early on in their 
paper that popular fiction is ‘more readerly’ and tends to ‘portray the world as internally 
consistent and predictable’ which may only reaffirm readers’ expectations so not promote 
theory of mind (2013: 1). Similarly, Koopman takes ‘literary fiction’ to include aesthetic 
and unconventional features, unlike non-literature, where ‘the striking features in literary 
texts could increase the time needed to process the content as well as making the content 
more vivid’ (2015: 5-6). In both studies the ‘literary passages’ were selected from novels 
that had been nominated or had won a national award for literature. 
 
The Kidd and Castano study posed five questions to 86 participants on ‘theory of mind’ 
which is defined as the human capacity to comprehend that other people hold beliefs and 
desires and that these may differ from one’s own beliefs and desires. The result from the 
study suggested that there is a relation between reading literary stories and theory of mind. 
In the Koopman online survey 282 participants, of whom 218 filled out both 
questionnaires, were given one of three excerpts from: a literary work, a life narrative and 
an expository text.  Which text was received was randomised and participants were told 
that ‘what they were about to read was a story based on true events’. Each passage was 
either about depression or grief. Participants then received another excerpt, again 
randomised but from a different genre from that of the excerpt previously received, and on 
the alternative subject to the passage they had read before. Participants were then asked to 
state to what extent they were in agreement with five follow up statements such as ‘I feel 
understanding for people who are depressed’ and ‘the basic insurance policy should cover 
therapy for depression’. Participants were also asked whether, on completing the reading 
and test, they wanted to make a donation to a relevant charitable organisation. Koopman’s 
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results suggest that exposure to literature predicted empathetic understanding in both cases 
of depression and grief and related to a significantly higher likelihood of donation. 
 
Both empirical studies generate results that are compatible with my thesis but I do not want 
to hold too much sway by either for the following worries. First, there are a limited number 
of participants from which it is difficult to draw general conclusions. Secondly, the focus is 
on knowledge of other minds or empathy rather than the general cognitive skills that I want 
to defend; ‘understanding’ as a concept is not unpacked so it is unclear as to what sense of 
understanding is being tested. Thirdly, readers of literary fiction performed only slightly 
better so what is of statistical significance may not be entirely persuasive to a sceptic. 
Before the issue of empirical testing can be addressed we need a far clearer account of 
what we are looking for in terms of cognitive gain. We also need a realistic time scale 
given that the business of accruing cognitive skills from reading literature is likely to be a 
lengthier process than the immediacy of feedback in ‘lion taming or plumbing’. I shall take 
up this issue again briefly in the closing remarks and in light of the argument through 
chapters 3-5. 
 
To draw the above discussion to a close, I have sketched literary anti-cognitivism as a 
sceptical position: one that harbours serious reservations about the cognitive power of 
literary fiction.  Four main questions are asked of the literary cognitivist: 
 
1. What has the skill of writing in a manner standard to literary fiction got to do with 
understanding something better? 
2. How does the status of a literary fictional text as literature help with our 
understanding of the world outside the text? 
3. If literary fiction enhances understanding then why hasn’t literary fiction exerted 
more influence beyond the study of literature? 
4. How are readers of literary fiction any better at understanding people, if at all, than 
those who do not read literary fictional works? 
 
These questions present a series of challenges to the literary cognitivist but they do not 
present a decisive argument against literary cognitivism. I shall address the fourfold 
literary anti-cognitivist challenge in the course of the remaining three chapters. 
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2.3 LITERARY NON-COGNITIVISM 
 
‘Literary non-cognitivism’ is the thesis that cognitive gain is neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient condition on literary value. The thought is that cognitive gain is irrelevant to our 
valuing literary fiction just as the collectability of literary fiction is irrelevant to the value 
of such a work as either literature or fiction.  The fact that a first folio of Shakespeare’s 
plays has economic value does not have any bearing on the value of Shakespeare’s work as 
literary art.  Similarly, the fact that the Shakespearean canon may be able to supply truth or 
develop understanding has no bearing on the value of the work as either literature or 
fiction. Literary non-cognitivism is not the same as literary anti-cognitivism as non-
cognitivists like Lamarque and Olsen do not doubt literary fiction can provide cognitive 
gain (Lamarque and Olsen 1994: 136). Literary non-cognitivism is compatible with the 
notion that we can learn successfully from literary works, that authors often aim at 
conveying cognitive gain and that literary works are valued for what they teach us. The 
contention is that none of these factors are a requirement of our valuing literary fiction as 
literary fiction. Lamarque and Olsen are sometimes classified as ‘no truth theorists’ and 
Lamarque has consistently defended the idea that conveying truth has no bearing on 
literary value, most recently in The Opacity of Narrative (2014: 121). I favour the term 
‘non-cognitivism’ over ‘no truth theory’ as the position does not only deny truth value as a 
necessary condition for literary appreciation but just as readily applies to understanding or 
indeed any other candidate for cognitive advantage. A selection of arguments is presented 
against non-cognitivism in the course of this section. 
Lamarque and Olsen distinguish between literary fiction as literature and literary fiction as 
fiction and maintain that cognitive merits have no effect on either our appreciation of a 
literary fictional work as fiction or as literature. Lamarque and Olsen examine the attitudes 
and practices of reading literary fiction, from which they conclude that there is no 
requirement for truth-telling in relation to fictional or literary appreciation. Literary fiction 
qua fiction is uttered with a fictive purpose and approached from a fictive stance by its 
readership (1994: 32).  The fictive stance is a complex of attitudes, responses and rule-
governed practices adopted towards fictional narratives.  While a fictional narrative may 
contain truths, truth-telling is not part of the culture of response to fiction.  One could 
imagine a good yarn being ruined by persistent interrogation over whether such and such 
actually happened to so and so in exactly the way that it is depicted. Fiction may be used to 
various ends: entertainment, instruction, aesthetic appreciation or to communicate 
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experience, but such ends are external to the practice of fiction (1994: 445-446).  In fact all 
that we can say about fiction as fiction is that it is a way of talking and writing that is 
received in a typical way where gaining truth, knowledge or understanding bear no relation 
to how such a text is received.  
Non-cognitivists run the risk of drawing a false inference if their argument runs: ‘it does 
not matter whether a certain detail in a given fiction is true therefore truth does not matter 
in fiction’. It does not matter that Thomas Hardy’s novels are set in the fictional district of 
Wessex but that does not mean that it does not matter whether Hardy’s vision of life, a 
generally pessimistic one, is right or not. 
There is, parallel to the fictional stance, a literary stance which takes the aim of literary 
fiction to be the maximisation of aesthetic appeal: ‘Adopting the literary stance towards a 
work involves being prepared to make an effort to recognize the qualities making the 
literary work a worthwhile object of appreciation. To adopt the literary stance therefore is 
to be ready to make an effort to see a text as expressive not of just any theme, but of such a 
theme as maximizes the aesthetic reward it offers the reader’ (1994: 426-427). There is 
something Wildean in this: novels are neither true nor false just well written or badly 
written. What matters about a novel’s portrayal of love or death is that these subjects give 
the piece an aesthetic lift rather than cognitive gravitas.  
While I disagree with the non-cognitivist contention that cognitive gain is so far removed 
from aesthetic appreciation, for reasons that will shortly be rehearsed, Lamarque’s 
approach has a lot in common with my thesis. I agree with Lamarque’s separation of the 
fictional and literary stances, his analysis of how we read literary fiction and his statements 
of cognitive gain from literary fiction (2014: 149; 166-167). Consider the following 
passage from The Opacity of Narrative: 
At the heart of narrative opacity is the idea that a reader’s attention to textual 
nuances, implicit valuations, narrator reliability, symbolic resonance, humour, 
irony, tone, allusions or figurative meanings in the textual content will help give 
precise shape to the thoughts and beliefs that the content brings to mind. Similarly, 
the very ordering of the material, the manner in which information is imparted in a 
narrative and the setting up and fulfilment of expectations, can structure the 
reader’s perspectives. Thought-clusters, then, are densely opaque when formed 
with a literary interest in mind.   
                                                                                                  (Lamarque 2014: 149) 
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This observation by Lamarque on how we read literature is also a central premise in my 
literary cognitivist thesis. My disagreement is with the non-cognitivist conclusion that any 
cognitive gain derived from opaque or thick narratives, a standard feature of literary 
fiction, has no bearing on aesthetic value. We return to this in Chapter Four where I 
examine the kind of understanding gained from specific literary devices and where I make 
the case that cognitive gain relates to aesthetic effectiveness and hence stands in a relation 
to aesthetic value (section 4.7).  
Lamarque and Olsen (1994) and latterly Lamarque, as the sole author, defend their position 
with three main arguments:  
i) cognitive gain is not a concern of the author,  
ii) cognitive gain is not a concern of the reader and 
iii) cognitive gain is not a concern of the critic. 
I shall rehearse these claims next and make the point that exceptions are easy enough to 
find before ending this section with two further criticisms: that cognitive gain can be 
integral to literary appreciation and that the notion of intrinsic value, a seemingly important 
part of the non-cognitivist argument, requires further defence. 
Lamarque and Olsen argue that truth plays no part in the concerns of the writer of literary 
fiction in a significant number of cases (1994: 296-297; 2014: 130-131). For example, 
Shakespeare changes Caesar’s last words to the Latin ‘Et tu, Brute?’ meaning ‘And you, 
Brutus?’ (Julius Caesar III. 1. 77) while Suetonius tells us that Caesar’s last words were 
the Greek: ‘Kai su, teknon?’ meaning ‘You too, son?’ Non-cognitivists argue that factual 
errors are no grounds for artistic criticism and that one could imagine a factually inaccurate 
novel being praised for its literary aesthetic value.  
Non-cognitivists are correct that the conveyance of accurate information is not always the 
primary concern of the literary author. The non-cognitivist is not correct, however, that 
accuracy never affects the value of a piece. Mark Rowe reports that ‘some errors are nearly 
fatal’ for instance Philip Larkin mistakes the type of wave under discussion at the start of 
his poem ‘Absences’ (Rowe 1997: 334-335). In this case, a laissez-aller approach to 
accuracy renders the piece incoherent where incoherence, one assumes, is not the intention 
of the author. Imagine a similar inaccuracy occurring in a novel about environmental ethics 
to the overall detriment of our appreciation of the work. The same culture of writing where 
factual inaccuracy is ignored does not pervade all branches of literary fiction in every era. 
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With specific regard to aesthetic appreciation, a reader might be so distracted by 
inaccuracy as to have his or her aesthetic appreciation numbed. I believe non-cognitivists 
overstate the case and that there are examples where a deficit of truth leads to a decrease in 
aesthetic appreciation. 
 
Next to the reader of literary fiction, Lamarque argues that there are plenty of examples 
where factual inaccuracies in a text do not diminish the reader’s aesthetic appreciation of 
that text. The fact that Piggy’s glasses were concave and could not start a fire, where a fire 
is crucial to the plot of Golding’s Lord of the Flies, does not detract from the artistic 
enjoyment of the novel (Lamarque 2010: 375). However, no general rule can be applied 
here and there are plenty of counter examples which may be cited that some detail not 
ringing true does affect the reader’s aesthetic appreciation of a text. At this stage it is worth 
pointing out that ‘not ringing true’ covers more than just ‘not being true’ and that a reader 
of literary fiction may be affected by a text being: implausible, unbelievable, sounding 
inauthentic or even just silly.
24
  
Take, for instance, these readers’ responses to Protocol 2 and 6 in I.A. Richard’s Practical 
Criticism (1929). Comments on Christina Rossetti’s ‘Spring Quiet’ (1847) run: 
 
2.2 I think this is utterly absurd…who has ever seen a “green” house, or seen the 
sun shine shadily?  
2.22 Full of mistakes.                                                                                                                                                             
(Italics in original) 
Another comment in response to ‘Spring and Fall, to a young child’ (1880) by Gerard 
Manley Hopkins states: 
6.32 The thought is worthless, and hopelessly muddled. 
6.36 What does all this mean?...I should like to know precisely what is the ‘blight 
man was born for’.                                                                          (Italics in original) 
 
                                                          
24 One comment on Poem II in I.A. Richards’s Practical Criticism just reads ‘whole poem silly’ (Richards 
1929: 33). 
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In the case of Protocol (2.2 and 2.22) the reader objects to something not being true while 
in the case of Protocol (6.32) the reader objects to the thought conveyed by the poem being 
muddled and in the case of Protocol (6.36) the reader objects to the thought being 
expressed in an imprecise way. In each case a cognitive deficiency about the poem is taken 
to affect the reader’s aesthetic appreciation of the poem. 
Lamarque and Olsen point out that evidence for their non-cognitivism may be found in 
literary critical approaches to works ‘… there is no significant place for truth as a critical 
term applied to works of literature’ (1994: 1).  Lamarque and Olsen cite as an example the 
reaction of Rebecca to the suggestion that she may be Dr West’s real daughter in Ibsen’s 
Rosmersholm: ‘…appreciation involves no evaluative judgement concerning ‘how true’ 
Rebecca’s behaviour is to the actual reaction patterns of women who have been involved in 
similar relationships’ (1994: 300).  The co-authors of Truth, Fiction and Literature 
extrapolate from cases where truth-telling has no place in the critical appreciation of 
literary fiction and conclude that: ‘Literary works qua literary works are neither probable 
nor improbable just as they are not modes of fact-stating’ (1994: 318). According to non-
cognitivists: truth-telling, probability, fact stating and understanding play no significant 
role in evaluating a work of literary fiction.  
Lamarque and Olsen make a bold empirical claim about literary criticism without evidence 
which makes their claim seem implausible. On any non-partial reading, literary criticism 
seems studded with the kinds of claim the non-cognitivist insists never occur (although 
there has been something of a tailing off recently). There follows some examples where 
critics praise literary fiction for being insightful, well-observed or perceptive and blame 
literary fiction for being implausible, misleading or unconvincing. 
In the opening chapter of The Great Tradition F. R. Leavis quotes Lord David Cecil on 
George Eliot ‘Her plots are too neat and symmetrical to be true’ (1962: 15) and Henry 
James is quoted as describing Hardy’s Tess of the D’Urbervilles as being ‘chock-full of 
faults and falsity’ (1962: 33). On a note of endorsement, Joseph Conrad is praised by 
Leavis for his ‘profoundly serious interest in life’ (1972: 27) as is D. H. Lawrence (1962: 
35). As a critic, Lawrence criticised Hardy’s bleak view of life: 
This is the tragedy of Hardy, always the same: the tragedy of those who, more or 
less pioneers, have died in the wilderness, whither they had escaped for free action, 
after having left the walled security, and the comparative imprisonment, of the 
established convention. This is the theme of novel after novel…     
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                                                                                                  (Lawrence 1967: 168) 
Hardy’s pessimism and the fact that he repeatedly explores the worst aspects of life affect 
Lawrence’s aesthetic appreciation of novels such as Jude the Obscure. These examples 
suggest that the non-cognitivist is wrong to argue that it does not matter to the aesthetic 
appreciation of a work whether a work of literary art is true or false or whether the vision 
of life depicted rings true or not. In many cases it matters a great deal.  
So far, our treatment of literary non-cognitivism has been broadly negative: the position 
understates cognitive success in the composition and reception of literary fictional texts. A 
more positive thesis is also required in order to dissuade the reader from adopting a non-
cognitivist standpoint; so how does cognitive value lead to aesthetic value? Monroe 
Beardsley sheds some light on the joint enterprise of aesthetic and cognitive gain in his 
series of flexible criteria for aesthetic experience in Chapter Sixteen of The Aesthetic Point 
of View. Beardsley argues that an experience has aesthetic character if one’s attention is 
fixed on a work and a selection of further conditions are present such as felt freedom, 
detached affect and active discovery (Beardsley 1982: 288-289).  Some of these criteria 
may be omitted or the list added to depending on the particular literary work; hence they 
are termed flexible criteria.  I am interested in the fourth condition as it appears in 
Beardsley’s list (1982: 288-289) and described in a later passage as follows: 
… One of the central components in art experience must be the experience of 
discovery, of insight into connections and organizations – the elation that comes 
from the apparent opening up of intelligibility. I call this “active discovery” to draw 
attention to the excitement of meeting a cognitive challenge, of flexing one’s 
powers to make intelligible – where this combines making sense of something with 
making something make sense.  In this aspect, experiences with aesthetic character 
overlap with experiences of empirical scientists and mathematicians; here is the 
link between them.                                                                                                               
                                                                                                  (Beardsley 1982: 292) 
This is the kind of cognitive gain that I seek to defend yet to count this cognitive gain 
alongside other contributing factors is still not enough for my purposes; after all both may 
lie as frigid bedfellows. The kind of relation I need to show is where the process of 
cognitive gain has aesthetic appeal. A parallel exists in mathematics where an aesthetic 
judgement about beauty or elegance is made about the cognitive value involved in solving 
a mathematical problem. The solution to a problem in mathematics might be simple in 
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contrast to the complexity of the problem and this contrast strikes the mathematician in 
aesthetic terms.  This task is too ambitious an undertaking for this section alone but I shall 
end with some preliminary comment to bring us closer to the discussion on aesthetic 
effectiveness developed in Chapter Four. 
Anna Christina Ribeiro refers to a direct relationship between cognitive benefit and 
aesthetic enjoyment in her paper on why we enjoy sad poetry (Ribeiro 2014: 196, 197). In 
one kind of example, the literary vehicle for cognitive gain is aesthetically pleasing for 
reasons explained by psychology ‘…formal poetic devices, such as alliteration, rhyme, 
meter, and so on, are pleasing in themselves, for reasons having to do with our auditory 
psychology, and as special aids to cognition they make the process of understanding a 
poetic message more pleasurable’ (2014: 190). In two further cases, there is a stronger link 
between cognitive gain and aesthetic experience. The reader can appreciate the succinct 
expression of an author in instances where a point is made with a minimum number of 
well-chosen words:  
The pleasure here, as in other areas of life, is that of getting more for less: fewer 
words, by virtue of being combined in novel ways, engender a greater and faster 
expansion of our ‘encyclopaedic entries’ than more words combined in the usual 
ways would have.                                                                                        
                                                                                                      (Ribeiro 2014: 196) 
In the third case, Ribeiro argues that auditory pleasure and novel expression on their own 
are not sufficient conditions on engendering aesthetic satisfaction when not accompanied 
by meaningful content (2014: 197). Cognitive gain can come down to how a given 
metaphor works which leads us to appreciate the metaphor aesthetically in so far as this 
trope communicates to us forcefully and expansively.  
Take the following lines from Shakespeare’s Antony and Cleopatra: 
Antony: O Sun, thy uprise shall I see no more! 
Fortune and Antony part here; even here 
Do we shake hands. All come to this? The hearts 
That spaniel’d me at heels, to whom I gave  
Their wishes, do discandy, melt their sweets 
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On blossoming Caesar; and this pine is bark’d 
That overtopp’d them all. Betray’d I am.   (IV. 12. 20-26) 
 
One thing I understand better from reading this passage is a certain kind of power 
relationship: the kind wielded by the nominally powerless over the nominally powerful. 
Two images, among other devices, help me to understand this. The court spaniels have 
clearly enjoyed some power over Antony who admits to appeasing them and yet they have 
withdrawn their support and now deign to lavish slavering affection on Caesar. Secondly, 
Antony’s construal of himself as a noble pine, felled, hollowed out and launched for the 
impending sea battle is an image of a leader as the very vessel of his side’s fortunes. 
Central to the relation between cognitive value and aesthetic appreciation is my admiration 
of the skill of the author in crafting these lines. I admire the artistry of how so much 
significant material is conveyed in these few lines: the pun on ‘bark’d’ that links the 
images of a slowly dying, ring-barked tree and a war ship, the alliteration of ‘hands’, 
‘hearts’ and ‘heels’, the accompanying allusion to Achilles’s weak spot, the allusion to 
Matthew (15: 26-27) where dogs are described as feeding on their master’s scraps in a 
reverse power dynamic than the one described above, inter-textual references to fortune 
and betrayal. My aesthetic appreciation of this passage would be shallow without my 
developing an understanding of the text and what the text informs me about a certain kind 
of power dynamic. I might note the pun on ‘bark’d’ but so what? My reading would have 
to end there without further comment rather than yield the results typical of literary 
analysis and interpretation. In this example, gaining a better understanding of a literary 
work has increased my aesthetic appreciation of that literary work.  
Finally, we should question the non-cognitivist account of value. Lamarque and Olsen 
point out that literary fiction enjoys an autonomous status and as a result should be valued 
on its own terms or for its own sake (Lamarque and Olsen 1994: viii). In the final chapter 
of their seminal work the authors argue that the value of literary fiction is gained from the 
process of reading and appreciation: 
Value is not inherent in discourse or in texts. It emerges only by seeing a text as 
either fictional or literary, i.e. in taking up the fictional or literary stance to the text. 
One can then see it as serving more or less well the purpose or purposes served by 
the practice. 
                                                                                 (Lamarque and Olsen 1994: 440) 
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The claim is that reading literary fiction as literature and as fiction is its own reward, that is 
reading literary fiction has intrinsic value. In contrast to, say, reading a text in order to pass 
an examination and gain a qualification. 
According to one prominent account of intrinsic value that seems plausible: X has intrinsic 
value if X gives rise to non-instrumentally valuable experiences provided it is experienced 
with understanding (Budd 1995: 4). Malcolm Budd says of intrinsic value: ‘It is the nature 
of the work that endows the work with whatever artistic value it possesses; this nature is 
what is experienced in undergoing the experience  the work offers; and the work’s artistic 
value is the intrinsic value of this experience’ (1995: 5). Budd says of instrumental value: 
‘… the instrumental value of a work of art, its beneficial or harmful, short- or long-term 
effects or influence, either on a given person or people in general – where the effects are 
consequences of the experience and not elements or aspects of the experience itself – is not 
the value of the work of art as a work of art’ (1995: 5). That leaves us having to give an 
account of the grounds for such non-instrumentally valuable experiences. Budd argues that 
there are many and various grounds for our non-instrumentally valuable experiences; with 
no a priori way of determining what gives rise to such experiences. As a result, we are to 
decide this issue on a case by case basis. However, the literary non-cognitivist rules out, in 
advance, any role for cognitive gain in the story of non-instrumental value. This non-
cognitivist exclusion of cognitive gain in yielding non-instrumental value looks 
unmotivated and consequently ad hoc. 
To sum up, Lamarque and Olsen are right to draw the distinction between receiving 
literary fiction as literature and as fiction but overstate the case that writers, readers and 
critics are not concerned with cognitive gain; where cognitive gain extends to more than 
factual accuracy. The culture of receiving literary fiction does comment on whether the 
ideas of a literary fictional work are plausible. Many works of literary fiction are valued for 
reasons other than cognitive gain; one such reason is entertainment (take as examples the 
works of Dumas and Buchan) another might involve aesthetic appreciation. However, the 
fact that literary fiction is admired for other reasons including the aesthetic appreciation 
does not entail that the cognitive and aesthetic are mutually exclusive categories. Non-
cognitivists are overly restrictive in citing the ways that readers find literary fiction 
valuable because they exclude the contribution cognitive gain makes to the aesthetic 
experience of many works. Further, it is not clear why non-cognitivists preclude the 
development of cognitive powers from the category of intrinsic (non-instrumental) value. 
As a result, non-cognitivism advances a false conclusion that cognitive value is separate 
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from the artistic value of a work. Non-cognitivists overlook the aesthetic effectiveness of a 
literary work in communicating cognitive gain; for instance the author’s careful selection 
of an apt word or image. I shall argue in section (4.7) that the success of literary devices in 
communicating cognitive gain often depends on the author’s skill and innovation.  
This chapter has shown three important things. First, that a more careful case is required to 
explain the role of the reader’s engagement with literary fiction as literature. Secondly, the 
literary cognitivist has to respond to a fourfold sceptical challenge posed by literary anti-
cognitivism. Thirdly, the literary cognitivist needs to provide a positive account as to how 
the reader’s engagement with literary devices affects his or her aesthetic appreciation of 
literary fiction in order to defeat literary non-cognitivism. Let us move to a more positive 
account of the literary cognitivist position in the remaining three chapters. First by 
explaining what is meant by ‘cognitive gain’. 
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Chapter Three: Understanding Others 
from Understanding Literary Fiction 
 
Literary cognitivists claim that there is cognitive value to reading literary fiction. 
Candidates for cognitive value are numerous and include: truth, knowledge, understanding, 
insight, revelation, disclosure and illumination (Walsh 1969: 3). Of these candidates, 
understanding is the choice of a great many literary cognitivists (Novitz 1987: 77-88; 
Graham 1997: 28, 49; Elgin: 2002: 1; Kivy 1997: 135; Kieran 2003: 69; Gibson 2007: 143-
144; Landy 2012: 12-13). The claim that understanding is the appropriate cognitive benefit 
in question is supported by the limited empirical evidence. Consider how the cognitive 
achievement is described in the surveys cited by Pettersson (2012: 171-177). The 1979 
survey conducted by Hintzenberg, Schmidt & Zobel showed that 60.5% of the 1057 
readers asked said that ‘engaging with human problems’ provided a very strong motivation 
for reading ‘literature’; while 57.3% read in order to ‘compare opinions and attitudes with 
those of others’. Charlton and associates (2001) recorded that 58% of the 1025 readers 
surveyed return to literature because ‘themes give impulse to reflection’ and 57.9% to 
‘learn about other people’. 
On my asking a small sample of readers whether they thought they had learnt anything 
from reading poetry, novels or plays, one reader referred to understanding directly when 
she said that she understood social hypocrisy better from reading Stendhal’s The Red and 
the Black. Another said she ‘saw in clearer terms’ how miscommunication in various forms 
can lead to tragedy from reading Euripides’s Hippolytus and a third said he ‘grasped’ how 
rejection could affect people from reading Steinbeck’s East of Eden. ‘Engaging with 
problems’, ‘comparing attitudes’, ‘reflecting on themes’, ‘seeing in clearer terms’ and 
‘grasping’ seems to fit ‘developing a better understanding’ more than ‘acquiring 
knowledge’. Despite frequent mention, little attempt has been made by philosophers of 
literature to specify exactly what is meant by ‘understanding’.   
Unfortunately, contemporary epistemology offers no consensus as to the nature of 
understanding so I need to make my own suggestion; such an account can only be ‘work in 
progress’ given the constraints of this project. I take as my starting point the fact that there 
are disparate things to understand as well as different ways in which they may be 
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understood. I understand: Brownian motion, alpacas, that it is never too late to change; I 
am able to reach a mutual understanding,  thank someone for being understanding and 
understand that it is not the done thing to slurp soup in public. One epistemologist 
identifies the scope of understanding as covering at least the following: rules, reasons, 
actions, passions, objectives, obstacles, techniques, tools, forms, functions, fictions, facts, 
pictures, words, equations, diagrams (Elgin 1993: 14).  
In this chapter, I am interested in our understanding of human thought and action. Section 
(3.1) sets the scene with some introductory comments on what we do when we understand 
each other better, what constitutes the domain of interpersonal understanding and sets out 
two cognitive benefits of a common sense psychological description of this domain. I offer 
a grammar of ‘understanding’ in section (3.2) which preserves the uneven contours and 
curious features of the landscape. This provides a lexicon for the rest of the project. As we 
shall see, various uses of ‘understanding’ correspond to various senses of ‘knowledge’ 
(there is one exception) although not all of these uses are pertinent to literary cognitivism. 
Section (3.2) offers a disjunctive statement suggesting various senses of ‘understanding’ 
relevant to the literary cognitivist argument. Section (3.3) focusses on understanding 
literary fiction exclusively and elaborates on what I mean by close analysis. I start to make 
the case that close analysis of a literary fictional text can generate understanding in the 
senses previously identified (this work is carried on in Chapter Four with specific 
examples from literature). Chapter Three ends with some discussion of two potential 
criticisms: first, that close reading is an elitist pursuit (section 3.4); secondly that reading 
literary fiction is subjective so does not count as genuine cognitive gain (section 3.5).  
 
3.1 Understanding human thought and action 
 
Underpinning this section is the well-rehearsed contrast between explanation and 
understanding, traditionally represented by the German terms ‘Erklären’ and ‘Verstehen’ 
respectively (for example Heal: 1998: 84; 2003: 2). These terms convey the sense of being 
given an explanation in contrast to developing an understanding. The acts of providing an 
explanation and developing an understanding are compatible, but these terms have been 
borrowed by philosophers to signify two distinctive traditions in cognitive gain: the 
technical or theoretical, represented by ‘Erklären’, and understanding the often 
idiosyncratic thought and action of human beings, represented by ‘Verstehen’. Many 
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contemporary philosophers endorse the Erklären/Verstehen distinction, for example Jane 
Heal says there is no continuum from explaining mechanical or biological complexity to 
understanding another person’s outlook on the world and consequently why a person acts 
in such a way: ‘We do not deal with our family members, friends, colleagues or fellow 
citizens as we do with volcanoes, fields of wheat or kitchen mixers, namely by trying to 
figure out the nature and layout of their innards so that we can predict and perhaps control 
them’ (Heal 1998: 97).  Rather our interpersonal understanding represents a different kind 
of understanding; though not sui generis as we may come to understand another species 
along the same lines.  
There are at least two ways in which our understanding of human thought and action are 
marked out. First, we need to take account of the inter-connectedness of multiple beliefs; 
referred to as a ‘holism of the mental’ (Heal 1986: 136). Heal says: ‘There is no clear 
upper bound on the number of different beliefs or desires that a person may have. And, 
worse, we cannot lay down in advance that for a given state these and only these others 
could be relevant to what its originating conditions and outcomes are’ (Heal 1986: 136). 
Secondly, it is not clear how we can understand human thought and action in terms of neat 
causal laws so a different approach is required (Heal 2003: 12-13). I will argue alongside 
those philosophers in the Verstehen tradition that the realm of human thought and action 
benefits from a broader conception of understanding than an exclusively theoretical or 
scientific approach permits.  
This section starts with the Aristotelian account of understanding in order to introduce the 
reader to the kind of activity that takes place when we understand human thought and 
action effectively.  I take an example from Wittgenstein’s Notes on Fraser’s Golden Bough 
of the kind of thing we seek to understand and borrow two arguments in favour of a 
common sense psychological approach from the work of Kathleen V. Wilkes. I should 
point out that in the course of this discussion nothing hangs on the architecture of 
Aristotle’s epistemology, the terminology of Wittgenstein or the anomalous monist stance 
of Wilkes in the philosophy of mind debate. I do not need to commit to any of these 
positions to make the points I make concerning how we understand each other better, the 
kind of thing we come to understand and the ways we have developed to describe what we 
understand. This section provides important groundwork for my contention that literary 
fiction describes human thought and action in a way that carries certain cognitive benefits. 
I hope to make this cognitive gain explicit in the succeeding sections.  
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Aristotle on understanding 
 
In one of the earliest accounts of understanding Aristotle says the following: 
There is also understanding, and good understanding, the qualities in virtue of 
which people are said to be understanding and of good understanding. They are not 
entirely the same as <scientific> knowledge or opinion (for then everyone would be 
understanding), nor is it one of the particular sciences, such as medicine, which 
deals with health, or geometry, which deals with spatial magnitudes. For 
understanding is concerned not with things that are eternal and immutable, nor with 
any and everything that comes into being, but with matters that may cause 
perplexity and call for deliberation. Hence its sphere is the same as that of 
prudence; but understanding and prudence are not the same, because prudence is 
imperative (since its end is what one should or should not do), and understanding 
only makes judgements. 
                                (Nicomachean Ethics VI. 10. 1142b31, trans. Thomson, J.A.K.) 
At least three details are noteworthy in this passage. First, that the kind of understanding 
(Sunesis) in question is not identical to scientific knowledge though Aristotle’s use of 
‘entirely’ admits that the understanding in question is compatible with scientific 
knowledge. Secondly, that understanding is neither theoretical and abstract nor contingent 
and particular but transcends this dichotomy. Thirdly, that understanding is related to 
Phronesis (practical wisdom) though lacks the moral imperative of Phronesis. 
The distinction between Sophia (theoretical wisdom) and Phronesis (practical wisdom) is 
well documented in commentaries on (Nicomachean Ethics VI. 8-11) so I shall rehearse 
the contrast only briefly. While both Sophia and Phronesis are cognitive achievements, 
theoretical wisdom is: more akin to propositional knowledge, something finished, 
exclusively concerned with universals, only deductive, abstract and judged on its own 
merits. Practical wisdom, contrariwise, is: more like ability knowledge, on-going, 
concerned with particulars as well as universals, uses both deduction and induction, relates 
to a wide range of fields (legislative, administrative, judicial, deliberative, economics, 
physical fitness and household management) and involves auxiliary concepts such as 
resourcefulness, correct deliberation, understanding, judgement, cleverness and being 
scrupulous. For Aristotle, Phronesis is preceded by the process of appraising a situation for 
oneself and appraising a person’s description of a situation (Sunesis). Sunesis is translated 
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as ‘understanding’ but has the particular sense of seeing the point in something, coming to 
a reasonable judgement over an issue or sizing something up. 
In her paper ‘Practical Wisdom: a mundane account’ Rosalind Hursthouse draws our 
attention to the role of Sunesis and the importance of reading the situation correctly before 
reaching any judgement or performing any action: 
We should, I think, allow ourselves to be struck by how often finding out exactly 
what ‘the situation’ is, with a view to acting well, involves judging what other 
people say, particularly about their own, or someone else’s, actions and/or feelings, 
past, present or future. It is an absolutely indispensable part of knowing one’s way 
about in the human world, which is a world of language-using creatures.                                  
                                                                    (Hursthouse 2006: 291 italics in original) 
This particular form of understanding prior to making a decision and performing an action 
may be called ‘understanding’, ‘comprehension’ or just ‘getting a situation right’. 
Aristotle’s discussion of Sunesis though slim in the text is worth closer examination.  The 
process of sizing up a situation involves arranging the information one has gathered in such 
a way as to make sense of that information. This is an intellectual activity involving 
‘puzzling over and deliberation’ (Nicomachean Ethics VI. 10. 1143a5).  The phrase 
‘puzzling over’ is sometimes translated as ‘questioning’ (for differing translations see 
Irwin 1999: 95; Crisp 2000: 113; Rowe and Broadie 2002: 185). There is a parallel with 
philosophising here in so far as both philosophy and Sunesis involves the marshalling of 
material to make an overall case coherent. Yet deliberation is not the theoretical exercise 
referred to in Book Three of the Nicomachean Ethics and is described as context sensitive 
(Wiggins 1980: 236-237). Much of what Aristotle says about Sunesis in Book VI, Chapter 
10 is negative in nature:  Sunesis is not exactly the same as knowledge or judgement, 
otherwise anyone with a little knowledge or anyone who makes a judgement would be 
‘comprehending’.  Sunesis is not limited to any single area of investigation.  Sunesis is not 
concerned with universal truths nor contingent facts.  Sunesis is not like having or 
acquiring wisdom.  
As for the positive account of Sunesis, Aristotle emphasises that understanding entails an 
active process of working things out.  Learning is a broad term covering both the 
committing of facts to memory as well as active discovery. The contrast between these 
kinds of learning is implicit in the way we talk: one is given an explanation but comes to or 
reaches an understanding. ‘Manthanein’, the Greek word for the latter kind of learning, 
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conveys a sense that the process of cognitive gain is on-going just as when I advise 
someone to eat healthily I mean that they should continue to heed the advice. The process 
of coming to understand involves making mistakes, rearranging the material by trial and 
error, seeing how something develops over time and acquainting oneself with territories 
related to what is understood.  Engaging in a process of discovery as opposed to being fed 
propositional knowledge seems to put the cognitive agent at a distinct advantage in passing 
a common test for understanding, namely whether one is able to apply what is understood 
to new and challenging situations.  There are benefits in using, rather than just accruing, 
the material.  
This process of Sunesis as ‘getting a better sense of p’ or ‘forming a considered judgement 
of p’ takes place in many everyday contexts.  The same process is at work when we take 
into account other people’s testimonies or reports of an incident or person.  In her 
discussion of Sunesis and Eusunesia (excellence in this form of understanding) Hursthouse 
says: 
People with such knowledge have a better understanding of other people than the 
inexperienced, and can make better judgements than them about more than the 
genuineness of expressions of feeling. They have a perceptual capacity, 
‘perceptiveness’ or ‘sensitivity’, to see or hear that, despite a smiling front, others 
are hurt, embarrassed, uncertain, angry, frightened, worried, or that their apparent 
shiftiness or brazenness is no more than embarrassment, that their expression of 
gratitude, though awkward, is genuine, or…. This is the perceptual capacity that 
Nussbaum has discussed and vividly illustrated, and rightly so. Like 
comprehension, it is a capacity absolutely requisite for finding out what ‘the 
situation’ is in many central cases in which action is called for. 
                                                                                                (Hursthouse 2006: 297)   
The motivation for Sunesis, as Aristotle points out, is not to manipulate others but to 
understand fellow humans better which is rewarding in itself.   
 
The sphere of interpersonal understanding 
 
Wittgenstein famously said that: ‘What has to be accepted, the given, is - so one could say 
- forms of life’ (Philosophical Investigations II. Xi. 226e italics in orginal). ‘Forms of life’ 
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or ‘Lebensformen’ may also be translated as ‘ways of life’ and encompasses how an 
individual or group of individuals think and feel about the world as well as how such a 
world-view is manifest in verbal and non-verbal behaviour. Marie McGinn draws our 
attention to the fact that ‘form of life’ for Wittgenstein is a matter of culture rather than 
biology in the following passage: 
The idea of a form of life applies rather to historical groups of individuals who are 
bound together into a community by a shared set of complex, language-involving 
practices. These practices are grounded in biological needs and capacities, but 
insofar as these are mediated and transformed by a set of intricate, historically-
specific language-games, our human form of life is fundamentally cultural (rather 
than biological) in nature. Coming to share, or understand, the form of life of a 
group of individual human beings means mastering, or coming to understand, the 
intricate language-games that are essential to its characteristic practices. It is this 
vital connection between language and the complex system of practices and 
activities binding a community together that Wittgenstein intends to emphasize in 
the concept of a ‘form of life’. 
                                                                                                       (McGinn 2006: 51)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
It seems natural for us to be curious about how others view the world, how world-views 
differ from our own and so seek better ‘interpersonal understanding’.  
In the course of his response, Wittgenstein gives many examples of cultural practice that 
do not fit the scope of scientific study as no scientific account succeeds in helping the 
onlooker understand the situation better. I shall limit myself to one example, that of kissing 
a picture, which occurs in the following passage from Wittgenstein’s Remarks on Fraser’s 
The Golden Bough: 
Burning in effigy. Kissing the picture of a loved one. This is obviously not based 
on a belief that it will have a definite effect on the object which the picture 
represents. It aims at some satisfaction and achieves it. Or rather, it does not aim at 
anything; we act in this way and then feel satisfied. 
One could also kiss the name of the loved one, and here the representation by the 
name would be clear. 
                                                                 (Wittgenstein 2010: 4e italics in original) 
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The question is how best to gain interpersonal understanding? Wittgenstein declares in an 
earlier comment: 
We can only describe and say, “Human life is like that.”     
                                                     (Wittgenstein 2010: 3e.  Italics in original) 
Wittgenstein’s target in these notes was The Golden Bough (1890) by Cambridge 
anthropologist James Fraser which criticised cultural practices as though such practices 
were the result of misguided scientific beliefs. I argue, along with Wittgenstein and other 
philosophers in the Verstehen tradition, that a great deal of human action (planting a tree in 
remembrance, Morris dancing and party political broadcasts) is best understood in cultural 
rather than scientific terms.     
 
Common sense psychological description 
 
In her paper ‘The Relationship between Scientific Psychology and Common Sense 
Psychology’ (1991) Kathleen V. Wilkes argues that common sense descriptions of human 
thought and action enjoy explanatory power. Her target is the eliminative materialism of 
(Churchland 1981 and Stich 1983). In rehearsing Wilkes’s argument, I am not defending 
anomalous monism as a position in the philosophy of mind, eliminativists may well be 
correct in their view that common sense talk of mental states are incapable of explaining 
what consciousness is.
25
 I am interested in the argument that there is cognitive gain in 
describing human thought and action in an everyday, unscientific way. Wilkes draws a 
sharp distinction between scientific psychology and what she terms ‘common sense 
psychology’ where we cannot judge common sense psychology by the standards of 
scientific psychology. The mistake made by critics of common sense psychology is to view 
this form of description as commensurable with the scientific. 
According to Wilkes, both common sense psychology and scientific psychology purport to 
explain and predict. However, scientific psychology, unlike common sense psychology, 
‘wants to do this systematically’ (Wilkes 1991: 20). A systematic investigation involves 
showing how entities may be expressed as natural kinds and how a given phenomenon 
‘comes under’ a general explanation. Common sense psychology may classify things too 
                                                          
25 For further discussion see (Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson 1996: 240-242). 
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(kisses may be lingering, tender, tentative or disinhibited) but classifies things in a looser 
way. Wilkes gives the following example: 
[Common sense psychology] is no more interested in natural kinds than a cook or a 
churchgoer is interested in the close species relationship between garlic and lilies, 
which undoubtedly engages the interests of biologists.                  (Wilkes 1991: 20) 
Further differences between scientific psychology and common sense psychology are 
identified in Wilkes’s paper and I shall rehearse them briefly here. Common sense 
psychology does not strive for precise laws just loose rules of thumb (1991: 22). These 
‘rough and handy rules of thumb’ are more like the rules of friendship where it is expected, 
but never stated explicitly, that friends remember each other’s birthdays. Wilkes points out 
that it is an ambition of science that ‘experiments and observations should be repeatable’ 
but this ambition is not shared by common sense psychology (1991: 23); it does not help 
my understanding of why that person kissed a name in a letter if they were to perform this 
action again. Findings in scientific psychology aim to be context-transcendent while this is 
not an ambition of common sense psychology (1991: 24). Scientific psychology aspires to 
methodological rigour (1991: 24) while no such aspiration exists in common sense 
psychology; I cannot envisage asking someone ‘how they are’ in a methodologically 
rigorous way without this being off putting. Common sense psychology, unlike scientific 
psychology, enjoys many purposes: ‘joking, jeering, exhorting, discouraging, blaming, 
insulting, evaluating, advertising, hinting’ (1991: 25) to name just a few. 
The differences identified by Wilkes further illuminate the view that common sense 
psychology and scientific psychology provide very different approaches and that common 
sense psychology enjoys autonomy from scientific psychology. Common sense psychology 
is at work when we seek better interpersonal understanding. One implication of this 
discussion is that there is a false entailment from stating that common sense psychology is 
ill-equipped to offer any kind of explanation as to the nature of consciousness, to the 
conclusion that common sense psychology has no explanatory power at all. Paul 
Churchland says: 
 
The FP [folk psychology] of the Greeks is essentially the FP we use today, and we 
are negligibly better at explaining human behaviour in its terms than was 
Sophocles. This is a very long period of stagnation and infertility for any theory to 
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display, especially when faced with such an enormous backlog of anomalies and 
mysteries in its own explanatory domain.  
                                                                                                       (Churchland 1981: 74-75).   
The important contrast is between scientific psychology and common sense psychology so, 
for the sake of argument, we can take ‘folk psychology’ and ‘common sense psychology’ 
to be equivalent (cf. Wilkes 1991: 16). Churchland is right to say that we can offer a better 
scientific psychological analysis than Sophocles owing to the progress of science but he is 
not right to say that we can offer a better interpersonal analysis of human life and love 
because of the progress of science. 
That interpersonal understanding is a different enterprise to our seeking a scientific, 
psychological understanding does not mean that on some occasions the two enterprises of 
scientific and interpersonal understanding never inform each other. I am not advocating 
some form of anti-scientific obscurantism and neither is Wilkes (see her comments on how 
scientific psychology is central to our understanding depression 1991: 33); only that the 
two cognitive processes are distinctive. One example of constructive and consistent inter-
permeation between the scientific and interpersonal understanding occurs in social 
anthropology. Some critics of the literary turn in social anthropology complained that 
literary descriptions and literary allusions compromised the serious standing of their 
subject and advocated a return to the exclusively empirical (e.g. Crapanzano 1986: 58).
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For others the literary turn in social anthropology and its empirical backlash represented a 
false dichotomy:  
Explaining cultural representations, interpreting them: two autonomous tasks that 
contribute to our understanding of cultural phenomena. Both can achieve relevance, 
but in opposite ways: the more general an explanation, the more relevant it is; what 
makes an interpretation relevant, on the other hand, is not its generality but its 
depth, that is its faithfulness to the nexus of mental representations that lies under 
any particular human behavior. Even though they make a lesser use of imagination 
and a greater one of experience, ethnographers achieve relevance in the manner of 
novelists…                                         
                                                                                                        (Sperber 1982: 34) 
                                                          
26 ‘The literary turn’ occurred in three waves (Geertz 1973; Shostak 1981; Luhrmann 1996). 
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Disagreement between social anthropologists as to the nature of their subject should not 
detain us further and are too parochial to damage my thesis. What should detain us further 
is the exact cognitive gain promised in the domain of interpersonal understanding. The 
autonomy of common sense psychology from scientific psychology
27
 does not make the 
case for cognitive gain but points to how such a case may be made and we shall take up 
this challenge for the rest of this section.  
In the course of her paper ‘The Relationship between Scientific Psychology and Common 
Sense Psychology’ (1991) Wilkes suggests two further ways in which common sense, non-
scientific psychology may help develop our interpersonal understanding. First, a common 
sense, non-scientific psychological description is generally tailored to a particular 
individual in a particular situation and as a consequence contributes an understanding that 
is missed by generality: 
CSP [common sense psychology] and SP [scientific psychology] are both 
concerned to explain and predict the behaviour of humans and other animals.  But 
after that anodyne point, the similarities end.  SP attempts to explain and predict 
generally. CSP however is interested in explaining the particular.  George wants to 
know why his daughter Georgina has become a skinhead, a mathematics professor, 
or a born-again Christian, rather than why teenagers are tempted to become 
skinheads, to take up mathematics, or to get waylaid by fundamentalism. And, he 
would have a much better chance of finding a satisfactory explanation if he looked 
to the specificities of Georgina’s individual history – which as her father he 
probably knows rather well rather than if he resorted to his local university 
collection in psychology (which is not to say that he would not find indirect help 
there for his researches…). 
                (Wilkes 1991: 19-20) 
Wilkes grants inter-permeation between scientific psychology and common sense 
psychology but maintains that the application of general scientific laws can miss the full 
and fine detail required for a thorough grasp of a situation. Georgina, in becoming a 
skinhead may be making a religious, political or fashion statement none of which fall 
under neat causal laws. Donald Davidson (2001b: 233) argues that innumerable 
considerations are relevant to human thought and action to the extent that it is impossible 
                                                          
27 A claim made elsewhere in the literature on anomalous monism (Davidson 1980; Horgan & Woodward 
1985). 
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to state such considerations a priori or formulate any neat causal laws that govern the 
phenomena. 
Secondly, Wilkes contends that our common sense, non-scientific descriptive language has 
evolved to portray subtle and nuanced distinctions in human action and behaviour. So, for 
example, my choice of ‘taciturn’ over ‘speechless’, ‘quiet’ or ‘dried up’ plays an important 
communicative role in my communicating what I see in other people. Wilkes makes the 
case as follows: 
One reason for the success of CSP [Common Sense Psychology] is the riotous 
richness of the framework.  We can exploit overlapping shades of meaning, 
nuances, and ambiguities, to convey accurately and precisely whatever we want.  
We can explain behaviour by citing wanting, wishing, desiring, craving, hoping, 
lusting after, longing for; all in context these may convey quite different 
implications.  And, as we have already seen, since CSP explanations are typically 
of specific actions of specific agents at specific times, they all belong to an equally 
specific and individual context.  Consider the size of Roget’s Thesaurus and then 
consider what proportion of it is given over to ‘mental’ terms - a colossal 
proportion. Consider, too, how few of these terms have sharp definitions.   It is 
precisely because they are free of such – they are in fact amorphous and nuance-
ridden – that they enjoy the flexibility and richness that allows us to wield them to 
such effect in a given context.  The richness of the context ensures that what is 
conveyed is precise, accurate, and economical. 
                                                                                                               (Wilkes 1991: 22 -23) 
 
My contention is that Wilkes’s arguments can be applied a fortiori to literary fiction qua 
literature. Wilkes does not comment on literary fiction directly as she says any mundane 
example of common sense psychological description will do just as well as an example 
(1991: 18). However, in the course of her discussion she cites ‘the lasting appeal’ of 
Homer, Euripides, Chaucer, Proust, Dostoevsky and Henry James (1991: 17-18) which 
suggests she acknowledges such a link. In the final paragraphs I intend to make this link 
clearer. 
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Interpersonal understanding and literary fiction 
 
Noel Carroll defends the literary author’s powers of critical observation as follows: 
 
… the realist novelist as a young artist makes the ability to dissect society part of 
his curriculum.  By the time he is mature, if everything has worked out well, he is 
an expert in social affairs.  Moreover, it needs to be added that with many of the 
things for which realist authors possess an expert eye – such as the emerging signs 
of status, the daily intrigues of micro-power, the ways of the heart, everyday 
anxiety, or the emerging claims of social justice – it is scarcely clear exactly whom 
the better experts might be.                                                                                       
                                                                                                       (Carroll 2007: 36) 
 
These lines remind me of William McCready’s description of his close friend Charles 
Dickens who he described as having ‘a clutching eye’. This eye for detail does not involve 
technical expertise, and is all the better for that, but involves the power of keen social 
observation. While the reader may well have noticed something of what is documented 
from their experience of the world beyond the literary work, this reader may not have 
noticed what is recorded in such detail, made certain connections, drawn out certain 
consequences nor described what is before them so appropriately.   
 
Take the following extract from Chapter Eight of John Kennedy Toole’s A Confederacy of 
Dunces as an illustration of what I take to be a literary fictional description of human 
action. The passage describes Santa Battaglia kissing a photograph of her mother which 
ties in with Wittgenstein’s example of kissing a photograph:  
‘Poor momma,’ Santa said feelingly, giving the picture a loud wet kiss. The grease 
on the glass that covered the photograph showed the frequency of these little 
affectionate onslaughts. ‘You sure had it hard, kid.’ The little black coals of Sicilian 
eyes glared almost animatedly at Santa from the snapshot.’ The only picture of you 
I got, momma, and you standing in a alley. Ain’t that a shame.’ 
Santa sighed at the unfairness of it all and slammed the picture down on the 
mantelpiece among the bowl of wax fruit and the bouquet of paper zinnias and the 
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statue of the Virgin Mary and the figurine of the infant of Prague. Then she went 
back to the kitchen to get some ice cubes and one of the kitchen chairs. 
                 (Kennedy Toole 1981: 193-194) 
Read in a casual way, paying attention only to what happens in the story, such a 
description merely sets out how a female character kisses a photograph of her mother then 
returns to her household chores. Read in a close way, the reader is informed by omniscient 
narration that Santa Battaglia is a feeling, affectionate and somewhat forceful individual.  
Forcefulness is conveyed by the words ‘onslaughts’ and ‘slammed’ and the potential of 
Santa’s inheriting something of that Sicilian stare. The metaphor of ‘little black coals of 
eyes’ suggests potential fire and contrasts with the reference to ice at the end of the 
passage. Here is a contrast between what is elemental in the context of the mundane. There 
is also a jarring topic shift between reflection on family and fairness and the functional 
demands of the kitchen. For Santa, time for such reflection is an indulgence. There is irony 
in both Santa’s Christian name (appearance suggests that she is far from saintly but 
appearances can deceive) and in the items displayed on her mantelpiece: the photograph, 
artificial flowers, fruit and devotional statues are all substitutes for the real thing. The irony 
is that Santa is an entirely genuine character and not a fake.  
So this is not an unvarnished account of someone kissing a picture but an artfully 
constructed description which yields significant detail to the reader on close analysis. I 
suggest that there is a twofoldness in how we read a literary fictional text that is not found 
in other fictions. On one hand we read to follow the story but on the other hand we analyse 
how the story is told. In section (3.3) I make the case that reading literary fiction involves 
more effort than other common sense, non-technical descriptions of human interaction. In 
consequence, I argue further that it is the reader’s engagement with literary fiction as 
literature that plays the most significant role in coming to a better interpersonal 
understanding.  
On the back of these introductory comments, the cognitive benefits of interpersonal 
understanding come out as strongly skills based. An individual possessing interpersonal 
understanding is able to: size up a situation effectively, pick up on significant and often 
subtle detail through common-sense description and use his or her powers of reflection. 
Further work is required to distinguish between the kinds of understanding that are at work 
when we understand each other better. I shall pay particular attention in the next section to 
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which senses of understanding are appropriate to the context of gaining a better 
understanding of others through reading a work of literary fiction. 
 
3.2 Five senses of ‘understanding’ 
 
Willie Russell’s play Educating Rita tells the story of a Liverpool woman returning to 
education through a course with the Open University. The course on English Literature 
helps Rita develop her intellectual confidence, curiosity, sensitivity and sophistication in 
thought and expression. Rita recommends a poetry anthology by Roger McGough to her 
tutor, Frank, at their first meeting: 
RITA I’ll bring y’the book – it’s great 
FRANK Thank you 
RITA You probably won’t think it’s any good. 
FRANK Why? 
RITA It’s the sort of poetry you can understand 
Rita understands McGough’s poetry in a number of ways: she knows what the words 
mean, what the jokes or allusions are and what the poem is about. Contrariwise, someone 
starting a course in literature will find unfamiliar words, opaque themes and obscure 
references in the poetry favoured by Frank. There are different ways of understanding 
poetry as there are different ways of understanding a broad range of things that people 
claim to understand. The important contrast is not between what Frank understands about 
his poetry and what Rita understands about McGough’s work but between the different 
ways anyone can be said to understand anything, including poetry. In the following 
discussion I shall challenge the assumption that understanding refers to a single cognitive 
process and argue instead that ‘understanding’ is a polysemous and context-sensitive term. 
There is a tendency to write about understanding as if it were a single phenomenon and in 
so doing commit what has been termed ‘the curse of the definite article’ (Chappell 2014: 
5). This error occurs when one frames a question in such a way as to preclude the 
possibility of there being more than one answer. The question ‘what is the meaning of 
life?’ puts us on the scent of a single quarry, the meaning of life, and ignores the possibility 
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that we might have set a whole herd running. It is telling that the question ‘Is 
understanding a species of knowledge?’ predominates the virtue epistemologists’ 
discussion (Zagzebski 2001; Kvanvig 2003: 185-203; Grimm 2006: 515-535; Pritchard 
2010: 66-88). Reference to ‘understanding’ in singular terms does not allow for the 
possibility that ‘understanding’, like ‘knowledge’, has more than one sense. The question 
‘Is understanding a species of knowledge?’ should invite the question ‘What senses of 
understanding and knowledge are we talking about?’  
In order to compare and contrast understanding to knowledge, I need to say what is meant 
by ‘knowledge’. I shall argue, along with ‘most contemporary philosophers,’ that 
‘knowledge’ comes in at least three different forms: 
For most philosophers today, the paradigm of knowledge is propositional 
knowledge. Of course most contemporary philosophers are likely to accept that 
there are other kinds of knowledge too. They may, for example (and these are the 
two commonest examples), agree that there is also knowledge-how (ability 
knowledge), or knowledge-what-it’s-like (experiential knowledge); or both. But 
these, they are likely to say or assume, are marginal or secondary cases; it is 
propositional knowledge that is primary.                                                                                                                                                               
                                                                                                    (Chappell 2014: 264)    
Knowing who, where, when, which, why and whether are often combined in a category 
termed ‘knowledge-wh’ and are all instances of propositional knowledge; that is to say 
what is known can be expressed in a given statement or proposition. There is a sense of 
understanding that equates with each of these senses of ‘knowledge’. For instance when I 
say ‘I understand why Bob didn’t apply for that promotion’ I mean that I know the whys 
and wherefores. This does not mean that propositional knowledge alone accounts for 
understanding in these circumstances as we shall see from the first three cases of 
understanding below. There is a further honorific sense of understanding that involves 
applying certain skills to the body of propositions in order to achieve a better 
understanding. In this honorific case ‘to understand’ refers to ‘know how’. There are also 
cases where ‘to understand’ refers to experiential knowledge.  
I only want to draw the reader’s attention to the fact that there are different forms of 
knowledge and understanding in our language and thinking. I need not commit to any 
metaphysical claims about the relations between types of knowledge, between types of 
understanding and between types of knowledge and understanding; for instance that 
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knowledge-how is really knowledge-that (Stanley and Williamson 2001) or that 
knowledge-that is really knowledge-how. In what follows I maintain that know-how is 
different from propositional knowledge. For one thing, the contrast between knowledge 
that and knowledge how is too rich for me to describe one form of knowledge in terms of 
the other. At the same time I do not have space to document the various interesting 
differences between these classifications of knowledge, for instance that knowledge that 
need not entail knowledge how or that knowledge how comes in degrees but knowledge 
that does not. Lastly, by way of introductory comment, there are cases where ‘my 
understanding of something’ does not equate to knowledge at all but rather involves the 
forming of an interpretation. My sole purpose, in what follows, is to provide a fuller 
account of the senses of ‘understanding’ than is otherwise available in order to identify 
which senses of understanding are relevant to the cognitive gain from reading literary 
fiction. 
 
 ‘Understanding’ as propositional knowledge 
 
There is a sense of understanding that equates to propositional knowledge so I might say: 
‘I understand how the heart works’ meaning ‘I know that the heart works like a pump’. If 
one really knows that the heart is a pump then one is able to explain what this proposition 
means in more than one way and talk convincingly about it. As is the case with knowledge, 
my understanding that the heart is a pump cannot be based on the parroting of facts or 
guesswork but, properly construed, requires that I accept certain facts and can provide 
justification for my acceptance.  
While a sense of understanding equates to ‘knowledge that’, there is a kind of brute and 
boring fact that we may be said to know but where to substitute ‘understand’ would alter 
the meaning.  Consider:  
‘I understand that it is 9.30 am’ 
The use of ‘understand’ sounds tentative as if the speaker were not sure of the time but 
seeking confirmation.
28
 The fact that ‘understand’ is misplaced in this sentence, given the 
speaker knows the correct time, may be explained by the prevalence of the honorific sense 
of ‘understand’. We generally choose the term ‘understand’ on occasions when there is an 
                                                          
28 In this instance, the sense of understanding relates to ‘forming an interpretation’, see below. 
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impressive cognitive gain involved, and this renders the use of ‘understand’ incongruous 
when there doesn’t seem to be anything more to the cognitive process than the registering 
of a fact. That the statement ‘I understand that it is 9.30 am’ sounds either wrong or 
tentative does not undermine the claim that sometimes ‘understand’ means ‘to know a 
fact’.  
In recent years, virtue epistemologists have granted a higher, honorific status to 
understanding as being more comprehensive than knowledge (Elgin 1993: 14; 2007: 44; 
Cooper 1994: 3-5; Zagzebski 2001: 244; 2009: 6-7; 141-9; Riggs 2003: 214-215; Kvanvig 
2003: 186, 192-193; Pritchard 2008: 335; Grimm 2012: 103-117). I am sympathetic to the 
idea that some forms of understanding are more comprehensive than some forms of 
knowledge; it is only that virtue epistemologists do not give us the full picture when it 
comes to what might count as understanding. If one form of understanding is the same as a 
form of knowledge then developing that form of understanding cannot be better than the 
corresponding form of knowledge.  While my account cannot come close to an exhaustive 
account of ‘understanding’, the analysis does enough to show the diversity of cognitive 
gain at work when someone understands something better. It comes as no surprise that 
someone who navigates through a complex of data, or someone else who is able to ask 
insightful questions on the back of such data, or add non-propositional elements, does 
more than gather and regurgitate the data. Hence it is right to award some forms of 
understanding with an honorific status. 
While many readers gain propositional knowledge from literary fiction, I may learn about 
Regency etiquette from reading Pride and Prejudice or learn that it is true of the fiction 
that Mrs Bennett has five children; such cognitive gain does not seem the basis for a fitting 
or interesting defence of literary cognitivism. A cognitivist can concede to the literary anti-
cognitivist that propositional knowledge is better learnt from a specialist source; after all a 
sociologist or historian treat fictional cases as very different kinds of evidence about the 
attitudes people held at a given time. Yet this concession does not compromise the literary 
cognitivist case. The kind of understanding identified here, understanding as propositional 
knowledge, is secondary or even coincidental to other cognitive gain from literary fiction.  
So we can say: 
 When literary cognitivists claim that reading literary fiction develops understanding 
they may mean ‘understanding’ as synonymous with discrete propositional 
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knowledge but are more likely to mean understanding in some other sense such as 
the exercising of certain skills. 
 
‘Understanding’ as ‘knowing what is meant by’ 
 
Understanding what someone means, for instance when they say ‘it is raining cats and 
dogs’ is a case of knowing that they mean ‘there is a lot of rain falling with force’. In some 
circumstances, there is more to understand from the pragmatic context of the utterance. 
Ordinary language provides a paradigm, for example when I say: 
‘Martina understands what Martin said’ 
I mean  
‘Martina knows what Martin said’ 
Martina, a native Czech speaker learning English, can understand what Martin said in the 
basic sense of knowing what the words in a sentence mean. Martina’s sister, who has no 
English, would not know what the sentence means. If Martina’s sister has a keen enough 
ear then she may be able to repeat the words accurately so ‘knows’ or ‘understands’ what 
was said in this more fundamental respect. Martina’s understanding of what was said, in 
some cases, may not be sufficient for her to be said to really understand what was said. 
What makes understanding in the semantic sense interesting is the potential to grasp layers 
of meaning that may surround the statement and which the speaker intends the listener to 
be aware of. We talk about ‘reading between the lines’- meaning one possesses an 
awareness of the context not just the literal meaning of what is said - and here we have a 
case of ‘understanding between the lines’. Martina really understands what Martin said if 
she grasps that what was said is an allusion, pun or secret message. Martina may also 
understand something more about what Martin said if she is able to judge that an office in-
joke was particularly well used on that occasion. If Martina understands all of these things 
in addition to what is stated directly we can call the cognitive gain a ‘fuller ‘or ‘more 
thorough’ understanding.  
William Tolhurst (1979) provides some helpful analysis when he argues that what an 
utterance means cannot always be solely determined by reference to the word sequence 
meaning of that utterance and that an important role is played on occasion by what an 
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utterer means by his or her use of a linguistic token. The comment ‘nice trousers’ may be 
used as a compliment or as a sarcastic jibe where nothing in the word sequence gives an 
audience any clue as to which meaning is apt. In these cases, and they need not be 
sophisticated literary cases, the audience needs to know something about the authorial 
intention, recognise the utterer’s tone, or know something of the context. Tolhurst says: 
The difficulty which I have had in understanding a poem such as ‘The Red 
Wheelbarrow’ by William Carlos Williams has nothing to do with not 
understanding the meaning of the sentence which the poem instantiates and quite a 
lot to do with the point or force of the sentence which is given in a specification of 
its meaning as an utterance.  
                                                                                                      (Tolhurst 1979: 14) 
So understanding what is meant by a word or phrase extends beyond the reader’s 
understanding the literal meaning of words and includes tone, authorial intention and 
allusion. Understanding what is meant, in this broader sense, still counts as knowledge that 
where the kind of tone is possible to articulate.  
A basic sense of understanding as ‘knowing what is meant by’ can be gained from reading 
literary fiction owing to the fact that reading such texts may increase the reader’s 
vocabulary ˗ but the literary cognitivist’s claim goes further than this sense. A broader 
understanding of what is meant is a candidate for the kind of cognitive gain at stake so let 
us add: 
 When literary cognitivists claim that reading literary fiction develops understanding 
they do not mean ‘understanding’ in the sense of knowing what words in a literary 
fiction mean, but may mean ‘understanding’ as an awareness of the layers of 
meaning to be found in a given utterance in the literary fiction. 
 
Understanding as explanation (knowing why something happened) 
 
In spite of the historical distinction drawn between Verstehen (understanding) and Erklären 
(explanation) there is a sense of understanding that equates to ‘being able to offer an 
explanation’. This third type of understanding, as explanation, is prominent in the 
philosophy of science and tends to refer to a causal history or to general laws or some 
[94] 
 
combination of causal history and laws. Peter Lipton says of the causal model of 
explanation: ‘Understanding is not some sort of super-knowledge, but simply more 
knowledge: knowledge of the phenomenon and knowledge about its causes’ (Lipton 1991: 
32). This kind of understanding is an instance of propositional knowledge but includes 
knowledge of how facts relate in order to enable an individual to know why p occurs which 
is to be able to give an explanation of p. There is a further honorific sense of understanding 
in this context where someone might be praised for offering a good explanation in the 
sense of not just offering a description of a given system but being able to draw on 
elements of that system quickly and adroitly (this seems to be an additional case of 
understanding as know-how, discussed below). 
In Wayne Wright’s paper ‘Why Naturalize Consciousness?’ (2007) the author says 
‘…there is an authentic, deep form of understanding that comes with a good control 
explanation’ (2007: 599). A control explanation is one that says: when you have X but not 
C then you don’t get Y; when you have X and C then you do get Y. Wright (2007: 595-
598) points out that any feeling that one has understood the target phenomenon is not a 
reliable indicator as to whether genuine comprehension has taken place; that is enjoying ‘a 
warm glow of satisfaction at having understood p’ is neither a necessary nor sufficient 
condition on understanding p. In contrast, being in possession of a good control 
explanation is both necessary and sufficient for understanding p. James Woodward offers a 
plausible account of a good control explanation in his Making Things Happen. 
Woodward’s manipulationist conception of explanation focusses on control and 
manipulation ‘…the distinguishing feature of causal explanations, so conceived, is that 
they are explanations that furnish information that is potentially relevant to manipulation 
and control; they tell us how, if we were able to change the value of one or more variables, 
we could change the value of other variables’ (Woodward 2003: 6). So one understands 
why something happens if one is able to make it happen or stop it from happening.  
This account of explanation works in individual as well as general cases. Old Fred 
‘understands’ the idiosyncrasies of his tractor because he is able to explain how he works 
his tractor, for instance by turning the starter motor in a certain way. The test for this third 
type of understanding, understanding as explanation, is the ability to apply knowledge to 
different settings. The evidence that old Fred really understands tractors is the fact that 
people from all over the county bring their temperamental machines to his workshop. 
Understanding as knowing why something happened tends to apply, though is not 
exclusive to, scientific or technical fields. 
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I agree that there is a form of understanding where being able to offer an explanation is 
sufficient to gain said understanding and that a good control explanation is sufficient for an 
explanation but I do not think, as Wright seems to suggest,  that this is the only form of 
understanding available. It is hard to see what work control explanations would do in 
understanding literary fiction. Nevertheless, there seems to be common ground between 
understanding as explanation and the reader gaining understanding from literary fiction in 
three important respects. First, what is understood from a literary work tends to involve 
seeing a fuller picture. Secondly, someone may be said to understand the fuller picture 
better if they are able to navigate quickly and adeptly around the fuller picture (navigation 
is discussed separately below). Thirdly, the understanding gained from literary sources 
tends to involve the ability to reason about similar cases. Hence we can add: 
 When literary cognitivists claim that reading literary fiction develops understanding 
they can mean that reading literary fiction encourages the reader to set out and 
navigate a body of propositions and apply the understanding accrued to similar 
cases. 
 
Understanding as knowledge how  
 
There is a fourth sense of ‘understanding’ which equates to ‘knowledge how’ or ‘know-
how’. What is meant by know-how? Person S has know-how if he or she is able to exercise 
some competence when called upon. I stipulate that knowledge how enjoys the 
accompanying competence to avoid the following kind of counter examples: 
…a ski instructor may know how to perform a certain complex stunt, without being 
able to perform it herself. Similarly, a master pianist who loses both of her arms in 
a tragic car accident still knows how to play the piano.  
                                                                              (Stanley and Williamson 2001: 6).  
There is a common use of ‘understand’, for instance when someone nods and says ‘I 
understand what to do’ where the person indicates that he or she knows what to do and is 
competent to get on and do it. I favour ‘competence’ over ‘ability’ as the former term 
covers what can be learnt and carried out, and this is what I take the term to mean, whereas 
‘ability’ carries the connotation of some innate talent. Of course, there may be cases where 
an innate talent, having a nose for something, influences our understanding. For example, a 
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poet may understand when to stop honing a verse where such understanding may be the 
result of a feel for the creative process as well as experience. In adding ‘when called upon’ 
I mean that competences aren’t performed by accident or luck. There are instances where 
one calls upon one’s own competences.  
Many competences are practical in nature: I may know how to canoe, shoe a horse or tie 
my shoe laces. Understanding as know-how presents an opportunity to perform a task 
competently or with degrees of efficiency. I understand how to shoe a horse efficiently, for 
example, when I possess strength and dexterity, effective timing, ingenuity when faced 
with a testing or unfamiliar situation and a sense of when to give a reassuring scratch to the 
horse. It seems, and I am aware that this is a separate debate, that being able to describe 
what one should do propositionally is not the whole story here. Other competences are not 
so hands on and refer to epistemic skills applied to a body of propositions. I know how or 
understand how to call default assumptions into question when I use the Socratic Method 
effectively. In many cases, understanding in the sense of knowing how to do something 
will cover a range of practical competence and epistemic skills. For instance, when I 
navigate with a map I read the map and know how to use a compass. Interpreting a literary 
text is sometimes referred to as ‘practical criticism’. This description suggests 
commonality between the skills exercised when we read a poem, play or extract of literary 
prose and skills exercised in the practical sphere. The label ‘practical criticism’ invites us 
to look at this activity as something broader than the exercise of epistemic skills and 
instead as a case where practical and epistemic skills exist together. 
What skills does the close reading of a literary work require? This question is dealt with in 
section (3.3) and in Chapter Four below. In the meantime, take the passage quoted earlier 
in Chapter One as representative, where Elgin says: ‘We already have a vast store of 
information at our disposal. But a jumble of disorderly data has little cognitive 
value…Advancement of understanding then involves finding order in or imposing order on 
the information at hand’ (Elgin 1996: 189). Elsewhere Elgin gives some examples of how 
‘finding order in or imposing order on the information at hand’ might be manifested:  
 
By calling default assumptions into question, and developing, entertaining and 
invoking alternatives to them, we may come better to understand a subject. 
Reorganizing a domain in terms of different kinds, highlighting hitherto ignored 
aspects of it, developing and deploying new approaches to it, and setting ourselves 
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new challenges with respect to it are among the ways we increase our 
understanding.                                                                          (Elgin 2002: 3) 
Yet while exercising particular competences efficiently may be sufficient for 
understanding in some cases, there are also cases where exercising particular competences 
are not sufficient for a genuine understanding.  
Consider the example of Person J who is a reliable but uncomprehending student of 
mathematics.  J is diligent and follows his teacher’s instructions in class and as a result he 
gets good marks in his homework which follows the same format as his classwork.  The 
problem is that despite performing all the correct mathematical functions in the correct 
sequence, when representing trigonometry graphically for instance, J does not really know 
why he is doing what he is doing.  He comes unstuck one day when his usual teacher is ill 
and another teacher sets a different kind of problem though one which could be solved if J 
were to use the mathematical skills acquired in a different way. J fails in this task for a 
number of reasons: he does not have an overview of ‘the bigger picture’, is unable to 
interpret the new and unfamiliar problem, lacks a sense of salience, gets side-tracked by 
irrelevancies and lacks the flexibility of thought to understand how to apply what he 
knows.  
There is an analogy here with Alison Hills’ line in her Beloved Self when she says: 
To understand why p, you must have an ability to draw conclusions about similar 
cases, and to work out when a different conclusion would hold if the reasons why p 
were no longer the case. If you have this kind of appreciation of moral reasons you 
must have, at least to some extent, a systematic grasp of morality.                                                                                                                                                       
                                                                                                          (Hills 2010: 194) 
I understand why Felicity stormed out of the party as I know that Darren was up to his old 
tricks again. If Darren had not been up to his old tricks again then I would need to search 
for a different explanation. Both examples of the reliable but uncomprehending 
mathematician and Felicity storming out of the party show that there are higher 
competences at work (such as the ability to apply know-how) which contribute to a 
genuine understanding of something. One might enquire as to whether someone possesses 
these higher competences by asking whether someone really understands.  Possession of 
these higher competences fits the two most common metaphors for understanding: having 
a good grasp of something and knowing one’s way around the subject. In the case of the 
first metaphor, understanding X means having a firm grip on X that is not easily lost when 
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challenged and which is transferable from one situation to another. In the case of the 
second metaphor, the higher skill is one of navigation.  
These competences are different from standard cases of ‘knowing that’ and look promising 
for the literary cognitivist case as they may be exercised when reading literary fiction. So 
we can add: 
 When literary cognitivists claim that reading literary fiction develops understanding 
they can mean knowledge of how to exercise certain skills or competences when 
reading a literary text. 
 
Understanding as experiential knowledge  
 
There is a sense of ‘understanding’ that does not equate to propositional knowledge, 
though it may be expressed as such, but equates to experience as when I say that ‘I 
understand that Oxford blue is darker than Cambridge blue’ or that ‘the sound that I have 
just heard was an F flat’. Experience may be expressed as propositional knowledge without 
any direct acquaintance. A horticulture student may give the correct answer that ‘white 
currants are less tart than red currants’ without having enjoyed the taste of either fruit; the 
student ‘understands that’ such and such is a fact. Nevertheless, someone who has the 
benefit of actual experience, the taste of each fruit, has the greater understanding or at least 
that a different understanding comes from experience. When I say to someone who is jilted 
or grieving ‘I understand what you are going through’ or ‘I understand how hard it is’ (I 
permit these clichés to show the common usage of this sense of understanding) I mean that 
I have a good idea of what the person is feeling perhaps as the result of having been 
through a similar experience myself.  
How experience is articulated in these cases is significant. Someone who has experienced 
red and white currants might be hard pushed to describe the different tastes yet can be said 
to understand that white currants taste in such a way in contrast to the taste of red currants. 
For the record there are other cases where one’s ability to articulate experience does not 
matter to the cognitive gain (e.g. understanding musical beat) as well as cases where the 
articulation of one’s experience is important (e.g. compiling notes when tasting wine). I am 
interested in how understanding as experience may be put into words in such a way as to 
convey that experience to those who have not experienced something themselves. Literary 
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fiction abounds with descriptions of how characters feel, and a literary cognitivist might 
claim that these passages communicate something of what it is like to experience X.   
One literary cognitivist claim is that literary fiction puts experience into words in an 
effective way so we should add that: 
 When literary cognitivists claim that reading literary fiction develops understanding 
they can mean the conveyance of what an experience feels like to someone 
experiencing it. 
 
Understanding as forming an interpretation 
 
There is a further sense of understanding which does not equate to any form of knowledge 
but rests on the ability to form a plausible interpretation where nothing conclusive can be 
established: one says ‘my understanding of p is x,y,z’ where ‘understanding’ stands for 
‘my reading of the situation is’ or ‘my working hypothesis is’. Take the case of an 
archaeologist who finds pre-historic animal remains loosely strewn in a circle with a gap of 
about a metre between two jaw bones placed at the most southerly tip of the circle. The 
bone fragments are identified as belonging to: owls, wolves, dogs and aurochs (primitive 
cattle). The archaeologist searches for some understanding of what went on here but the 
truth as to what once occurred remains lost to us. The archaeologist devises an interpretive 
hypothesis that makes best sense of the facts. The hypotheses that this was a pre-historic 
pet cemetery or abattoir are rejected on the grounds that the bones of animals not 
associated with being a food source or a pet were found. Instead the archaeologist 
conjectures that this was a site where ancient humans venerated both wild and 
domesticated animals, the entrance of which lay between the jaw bones. 
In this example, the archaeologist decides on what ‘understanding’ to take, based on: close 
attention to detail, whether the interpretation fits the evidence and whether such an 
interpretation coheres. No information can be revealed sufficient to establish the truth of 
what really went on at this site. One can variously interpret data, behaviour, idiom or a 
text. While data is entirely factual, an idiom or a literary fictional text will contain far 
fewer facts. I shall return to the interpretation of a literary text in section (3.3) below but in 
order to acknowledge the cognitive gain in forming a plausible hypothesis let us add: 
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 When literary cognitivists claim that reading literary fiction develops understanding 
they can mean that the reader is able to practice formulating interpretive hypotheses 
from reading literary fiction.  
 
Summary statement  
 
From the discussion above we can make the following set of claims about understanding: 
When person S is said to understand x, S either: 
1. Knows that ‘x’ (in one or more of the possible ways to know that) or 
2. Knows how to x or 
3. Knows what it is like to x or 
4. Is able to construct a working hypothesis about x. 
In a significant number of cases one talks about S understanding x where S is able to apply 
know-how to a body of propositions in a particularly proficient way. So an important 
upshot of my discussion is that understanding as know-how, sense (2) above, plays a 
consistently important role when we talk about S understanding p.  
When literary cognitivists claim that reading literary fiction develops understanding it is 
unlikely that they mean ‘understanding’ as synonymous with knowledge of facts that may 
be gained just as well as from an extra-literary source. In addition, it is unlikely that 
literary cognitivists mean ‘understanding’ in the sense of knowing what the words in a 
literary fiction mean, though this is a necessary condition on the cognitive gains listed 
below. These cognitive gains are not at stake in the case of understanding something better 
from reading literary fiction. When literary cognitivists claim that reading literary fiction 
develops ‘understanding’ they can mean one or more of the following: 
i. Understanding as discerning the layers of meaning to be found in a given utterance 
in a literary fiction.  
ii. Application of knowledge accrued from literary fiction to similar cases (fictional or 
non-fictional). 
iii. Knowledge of how to exercise a range of skills or competences in reading a literary 
fiction. 
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iv. Knowledge about an experience. 
v. Forming a coherent interpretation or reading of a literary fiction. 
 
There are still some further details to rehearse in our conceptual grammar before we move 
on to a more detailed account of how a reader of literary fiction exercises these forms of 
understanding. 
 
Lack of understanding and misunderstanding 
 
Lack of understanding means the absence of one or more sense of understanding; lack of 
understanding may mean that I do not know that the heart is a pump or do not know how to 
tie a bowline knot. In cases of misunderstanding, something stands in place of a correct 
understanding. I might mistakenly understand when I loop a rope into a ‘b’ shape rather 
than a ‘d’ shape when starting a bowline. In this type of case, the false belief or 
misconception needs to be challenged and put right in order to gain proper understanding. 
In other cases of misunderstanding, where an individual ‘gets the wrong end of the stick’, 
the context has been missed. Take, for example, a child who says that the opposite of white 
is brown rather than black. While lack of understanding and misunderstanding are 
distinguishable; the two are related when the lack of understanding allows room for a 
misunderstanding to take place. Emma Woodhouse lacks understanding over how Mr. 
Elton takes her behaviour which in turn leads to the various misunderstandings that take 
place during their carriage drive in Chapter Fifteen of Austen’s Emma. There are also cases 
of deliberate misunderstandings, perhaps to comic effect, where no mistake is made but 
rather the device is used to expose a pretention. 
 
Testing understanding 
 
I have argued that understanding how to exercise certain skills is more significant than the 
reader gaining propositional knowledge in the case of literary fiction. If this is true then it 
will have an implication on how understanding is tested. Propositional knowledge can be 
assessed with multiple choice questions whereas it is hard to see how understanding from 
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literary fiction, as described above, could be tested in this way. Michael Bonnett in his 
Children’s Thinking suggests that a class teacher could test children’s understanding of 
literature through a standard question-and-answer scenario where the teacher, who it is 
assumed has a good understanding of the literary text, looks out for a fuller response: 
Such potential criteria would include degree of vitality, perceptiveness, sensitivity, 
freshness of expression, aptness, engagement, empathy with subject, atmosphere, 
integrity, depth of meaning, revealment, self-expressiveness, imaginativeness, 
effectiveness of imagery and symbolism etc. 
                                                                                                      (Bonnett 1994: 172) 
A further test for the senses of understanding described above involves such familiarity as 
enables proficient application. Understanding in the senses identified above may be tested 
by comparing and contrasting two or more literary works or asking the student to exercise 
some practical criticism on a previously unseen work. With regard to application of one’s 
understanding, I am reminded of a characterful tutor in medicine I knew, who was famed 
for setting eccentric essay questions for his undergraduates: What are the differences 
between my neck and the neck of a giraffe?  How is the human nervous system like the 
Athanasian Creed? One assumes that the professor thought the regurgitation of medical 
facts too even a playing field to test his students’ understanding of the subject and was 
satisfied that his students were competent medical practitioners. As a consequence, he 
considered the best way to test his students’ understanding was to force them to apply their 
understanding to the new and unfamiliar: in this case to see that the human nervous system 
can be conceptualised as ‘a trinity in unity’ (an early line in the Athanasian creed). 
Encouraging medical students to think around the subject is good practice for their 
intended careers when they might meet cases far removed from those described in their 
text books.  
 
Stimulating understanding 
 
Having clarified various senses of understanding, and having located the potential gain 
from reading literary fiction in the development of certain skills, I want to end by saying 
something about how the cognitive gain might be stimulated. I shall take as a starting point 
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this passage from Christopher Bailey’s work in the philosophy of education Beyond the 
Present and the Particular (1984): 
A teacher seeking to teach for understanding, then, will need to: 
(i) be aware of the state of the present understandings of individual pupils being 
taught; 
(ii) have logically adequate understandings himself of what is being taught; 
(iii) be a skilful explainer of what is being taught in that (a) he marshals 
presentations logically and coherently, and (b) relates them well to individuals’ 
present understandings; 
(iv) be aware of areas of understanding where correctness matters and 
misunderstanding is possible, and know how to assess for correct 
understanding; and 
(v) be able to generate puzzlement in the minds of the pupils when it is not already 
there.                                                                                                                                          
 
                                                                                                (Bailey 1984: 151)  
Despite the cases of the teacher and the author being disanalogous in a number of respects, 
one assumes that the performance of the former is not judged according to aesthetic 
criteria, the passage raises a number of points pertinent to our gaining understanding from 
literary fiction. I approve of Bailey’s referring to ‘understandings’ in the plural given what 
is laid out above. I think it is hopelessly inadequate to concentrate on one type of 
understanding as exemplary or develop any thesis that seeks to show that understanding is 
really one kind of knowledge. Bailey’s account also draws our attention to points that 
might be missed such as the need for sensitivity in the author as to what a popular 
understanding of a given issue is likely to be prior to the reader taking up the literary 
fictional work. Without this assumption it would be difficult for any author to challenge 
received opinion. Further, that the author needs to have some understanding of what the 
theme is that he or she wishes to convey and to possess skill in communication in order to 
convey such a theme. This skill extends to being able to predict where, for instance, 
ambiguity may be helpful in stimulating the reader’s engagement and where ambiguity 
may mislead the reader in a way detrimental to their understanding. Bailey’s point (v) 
suggests insightfully that understanding may be conveyed through puzzlement initially 
rather than through explicit exposition; perhaps in the style of a Socratic interrogation. 
[104] 
 
So, by adapting Bailey’s criteria, we can say of an author seeking to stimulate 
understanding through literary fiction: 
i) that such an author requires a general idea of what a popular understanding of p 
is likely to consist in 
ii) has logically adequate understandings of what he or she is trying to convey 
iii) communicates effectively through the artistic presentation of the work 
iv) is aware of what is important to understand, where potential misunderstandings 
may occur and what would count as a test for understanding 
v) is able to generate puzzlement in the minds of the readers when puzzlement is 
not already there but when it may help to arrest the attention of the reader. 
                                                                                                                                                 
It is important, in what follows, to consider the artistry of the author in communicating the 
relevant senses of understanding through a work of literary fiction. 
 
3.3 Understanding literary fiction 
 
A literary cognitivist needs to state whether the cognitive value of reading literary fiction 
comes from the fictional status of a text or as a result of the literary features of a text or as 
a result of both. My contention is that while the fictional status of literary fiction can 
contribute to cognitive gain, for instance fiction allows an author the freedom to explore 
ideas, it is the literariness of literary fiction that plays the more significant role in helping a 
reader to develop a better understanding in the senses identified in section (3.2). The role 
of literary features has not previously been awarded enough credit and runs contrary to 
most orthodox positions which, following the tradition of Kendall Walton (1990), focus 
discussion on literary fiction as fiction. 
In the first part of this section I set out what I take to be the standard practices of reading 
literary fiction and in the second part discuss a prominent account of reading fiction known 
as simulationism. In recent years reading fiction has been characterised in terms of running 
a simulation in one’s imagination. I argue that running a life-like simulation of events 
depicted in a fiction is neither necessary nor sufficient for the cognitive gain outlined 
above. While ‘taking X to be the case in a fiction’ is a necessary condition for reading 
literary fiction, and as a consequence is a necessary condition for gaining understanding 
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from reading literary fiction, primary imagining is not a sufficient condition for the 
cognitive gain that I seek to defend. As a result of reading this section, I hope that the 
reader will see clear water between reading literary fiction as literature and reading literary 
fiction as fiction and identify the practices typical in the former case with developing a 
better understanding. 
 
Close analysis and interpretation 
 
There are at least three recognisable stages to reading literary fiction as literature: an initial 
reading where the reader establishes what the play, poem or prose is about, close analysis 
of the work in question and the reader forming his or her interpretation of the text on the 
back of the close analysis. An initial reading of e. e. cummings’ ‘it may not always be so; 
and I say’ (attached as the first appendix before the bibliography) will inform the reader 
that this poem is a counterfactual scenario exploring how the narrator would feel and react 
should his lover find someone else. The reader should note on first reading that the poem is 
a sonnet divided into an octave and sestet. A first reading will flag up difficult or unusual 
parts of the work that require further thought. On my first reading of the poem I wondered 
as to the meaning of the phrase ‘uttering overmuch’ (line 7) and the significance of the 
metaphor of a spirit being held at bay (line 8). There is no clear line in the sand between 
the three stages of reading a literary fictional work and something from one’s first reading 
may guide closer analysis which, in turn, can identify a significant or recurring theme to 
shape an overall interpretation. 
I term the second, distinctive stage of reading a literary fictional text ‘close analysis’ rather 
than the more common ‘close reading’ or ‘practical criticism’ as, while these descriptions 
refer to same process, I do not want to identify the process with any one movement or 
individual. The etymology of ‘analysis’ suggests loosening, unravelling or an investigation 
of the parts having disassembled the whole. There are many significant features worthy of 
comment relating to the poem in appendix (1) but I shall limit myself to only a few 
comments to give the reader an idea of what might be involved in this second stage.  
The choice of the Petrarchan sonnet form is ironic given that many poems written in this 
form are dedicated to unrequited love; the poem in appendix (1) is about imaginary 
unrequited love after a relationship has dissolved. Time seems a significant theme in the 
poem and receives explicit mention in lines 1, 2 and 4 while is implicit in lines 6 and 9. 
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The first stanza takes the traditional, enclosed ABBAABBA rhyme scheme while the sestet 
exhibits the more open ended ABCABC scheme which fits its counterfactual subject 
matter. The repeated motif of ‘I say’ is declarative and in the opening line of the sestet 
contributes to the impassioned and heartfelt tone. The words used to describe the female 
character: dear, strong, sweet, great, helpless and ‘of his heart’ are eulogising and 
reverential and refer on two occasions to his lover’s words. Each stanza ends with an 
animal metaphor: an exhausted hunted creature, perhaps a stag, held at bay before his 
execution and a lone bird, an image of abandonment and of the poet as songster. There is 
ambiguity in whether ‘spirit’ in line (8) refers to the narrator or the spirit of love. There is 
also ambiguity in the word ‘Accept’ meaning either ‘take from’ as when one accepts an 
invitation or an apology and ‘coming to terms with’ as when one accepts an unfavourable 
decision. The second part of the poem is rich in biblical allusion: she is of his heart (not his 
rib), a word is sent ‘…that i may go unto him’ and the phrase ‘turn my face’ echoes 
passages in the Gospels such as Luke (9: 53). Understatement is also used with regards to 
the ‘little word’ to contrast to the ‘great writhing words’ of the octave. The poet’s play 
with punctuation, grammar and capitalisation show that ‘literary devices’ are not limited to 
the likes of irony and metaphor but extend to more fundamental aspects of a text.  
Close analysis covers many aspects of a poem, play or literary prose as Terry Eagleton 
says in the following passage from How to Read Literature (evidence for potential 
understanding in senses i and iv):  
You can analyse the sound-texture of a passage, or fasten on what seem significant 
ambiguities, or look at the way grammar and syntax are put to work. You can 
examine the emotional attitudes that a passage seems to take up to what it is 
presenting, or focus on some revealing paradoxes, discrepancies and contradictions. 
Tracking down the unspoken implications of what is said can sometimes be 
important. Judging the tone of a passage, and how this may shift or waver, can be 
equally productive. It can be helpful to try to define the exact quality of a piece of 
writing. It may be sombre, off-hand, devious, colloquial, terse, jaded, glib, 
theatrical, ironic, laconic, artless, abrasive, sensuous, sinewy and so on. 
                                                                                                             (Eagleton 2013: 43-44) 
The cognitive elements (particularly understanding in senses ii and iii) are brought out by 
Catherine Elgin when she cites the following competences associated with analysing a text 
(1996: 189): the ability to make connections, the ability to marshal material in an orderly 
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way, the ability to spot a pattern, the ability to spell out an implication, the ability to 
identify a possibility, the ability to draw a distinction, sensitivity to nuance and 
connotation, the ability to recognise a fresh perspective, the ability to recognise a new 
question or set of questions, the ability to re-categorise subject matter and the ability to 
apply the information in new and challenging contexts. The close analysis of literary texts 
involves spotting recurring patterns in the likes of symbolism, rhyme or allusion.  
Close analysis is an exercise in attention to detail where attention is paid to what seems 
strange or out of place in an image, tone or choice of words. This, in part, is a matter of 
trusting one’s instincts. A particular trope or phrase may evoke a certain image or train of 
thought. The reader then suggests why such and such might be phrased in this way. The 
process of close analysis is influenced by the reader’s life experience outside the text as 
well as any knowledge the reader might have of the historical context, authorial intentions 
or of the etymology of certain words. I believe what I have said about close analysis is 
substantiated by prominent works on practical criticism. What I outline is compatible with 
descriptions of close reading of literary texts, such as: (Cox & Dyson 1965: 18-22; Wain 
1972: xiii-xvi; Phythian 1978: 15-16; Peet & Robinson 1992: 18-20, 82, 103, 183-184; 
Croft & Cross 2000: 193-95; Pope, R. 2012: 84-86). 
Close analysis results in an intuitive and complex mess which requires careful navigation. 
The result is a text covered with highlighted, underlined or circled words according to 
which elements of the work are pursued, and arrows leading to marginal annotations. This 
marginalia alone is not sufficient for a reading of a given work. Recognition that a word or 
phrase is ironic does not lead us anywhere beyond that immediate recognition. What is 
required is some organisation of the material yielded by close analysis, perhaps where 
themes are grouped together and arranged or presented in some coherent form. 
Recognition that a phrase is ironic may then be linked to an important overarching theme. 
Working out what the theme is and giving it some coherent form in itself and in the context 
of an overarching reading is referred to above as ‘forming an interpretation’ of a work. 
There are many details that I have not commented on in the close reading above and I 
would have to make a similar decision over what to leave out in forming my reading or 
interpretation of the poem. Perhaps there is a point that I am not clear about which 
constitutes work in progress or a thought that does not connect to the other material. I also 
need to decide on the order of the material, whether to follow the sequence of the literary 
work or arrange the material in themes and what constitutes the main themes. I thought 
about arranging my reading of this poem in terms of the first words of the stanzas ‘it’ and 
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‘if’ or perhaps in terms of the only words with capital letters ‘Accept’ and ‘Then’. Finally, 
I need to decide on whether to include a personal aesthetic judgement. 
The poem ‘it may not always be so; and i say’ may strike some readers as overly 
melodramatic. The synecdoche of ‘your lips, which i have loved’ (line 2) might seem odd 
to those who look for love beyond protruding lips. The syntax of the second quatrain of the 
Octave proves difficult to follow to the point of being ungrammatical and it may remain 
unclear to the reader what ‘uttering overmuch’ really means as well as an uncomfortable 
metaphor which describes words as standing. Further, the poem might be criticised for the 
introduction of an ad hoc bird at the end of the sestet and for ending on a slightly clichéd 
image for loneliness. Alternatively, the poem may be praised for its arresting opening 
quatrain, for the naturalness of phrases such as ‘it may not always be so’ and for its 
confident expression of emotion. These aesthetic judgements do not interfere with my 
developing a better understanding in senses (i-iv) above. This is not to say that my close 
analysis cannot, at times, affect my aesthetic judgement (see section 2.3 and 4.7).   
On the back of the discussion above, we can make the following statements concerning 
how our understanding of literary fiction is achieved: 
(i) The reader understands a literary fictional work through the practice of close 
analysis. 
(ii) In making sense of the close analysis the reader forms an interpretation of the 
work of literary fiction. 
There is a gap, however, between understanding a literary fictional text and the 
interpersonal understanding claimed by the literary cognitivist. The gap exists between 
understanding a literary fictional work and our understanding the world. This necessitates 
an additional statement which will act as a placeholder until Chapter Five: 
(iii) The close analysis and interpretation of a literary fictional work assists the 
reader’s interpersonal understanding of the world beyond the text.  
I want next to emphasise the role literary devices play, over fiction, in the reader 
establishing (i) and (ii). 
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Simulationism 
 
In recent years the notion of imagination as simulation has taken root, largely in the 
absence of a better alternative. In general terms a simulation is a dynamic and realistic 
presentation of reality contrived under controlled conditions for various purposes including 
cognitive gain. The claim that simulation increases interpersonal understanding can be 
traced back to the debate between theory theorists and non-theory theorists (the latter are 
sometimes referred to as simulationists) in the philosophy of mind. Simulation in this 
context is classed as follows: 
In the case of mental simulation the simulator feeds pretend beliefs and desires into 
her mental apparatus, and lets the same psychological processes operate as would 
operate upon real beliefs and desires.     
                                                            (Davies and Stone Folk Psychology 1995: 19) 
Note that Jane Heal is often conservative in her description of what simulation involves: 
‘…‘simulate’ in this context cannot mean ‘recreate’ or ‘build a model of’; it can here mean 
nothing richer than ‘imagine’ or ‘think about’. In other words, all it can mean is 
‘represent’’ (Heal 1995: 47). A particular example may help to illustrate the simulationist 
claim to better interpersonal understanding. 
There is cognitive advantage to running a simulation of events which the following 
example tries to capture. The captain of a local rugby club had the unpopular task of telling 
a dedicated member of the team that he was dropped owing to his lack of fitness. On the 
drive to his team mate’s house the captain ran through some possible ways of how to break 
the news and ran some corresponding imagined scenarios (simulations) on how the news 
might be taken. The captain saw the player who was about to be dropped as someone who 
operated under the normative constraints of rationality i.e. someone who would understand 
that he is dropped from the team owing to his lack of fitness and why this was important in 
light of the forthcoming match. The player’s family life, personality and sensitivities were 
also fed into the simulation. For instance, some scripts were rejected as the captain thought 
they would sound too clichéd, pre-rehearsed, direct or open to misinterpretation.  
There are at least two significant things to note about this example. First, the imagined 
scenario does not have to be particularly life-like. The individual breaking the unpleasant 
news only needs to construct the relevant details; imagining the décor can be omitted. 
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Also, it is significant to note while there might be sporadic insights noted at the time of the 
conversation, the cognitive gain through simulation takes place in anticipation of the event 
where possibilities are entertained after the event. Having entertained more than one 
scenario, the captain understands that a particular simulated scenario is closest to the actual 
scenario. On the drive back from breaking the news, the captain can reflect on how the 
episode played out. What point was taken as being particularly persuasive? What did the 
player mean when he said such and such and how does this detail fit with any pre-
conceptions? Some detail might have been surprisingly different to the simulation which 
will in turn inform the captain’s conception of his (former) team mate. My contention is 
that while running a simulation in this manner may teach us something, it has only a loose 
connection to the cognitive gain defended in this project. Simulation offers an account of 
how to read fiction which many philosophers of fiction deem attractive (Currie 1995a and 
1995b, 2002; Feagin 1996; Oatley and Gholamain 1997). I need to state explicitly why I do 
not find simulationism convincing and why the account does not provide an answer to my 
research question. 
Gregory Currie argues for a version of simulationism in his paper ‘The Moral Psychology 
of Fiction’ (1995a) where Currie awards some role for fiction in our moral learning: ‘…a 
really vivid fiction might get you to revise your values’ (1995a: 254). Currie has since 
changed position on the cognitive role of fiction in an ethical context but I am only 
interested in the account he gives of fiction as simulation which has not changed (to my 
knowledge) and which is pertinent to the present discussion. Central to Currie’s 
simulationism is the distinction between primary and secondary imagining. Primary 
imagining covers what the reader takes to be true in a given story: ‘Part of engaging with a 
fictional work consists of imagining those things which it makes fictional…imaginings 
about the story’s characters and situations’ (1995a: 255, 256). For example, I imagine that 
Levin in Anna Karenina spends time working in the fields alongside his tenants owing to a 
strong work ethic. Secondary imagining, in contrast, involves putting oneself in a fictional 
character’s position and in so doing ‘…I come to simulate the thoughts, feelings and 
attitudes I would have were I in that situation’ (1995a: 256). A reader, according to Currie, 
will imagine having the beliefs, desires and values as Levin and imagine enjoying the 
feeling of satisfaction at completing a hard day’s work with the accompanying 
camaraderie. Currie maintains that: ‘The moral power of fiction lies not so much in what 
makes fictional and in what we are therefore to imagine concerning its characters, but in 
what it encourages us to imagine about ourselves in order that we should discover what is 
fictional of those characters’ (1995a: 258). I take this to mean that propositional imagining 
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of the primary kind e.g. that Levin believes that ‘work is good’ is not sufficient for the 
reader’s understanding of the moral view. The reader needs to inhabit the fiction 
imaginatively to the extent that he or she is ‘right there with the action’ in order to be 
usefully informed.  
‘The Moral Psychology of Fiction’ contains a strong statement about the reader taking on 
the beliefs and desires of those fictional characters that he or she reads about:  
…I take on, temporarily, the beliefs and desires I assume someone in that situation 
would start off by having; they become, temporarily, my own beliefs and desires. 
Being, thus temporarily, my own, they work their own effects on my mental 
economy, having the sorts of impacts on how I feel and what I decide to do that my 
ordinary, real beliefs and desires have. 
                                                                                      (Currie 1995a: 252 italics in original)  
In his anthologised paper ‘Imagination and Simulation’ (1995b) Currie goes as far as to 
include the replication of bodily sensations in the simulation (1995b: 157) as well as the 
unconscious: ‘If, as I have argued, fictions function to drive imagination, they do so in 
ways of which the subject is sometimes unaware, and over which the subject rarely exerts 
conscious control’ (Currie 1995b: 162). In his pronouncement on simulation in Chapter 
Three of Recreative Minds, Currie and co-author Ian Ravenscroft say: ‘…mentalizing 
depends to a significant extent on, and can be at least partly explained in terms of, our 
capacity to project ourselves in imagination into the situation of others, and to generate 
within ourselves states of imagining that have as their counterparts the beliefs and desires 
of someone (hereafter ‘the target’) whose behaviour we want to predict or understand’ 
(Currie and Ravenscroft 2002: 51). We do not need to go into all the technicalities of 
Currie’s position to realise that the card is overplayed and further that simulation of this 
kind is not required for the senses of understanding I seek to defend; although there seems 
to be some role for the reader learning what an experience is like. 
I am not convinced that secondary imagining plays such a significant role in the 
phenomenology of reading literary fiction and invite the reader to read James Joyce’s short 
story ‘Counterparts’ or at least the following two extracts then answer the question which 
follows: 
The man stared fixedly at the polished skull which directed the affairs of Crosbie 
and Alleyne, gauging its fragility. A spasm of rage gripped his throat for a few 
moments and then passed, leaving after it a sharp sensation of thirst. The man 
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recognised the sensation and felt that he must have a good night’s drinking. The 
middle of the month was passed and, if he could get the copy done in time, Mr. 
Alleyne might give him an order on the cashier… 
                                                                                                           (Joyce 2000: 83) 
He cursed everything. He had done for himself in the office, pawned his watch, 
spent all his money; and he had not even got drunk. He began to feel thirsty again 
and he longed to be back again in the hot, reeking public-house. He had lost his 
reputation as a strong man, having been defeated twice by a mere boy. His heart 
swelled with fury and, when he thought of the woman in the big hat who had 
brushed against him and said Pardon! his fury nearly choked him. 
                                                                                                           (Joyce 2000: 93) 
How many of Farrington’s mental states do you ‘take on’ to use Currie’s term? When I 
read this story I take certain things to be true in the fiction (my primary imaginings) and I 
may empathise with some of Farrington’s frustrations but I do not entertain the perceptions 
he has of his boss seated in front of him or even a perception of the whole scene as it is 
described.  I do not experience the physiological manifestations of Farrington’s fury, nor 
his regret, humiliation or frustrated desire (I do not imagine feeling anything in my throat 
when I read the first extract and may even experience a sense of the ridiculous about the 
situation described). I register all of these details as they are presented to me, the reader, by 
the literary fictional text but that is all; indeed that is enough.
29
  
Admittedly, there are cases where secondary imagining could prove more prevalent. 
Authors who read their own fiction may imagine more vividly, children may conjure up an 
imaginary world in greater detail than adults and there will be occasional ‘Walter Mitty’ 
moments when a reader becomes so absorbed in the text that he or she ends up imagining 
the kinds of experience that the character is supposed to be experiencing. As a result, we 
should talk about ‘degrees of imagining’ that cover a spectrum of engagement, 
identification with, absorption in, together with full blown simulation. Degrees of 
simulation depend on the text and on the readership but we cannot state that secondary 
imagining is the normal response to a text. 
I agree with Matthew Kieran in his paper ‘In Search of Narrative’ (2003) that the kind of 
life-like simulation described by the term ‘secondary imagining’ is neither a necessary nor 
                                                          
29 See Carroll (2010: 329-352) and Kieran (2003: 69-87). 
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sufficient condition on my understanding of characters, episodes or themes presented in a 
literary work (2003: 72). Kieran (2003) adds two more arguments to the contention that 
simulation need not feature as part of my gaining a better understanding of others from 
literary fiction. First, in certain cases imaginative simulation should not feature in my 
reading and secondly that imaginative simulation cannot feature in my reading. Kieran 
argues that it can be disadvantageous to run a simulation; if the reader imagines herself in 
the position of a mistaken character then she will be led down the garden path and end up 
as mistaken as the character (2003: 73).  The reader needs to remain conscious of how the 
embedded narrator, Nellie Dean, is reporting events and conversations in Wuthering 
Heights as on many occasions the reporting is manipulated by this character. Alertness to 
this character’s manipulation seems unconnected to any secondary imagining as outlined 
above. Secondly, the reader may be incapable of simulating unfamiliar emotions but only 
‘grasp the contours of the state from the description and the way in which it is thus 
relatable to those emotions we are familiar with and have been subject to’ (2003: 75). One 
might find it impossible to simulate Humbert Humbert’s sexual attraction towards an under 
aged girl as described in Lolita or simulate how Patrick Bateman sees the world in 
American Psycho. While primary imagination counts as a necessary condition on reading 
literary fiction, and consequently on gaining cognitively from reading literary fiction, the 
reader’s entertaining the thought that p is true in a fiction is not a sufficient condition on 
the kinds of understanding identified in section (3.2). 
I conclude, along with Kieran, that simulation in either the primary or the secondary sense 
is not a sufficient condition on the reader’s understanding: ‘For deep understanding can be 
achieved without simulation, necessarily depends upon the possession of a rich narrative 
understanding and makes use of many narrative features with respect to which simulation 
is otiose or inapplicable. Simulation cannot be the central mechanism that affords narrative 
understanding’ (2003: 87). I take the ‘deep understanding’ referred to as compatible with 
the five senses of understanding identified above. Kieran is correct in both his reservations 
about simulationism and in awarding a primary role to what he terms ‘narrative features’ 
which as a category I assume to have common ground with what I call ‘literary features’. 
Kieran cites ‘figurative, symbolic and metaphoric allusions’ as well as play with 
perspective as features of literary fiction that afford the reader ‘a much deeper grasp of 
character’ (2003: 78) . In fairness, Currie does attribute a role for narrative or literary 
features in stimulating secondary imagining (Currie 1995: 254). In sum, my contention is 
that secondary imagining is not an integral part of the phenomenology of reading literary 
fiction and counts as neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition on the cognitive gain 
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from literary fiction though some form of simulation may play a peripheral role in 
understanding a text. We should then ask what the relation is between literary features and 
cognitive gain, which is taken up in Chapter Four. 
 
3.4  The charge of elitism 
 
The thesis that a reader can gain a better understanding from reading literature through the 
method outlined above (3.3) is subject to the charge of elitism. It should be noted from the 
outset that literary fiction, in general, is not written for an elite audience like a technical 
paper in analytic philosophy or a work on post-structuralism in literary theory where such 
texts are incomprehensible to anyone without specialist knowledge.  One does not need 
specialist knowledge to read literary fiction although literary fiction is often described 
using specialist vocabulary.  One might say, for instance, that Blake has introduced a 
trochaic foot into lines of tetrameter.  The cognitive value of literary fiction, defended here, 
does not lie in knowledge of the terminology involved; such terminology provides 
convenient shorthand to say a number of things precisely in a minimum number of words.  
The relevant cognitive value from literary fiction depends on sensitivity to the text, a range 
of skills pertaining to attention to detail and organisation of the material gathered from 
close analysis. The fact that these skills of analysis are exercised by a small number of 
specialists is not sufficient for the charge of elitism, after all we do not condemn elite 
athletes, crack commandos or expert carpet fitters for their expertise.  
The precise charge of elitism is twofold: 
a) My account sounds elitist if I condemn popular fiction like J.K. Rowling’s ‘Harry 
Potter’ series for not yielding to close analysis and literary interpretation. 
b) My account sounds elitist if I argue that there is a way to read literary fiction that 
seems open to a few and then condemn readers that fall short of this high standard. 
 
I can live with (a) as it is a fact that some fiction does not yield to close analysis and 
literary interpretation and as such these texts fall short of what counts as grounds for the 
kind of cognitive gain that I seek to defend. This does not mean that such texts should be 
looked down upon as they might provide rich benefits in other ways such as an escape 
from the routine and perfunctory. The second charge requires a little more by way of 
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response and I want to say that a sensitive, close reading exists in degrees rather than as a 
disjunction between reading in a close way and not reading in a close way and that, further, 
close reading is genuinely democratic. 
There is a parallel discussion in Peter Kivy’s Music Alone (1990) which I shall draw on; 
Kivy quotes the following passage from E.M. Forster’s Howards End as an epigraph to his 
book and refers to the character’s respective positions throughout the work: 
It will be generally admitted that Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony is the most sublime 
noise that has every penetrated into the ear of man.  All sorts and conditions are 
satisfied by it.  Whether you are like Mrs Munt, and tap surreptitiously when the 
tunes come – of course, not so as to disturb the others -; or like Helen, who can see 
heroes and shipwrecks in the music’s flood; or like Margaret, who can only see the 
music; or like Tibby, who is profoundly versed in counterpoint, and holds the full 
score open on his knee.  
                                                                                                             (Kivy 1990: vi) 
One might envisage another trip, not to the Queen’s Hall to hear Beethoven, but to The 
Globe Theatre to see Macbeth where Forster’s characters adopt similar stances.  Mrs Munt 
may be sensitive to the mood of the opening scene with the three weird sisters or the sword 
fights in the final act.  To Helen, the characters in the drama would seem life-like and feed 
her imagination while for Margaret the play would be interesting as a piece of theatre.  
Finally Tibby, who seems of all the positions represented the most obvious target for any 
charge of elitism, would watch the performance with a copy of the play open to note 
allusion, irony and metaphor. Further, there will be degrees of appreciation as to how such 
literary devices are used in a literary work. Differences between a theatrical and musical 
performance do not damage the point I make about degrees of appreciation in order to 
avoid the false dichotomy, possible in some charges of elitism, between reading as a 
professor and reading as a punter; most of us are somewhere in between.   
Kivy argues in the case of musical performance, and I acknowledge in the literary case, 
that it is too simple a dichotomy to say that Mrs Munt does not understand the performance 
while Tibby does understand the performance.  Kivy reasons that ‘… there is a continuum 
of more and more complex cognition …’ where Mrs Munt, Tibby and the composer or 
author are listening to the same work’ (1990: 69).  It should be pointed out that the sense of 
cognition here is used in its most general sense of there being some thinking going on, 
stimulated by what is heard or seen.  Along these lines Kivy is correct that there is only a 
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quantitative difference between Tibby’s cognitive engagement with the work and that of 
Mrs Munt.  One may continue that casual theatre goers like Mrs Munt should not be 
underestimated and that further reflection on themes of the play can be gained from a basic 
engagement with the fiction; for instance they may consider that actions sometimes have 
consequences that cannot be escaped.  On hearing a Mrs Munt say that a play has made her 
think, any further enquiry as to what the play made her think about may be met with 
silence, but in the spirit of Kivy’s discussion this does not mean that reflection has not 
taken place but only that the individual finds the appropriate articulation difficult: 
What the skeptic fails to distinguish here is the difference between thinking, 
consciously, about the music and being conscious of one’s thinking, that is to say, 
being aware and perceiving that (and what) one is thinking.  In the former case it is 
the music that is the object of one’s thoughts; in the latter case it is one’s thinking 
that is the object.                                                                                                                          
            (Kivy 1990: 81) 
In upshot, it would be unfair to say that Mrs Munt at the theatre is not engaging 
intellectually with the play as she is both registering and reflecting on what is before her.  
However, it is fair to say that while such engagement is a necessary condition on cognitive 
value from literature and indeed a natural starting point, such engagement does not involve 
the kind of cognitive gain from the literary arts that I defend here but rather the first steps 
towards such skilled reading.  I conceive of the gain arising from a reader’s engagement 
with a work where the reading is detailed, keenly noticed, coherently arranged and 
commented on in an articulate way.  These activities contribute to what counts as a good 
interpretation of literary fiction. The account I offer is an intellectualised account in so far 
as it refers to how the reader uses his or her intellect ˗ but this need not be elitist. 
A further corollary and one that meets the previous accusation of elitism is that Tibby’s 
response to Macbeth does not necessarily meet this ideal model solely by virtue of the fact 
that he is making an academic study of the text.  In fact the academic literati may be pre-
occupied with specialist concerns, the influence of the Demonology of James I (1599) on 
Macbeth (1606) for instance, to the extent that some of the cognitive value may be missed.  
So a scholarly work of literary criticism may or may not carry the kind of cognitive gain in 
terms of understanding upon which I rest my case. There will be much literary criticism 
that is of peripheral importance in gaining a better interpersonal understanding from 
literary fiction: the paraphrase of plots, detail of authorial intention (from personal 
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correspondence), detail of the research that authors undertook, comment on how successful 
the author is in achieving his or her aesthetic goals or comment on issues in the philosophy 
of literature. Other details will be more relevant to the cognitive value of literary criticism: 
comparative work on various drafts (for instance how George Eliot’s conception of 
sympathy develops over her work) or differences between how a theme is portrayed in 
different works by the same author (for instance the similarities and differences between 
depictions of sympathy in Silas Marner and Felix Holt). Discussion on problematic aspects 
of a work, how believable an episode is, may be relevant to the reader’s understanding as 
well as Marxist, Feminist, historicist and psychoanalytic readings. Nevertheless, a razor 
needs to be applied to literary criticism by the literary cognitivist as not all criticism is 
relevant to the cognitive value of literary fiction.  
This section ends with some comments on ‘the democracy of difficulty’ by the English 
poet Geoffrey Hill who addresses the challenge of elitism directly.
30
 Hill starts with 
interpersonal understanding: 
We are difficult. Human beings are difficult. We’re difficult to ourselves, we’re 
difficult to each other. And we are mysteries to ourselves, we are mysteries to each 
other. One encounters in any ordinary day far more difficulty than one confronts in 
the most “intellectual” piece of work. Why is it believed that poetry, prose, 
painting, music should be less than we are? 
                                                                  (Hill 1999, in interview with Carl Phillips) 
Given an artist may wish to comment on how we are and given that we are difficult, an 
artist may wish to comment on how we are difficult where portraying a difficult subject 
matter licenses a difficult artistic form of depiction. To object that art is too difficult or not 
made simple is a kind of tyranny on art in general and for our purposes on the literary arts 
in particular. Hill continues: 
Why does music, why does poetry have to address us in simplified terms, when if 
such simplification were applied to a description of our inner selves we would find 
it demeaning? I think art has a right – not an obligation – to be difficult if it wishes. 
And, since people generally go on from this to talk about elitism versus democracy, 
I would add that genuinely difficult art is truly democratic. 
                                                        (Hill 1999, in interview with Carl Phillips) 
                                                          
30 The two sources I have in mind are two extracts from Hill’s Collected Critical Writings (2008: 289; 530-
531) and an interview in February 1999 in The Paris Review. 
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Hill points out the need for diligence in working a text in relation to a comment made by 
Tyndale of some texts that ‘semeth at first choppe harde to be vunderstonde’ (2008: 289). 
Such texts require a little more effort to understand but if exercising effort is the target of 
criticism then to make the charge of elitism is just to support over simplification and 
idleness when reading.  
 
3.5  The charge of subjectivity 
 
So far, in this chapter, I have argued for the following four theses: first, that literary fiction 
is useful in helping the reader understand how people think, act and interact along the same 
lines as common sense psychology. Secondly, that the proposed cognitive gain that we 
receive from literary fiction is best expressed in terms of five senses of understanding. 
Thirdly, that: ‘close analysis’ and ‘interpretation’ play fundamental roles in my gaining 
cognitively from literary fiction. Fourthly, that the significant stimulation for these five 
senses of understanding is achieved by the reader’s interaction with the standard literary 
features of literary fiction rather than the work’s status as fiction.  
 
One charge that may be levelled against literary cognitivism is that such a position 
overplays the epistemic credentials of engaging with literary fiction given that most 
discussion surrounding these texts is made up of a mere exchange of personally held 
opinions which is not the stuff of genuine cognitive gain. This challenge arises from the 
fact that a reader’s analysis and interpretation of a literary fictional work involves at least 
two kinds of personal engagement. In the first instance, readers draw on their own 
experience as part of a close reading. A Christian reader of King Lear is well placed to 
recognise that Cordelia’s reply: ‘O dear father, It is thy business that I go about’ (IV.4.23) 
alludes to Jesus’s words on being found in the temple by Mary and Joseph: ‘Did you not 
know that I must be about my father’s business’ Luke (2: 49). As Putnam says: 
 
There can never be a final commentary, one that is perfect from the standpoint of 
every cultural position, every set of interests and assumptions.   
                                                                                                                       
(Putnam 1983 a:80) 
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In addition, it is widespread practice to arrange the material gathered from a close analysis 
in what the reader considers a coherent form. There is no single correct format of 
presentation and literary interpretation relies on the personal preference of the reader. 
Arrangement of the material gathered from a close reading according to personal 
preference is not unique to literary interpretation and extends to making a business pitch, 
presenting a case in a law court and writing a lecture.    
The presence of these personal elements fuels the charge that reading literary fiction is 
very much a subjective affair. The subjectivism in question is the kind that threatens 
objectivity and holds that there is nothing independent of opinion: ‘A wholly subjective 
opinion is one that is answerable to nothing more than how things seem to the subject’ 
(Smith 2007: 46). This subjectivism is compatible with relativism: ‘Relativism would lead 
us to say that each was right to deny the other’s opinion: that truth was relative to a point 
of view…’ (Smith 2007: 65). I should point out that the challenge in question applies to 
those texts that are rich enough to generate divergent readings; there is not much more to 
say about Herrick’s line ‘Gather ye rose buds while ye may’ other than a paraphrase of the 
thought. In contrast, on reading The Tempest one reader may conclude that Prospero is a 
pragmatic Machiavel, an arch manipulator of images and of his daughter while a second 
reader may conclude that Prospero is an insightful and benign Magus and that the first 
reading is wrong. Unlike differences of opinion in other areas where resolution depends on 
further investigation, in the literary case, there seems nothing more to add other than that 
these different personal readings of a text conflict.   
 
The challenge to my literary cognitivist thesis may be summarised as follows:   
 
1. There are personal elements to close reading and to a reader forming an 
interpretation of a given literary fiction. 
2. From (1) there is more than one admissible reading of a literary fiction. 
3. If we allow there to be more than one admissible reading of a literary fiction, then 
the claim that a reader of literary fiction achieves genuine cognitive gain is 
undermined. 
4. The claim that a reader of literary fiction achieves genuine cognitive gain is 
undermined. 
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My counter is that statement (1) overstates what is involved in a close reading and the 
forming of an interpretation of a literary text and that statement (3) amounts to a false 
entailment. The main flaw in the challenge is that it is entirely outcome-focussed while my 
version of literary cognitivism depends on certain skills of understanding that are gained 
while the reader offers a close reading and develops a fitting interpretation of the text. It is 
unclear why subjective elements or variation in the end result can compromise this kind of 
cognitive gain. The fact that readers can sometimes get things wrong, for instance 
misreading a poem by Wyatt as a bawdy Restoration ballad rather than as Tudor gallantry, 
has no bearing on the challenge laid out above and need not detain us further. 
The pluralism-monism debate about literary criticism does not help either. Critical 
monism, the view that there is a central, correct reading of a literary work, ignores the 
variety of valid interpretation (e.g. Novitz 2002: 103-104). Recourse to critical pluralism, 
the view that there are multiply admissible interpretations of literary fictional works (e.g. 
Margolis 2002), frames the issue but does not help counter these charges of subjectivism 
and relativism as each multiply admissible reading may be based on how the text ‘seems to 
the subject’. Robert Stecker (1994) argues for a compatibilist position between pluralism 
and monism: that it is possible to offer a single comprehensive reading of core details of a 
literary text while interpreting other details, which are not truth functional, in a more 
individual way (Stecker 1994: 195). For instance, we agree that Kent in King Lear adopts a 
disguise to become Caius, and agree that failure to notice this is to make a mistake. 
However, we may offer differing readings of what Kent means, for instance whether he is 
being sincere or not, when he says he sees ‘authority’ in Lear’s face (King Lear I. 4. 30). 
This form of compatibilism, like pluralism, only frames the problem. Let us look more 
carefully at the phenomenon of disagreement over literary fiction. 
 
The Leavis Bateson debate 
 
 
My contention is that disagreement between readers of literary fiction involves genuine 
debate rather than a mere exchange of opinions characteristic of the view that reading 
literature is ‘merely subjective’. Take as an example the disagreement between Leavis and 
Bateson from Scrutiny (1953) comparing the following lines from Marvell’s ‘A Dialogue 
between the Soul and the Body’: 
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A Soul hung up, as ‘twere, in Chains 
Of Nerves, and Arteries, and Veins, 
Tortur’d, besides each other part, 
In a vain Head, and double Heart.  
 
and Pope’s Dunciad IV, 501-4: 
 
First slave to Words, then vassal to a Name, 
Then dupe to Party; child and man the same; 
Bounded by Nature, narrow’d still by Art, 
A trifling head, and a contracted heart. 
 
Leavis objects to Bateson’s readings of the poems on a number of grounds; here are some 
examples. Bateson contrasts, incorrectly in Leavis’s view, the ‘grey abstractions’ of Pope’s 
line ‘A trifling head, and contracted heart’ with Marvell’s vivid picture language in his line 
‘In a vain Head, and double Heart’ (Leavis 1968: 283-284). For Leavis, Bateson has just 
asserted this contrast without providing evidence from the verse and is distracted by a 
source external to the poem.
31
 Leavis accuses Bateson of applying too simple a schema to 
Marvell’s poem, that the body is a torture chamber of the soul, whereas the poem explores 
the relation between body and soul in a more sophisticated, original and powerful way 
(1968: 285-288). Further, Leavis accuses Bateson of taking the words ‘slave’, ‘vassal’ and 
‘dupe’ to be ‘virtually interchangeable’ while Leavis points out that each word carries a 
distinctive meaning, for example the renting of land as a vassal expresses a different 
relation to that of being deceived as a dupe (1968: 289-290).  
 
In the course of their disagreement, Leavis and Bateson suggest some guiding principles or 
criteria for admissible readings of a literary work. I record some representative suggestions 
in the order that each suggestion appears in the original exchange between these critics and 
extract five general principles as grounds for not accepting an ‘anything goes’ relativism 
based on an exchange of opinion. The reader is required to read a text carefully and ‘duly 
ponder’ what they read in accordance with training in ‘practical criticism’; this process 
‘establishes a poem in analysis’ (Leavis: 1968: 309). While analysis is emphasised, and 
Bateson is taken to task by Leavis for his being distracted by social context, the benefits of 
some specialist knowledge of external factors is given credence by both parties: ‘Such 
                                                          
31 Emblem VIII in the Fifth Book of Quarles’s Emblemes which depicts a skeleton lolling in a sitting 
position (the body) with a kneeling figure inside (the soul). 
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intelligent reading, directed upon the poetry of the seventeenth century, cannot fail to be 
aware of period peculiarities of idiom, linguistic usage, convention and so on, and of the 
need, here, there and elsewhere, for special knowledge’ (1968: 281). A close reading must 
be based on evidence found in the literary work rather than mere assertion (1968: 284). 
The reader is not expected to work in isolation but as part of a collaborative and 
constructively critical community (1968: 288). Nevertheless, it is expected of the close 
reader that he or she provides his or her own analysis, interpretation and relevant 
experience rather than hide behind the conventions of a previous generation of readers 
(1968: 291). Articulation of the reader’s analysis should be ‘delicate and precise’ (1968: 
291).   
 
Criteria for admissibility 
 
I cite the Leavis-Bateson debate as one piece of evidence to show the kind of close reading 
and interpretation offered by readers and often overlooked in the philosophical debate. 
What I outline above is sufficient to demonstrate that reading literary fiction is more than 
an exchange of personal opinions and involves justification and the presentation of a 
coherent case. Let us summarise the guiding principles of this way of reading, taken from 
the Leavis-Bateson debate, as follows: 
 
i. Textual evidence: evidence must be supplied from the literary work for a given 
reading. The mere assertion of a reader’s opinion is deemed malpractice. 
 
ii. Specialist Knowledge – where appropriate the reader may cite specialist 
knowledge of, for instance, social context, biography or etymology. Knowledge 
that a skeleton is a symbol for the body is not a matter of opinion. 
 
iii. Coherence – the arrangement of material produced from the process of close 
reading of the text is arranged into coherent and carefully articulated themes. That 
certain points fit together in a particular order is not just a matter of personal 
opinion. 
 
iv. Honesty – where coherence is not possible the reader should draw attention to the 
fact and comment on any areas of interest as a result of such gaps or 
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inconsistencies; that certain points do not fit neatly together is not just a matter of 
personal opinion. 
 
v. Autonomy – the reader should exercise his or her skills of analysis and judgement 
as to what features of the text are significant. It is significant that authors of literary 
fiction often refuse to play ball when asked what a particular line or trope in a 
poem, play or work of literary prose ‘really means’; this is the duty of the reader. 
 
While criteria (i) and (ii) are applicable to the close reading of a literary fictional work, 
criteria (iii) and (iv) are applicable to the reader forming an interpretive hypothesis of the 
material gathered from a close reading. Criterion (v) applies to both close reading and 
hypothesis formation. Each criterion points to something we value in a good reading of 
literary fiction but no criterion is based on the reader’s opinion as some justification is 
provided in each case. The Leavis-Bateson debate shows a tension between close textual 
analysis and the reader’s comment on social context (Leavis 1968: 293). For the sake of 
argument I agree with Leavis that while there is some place for social commentary the act 
of literary analysis should take priority and I defend this further through Chapter Four. I 
end this section with two potential problem cases that suggest a further criterion of 
admissibility for literary interpretation. 
 
First, what are we to make of wild and outlandish readings? One example may be found in 
Richard Rand’s paper ‘Ozone: an essay on Keats’ (1987) where the thesis runs that ozone 
is pertinent to the poetry of Keats. This form of oxygen was discovered in 1840, nineteen 
years after the poet’s death, but the anachronism is irrelevant for Rand.  The justification 
given is that Keats was inspired by the letter ‘o’: 
… at a certain stage, beginning with “Endymion” and ending with “The Fall of 
Hyperion” – a stage which I am tempted to call the “ozone” of his career … Keats 
invested a truly remarkable degree of energy in “o” as a grapheme, in “o” as a 
phoneme, and in the virtual zone between and around the two terms. “O”, in an 
infinity of manifestations, became the chief focus of his concern.    
                                                                                                                                                      
(Rand 1987: 297) 
Such an interpretation helps Rand interpret the line in Endymion ‘once, above the edges of 
our nest,/ An arch face peep’d/ an Oread as I guess’ as follows: 
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Let us grant that an Oread is a kind of nymph.  You can also read it, however – and 
we do so here and now – as the words “O read”.  “O read”, means the peeping 
Oread; and, when you do so, “read O”.                                                     (1987: 299) 
 
In addition, the line from Keats’s ‘Two or Three Posies’: ‘Two or three dove’s eggs/ To 
hatch into sonnets’ is deemed significant evidence of Keats’s preoccupation with the letter 
‘o’ as ‘that branch of zoology which treats of eggs is denominated “oology”; and the 
formation and maturation of an egg is called “oogenesis” (1987: 302). Rand’s reading is 
text based, coherent and autonomous but eccentric, anachronistic and underdeveloped. The 
third detracting feature is important here. Rand’s paper makes a suggestion that may be 
fecund but the critic has not followed the suggestion through with a fully formed 
interpretation of Keats’s verse. If such a reading had been executed and if the reading had 
offered insight then we should take note in spite of the reading being eccentric and 
anachronistic. 
 
The second potentially problematic case is an example of a reading that is wrong in an 
interesting way. The following example is reported in the preface to the Cambridge edition 
of The Merchant of Venice: 
The Kenyan writer Karen Blixen once told the story of The Merchant of Venice to 
her Somali butler, Farah Aden, who was deeply disappointed by Shylock’s defeat. 
He was sure the Jew could have succeeded, if only he had used a red-hot knife. As 
an African listener, he had expected a tale about a clever trickster in the Brer Rabbit 
tradition; Shylock let him down. We can be as far off-course as Farah in our 
reading of the play if we do not pay some heed to the attitudes of its first audience: 
their range of expectations about comedy as a genre, and the assumptions they 
brought to a play set in Venice, to its portrayal of the law, of Jews, and of usury, 
and to its handling of the theme of love and friendship.  
                                                                                                         (Mahood 1987: 8) 
 
In this example the reader falls foul of the third criterion as they lack specific knowledge 
that has bearing on our reading of the text and mistake the genre but succeed, unwittingly, 
in offering a fecund way to explore the text. Why didn’t Shylock argue his case more 
creatively at the end of the play but submit to conversion and humiliation? A coherent 
answer to this prompt may count as an illuminating interpretation of The Merchant of 
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Venice. We are presented with a case of an illuminating misreading but I should point out 
that it is more illuminating when we know that the reading is a misreading and when we 
nevertheless run the thought experiment and consider what the answer might be to Aden’s 
question ‘Why wasn’t Shylock more creative in his defence?’ This question can be posed 
and an answer suggested without misreading the play yet credit should be given to the 
reader who posed the question even on the back of his misreading. 
 
I account for these problem cases, of outlandish and mistaken readings, by suggesting that 
it is our use of some of the material offered that may in certain circumstances be of 
cognitive benefit. This detour results in a further criterion which I suggest should run as 
follows:  
vi. Fecundity- the close analysis and interpretation of a literary fictional text is to be 
judged according to the fecundity of such a reading. A fecund reading leads us to 
new and interesting possibilities.  
  
My intention in this section is only to show that the business of close reading and 
interpretation is not merely a matter of opinion and so resist the charge of subjectivism 
leading to outright relativism.  
I want to preserve a healthy resistance to any old codology in literary interpretation but not 
at the cost of stifling insight.  I do not want to punitively police literary interpretation, but 
allow for different kinds of interpretive project: the anachronistic, creative, psychoanalytic 
as such readings can re-oxygenate a text. In what has been argued above: I admit to more 
than one admissible reading of a literary fictional text and believe that this does not 
damage the cognitive standing of literary interpretation. I am a pluralist but not an 
‘anything goes’ pluralist and have offered six criteria to judge what should or should not 
count; in offering these criteria I believe the charge of subjectivism is abated.  
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Chapter Four: The Cognitive Gain from 
Reading Literary Fiction as Literature.  
 
I argue, in Chapter One, that literary fiction is a subgenre of both literature and fiction as 
literary fiction possesses the standard features of both literature and fiction and lacks the 
contra-standard features of both super-genres. One standard feature of literary fiction as 
literature is the presence of what are known generally as ‘literary devices’. My contention 
is that literary devices play a crucial and neglected role in a reader gaining cognitive 
advantage from literary art. What do I mean by ‘literary device’? Literary devices do not 
form a quasi-natural kind like ‘culinary fruit’ or ‘extreme sport’ so I shall adopt an anti-
essentialist approach to categorising literary devices consistent with the approach taken 
throughout this project. In fact, the term ‘literary device’ can be substituted for ‘game’ in 
Wittgenstein’s famous passage from Philosophical Investigations I.66: 
Consider for example the features we call ‘literary devices’.  What is common to 
them all? – Don’t say “There must be something common, or they would not be 
called ‘literary devices’”- but look and see whether there is anything common to 
all. -For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but 
similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that.   
Literary devices form an extended family where there is variation in resemblance between 
the likes of: onomatopoeia, symbolism and omniscient narration. So, we may conclude 
along with Wittgenstein (PI I.66): 
And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of similarities 
overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes 
similarities of detail.  
As a result, I am left with a considerable number and variety of potential candidates for 
literary devices deserving of comment as well as a vague overlap between what counts as 
narrative, aesthetic, rhetorical and literary devices.  
Narrative style may include irony or allusion, which are also literary devices. Aesthetic 
devices generate aesthetic effect but may include rhyme, rhythm and metre which are also 
referred to as ‘literary devices’. Rhetorical devices are used to make a piece of writing 
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sound more convincing and range from the Ciceronian rhetorical strategy of citing things 
in groups of three to literary devices like alliteration. I shall keep only the prime candidates 
for literary devices in focus so as this chapter does not become unwieldy. Specific literary 
devices that deserve a more thorough treatment than I have space to offer here include: 
bathos, epiphanies, flashbacks, types of paradox such as oxymoron, pathetic fallacy, the 
role of the chorus, poetic justice, double plots (where the subplot comments on the main 
plot), symbolism, comic intensification, personification, soliloquy and interior monologue. 
I have also omitted a discussion of the more general aspects of a work: voice, tone, style, 
characterisation and imagery. The selection of literary devices is derived from the 
philosophical literature as well as from my experience as a reader:  
 irony and allusion (Nussbaum 1992: 3; Currie 2010: 164-166), 
 particularity and precision: particular detail (Putnam 1978: 87; Nussbaum 1992: 38 
154); precise use of language (Beardsmore 1973: 36-37; Robinson 2005: 161; 
Lodge 2002: 12, 18; Gibson 2007: 75-80),  
 metaphor and related tropes (Nussbaum 1992: 157; Lodge 2002: 13; Gibson 2007: 
75),  
 play with perspective (Putnam 1978: 87; Nussbaum 1992: 32; Robinson 2005: 
159; Lodge 2002: 37; Gibson 2007: 20), 
 ambiguity (John 1998: 336-337), 
 repetition through rhythm, rhyme and alliteration (Lodge 2002: 37).  
 
In each section, I shall discuss the relevant candidate in terms of the senses of 
understanding as presented in section (3.2). The general argument in section (4.1-6) runs as 
follows: reading literary fiction involves engagement with common literary devices such as 
irony and metaphor; the same level of engagement is not a prominent feature of reading 
non-literary fiction. The reader’s engagement with literary devices is a way that the reader 
can practice exercising understanding in senses (i-v) above so literary fiction is a source of 
cognitive gain.  ‘Involves engagement’ is deliberately vague here as the exact nature of the 
engagement depends on what simile, rhyme or instance of irony is in play. The project 
seeks to move the cognitivist debate away from what the reader gains from reading literary 
fiction to the process of how the reader gains any cognitive benefit from reading literary 
fiction.  
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My claim to cognitive gain from reading literary fiction is not an exclusive one as we can 
gain understanding, in the senses discussed above, elsewhere. Nevertheless, I maintain that 
reading literary fiction is an especially impressive way of practising the relevant skills 
given the broad range and combinations of cognitive capacities required when we read 
literary fiction and the way in which the material generated from a close reading feeds into 
the reader’s interpretation of a literary work. 
 
4.1 Irony 
 
‘Being ironic’ belongs with the multiplicity of language games identified by Wittgenstein 
in his Philosophical Investigations (I. 23) alongside ‘making up a story’, ‘play-acting’ or 
‘guessing riddles’. One of the earliest mentions of Eirōneia occurs in Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics where irony involves playful understatement.
32
 ‘Irony’ is cited as the 
deficiency where truthfulness is the mean and boastfulness is the excess (II. 7. 1108a19-
22). The magnanimous person is characterised as someone who is candid and straight-
speaking except when public occasions demand a degree of self-deprecation or ‘irony’ (IV. 
4. 1124b30; IV. 7. 1127a22f). In this case, virtuous individuals are permitted to use irony 
in order to win over an audience; appearing not to take themselves too seriously.  
A single, unified account of irony proves problematic given the scope of what is deemed 
ironic and I agree with Peter Goldie’s comments, in his review of Gregory Currie’s 
‘pretence account’ of irony:  
One notable thing about irony is its multiple forms and uses, and the multiple ways 
in which irony is bound up with other kinds of trope and rhetorical device – litotes, 
bathos, hyperbole, metaphor, sarcasm, and many others … As Currie himself 
accepts, ‘Irony can become very complex’ (158).  Perhaps in the end trying to 
provide a theory of irony, whether the pretence theory or any other kind of theory, 
is as dangerous as trying to provide a theory of humour. 
                                                                                  (Goldie 2011: 336) 
Allusion is an example of another literary device that can be ironic: ‘Most allusions serve 
to illustrate or clarify or enhance a subject, but some are used in order to undercut it 
                                                          
32 An earlier reference to irony occurs in Plato’s Republic where Socrates takes on the mantle of eiron, the 
arch dissembler from Greek tragedy.  
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ironically by the discrepancy between the subject and the allusion’ (Abrams 1993: 8). 
Allusion deserves separate comment at the end of this section. 
When Goldie refers to the ‘multiple forms’ of irony, he may have the following candidates 
in mind: 
i) ‘Verbal irony’: this occurs when what is said is more, less or contrary to what is 
meant. Currie gives the nice example of saying ‘you sure know a lot’ to a 
knowledgeable bore (Currie 2010: 151). 
ii) ‘Cosmic irony’ expresses a sense of futility concerning human destiny. There 
are many examples in Alanis Morisette’s song ‘Ironic’ including the opening 
lines: ‘An old man turned ninety-eight/ He won the lottery and died the next 
day.’ 
iii) ‘Socratic irony’: precisely what is meant by ‘Socratic irony’ is contentious (see 
the discussion in Vlastos 1991: 29-37). The term is frequently used to describe 
faux naivety on the part of Socrates who pretends not to have formulated views 
on a given topic when he has (The Republic 336c).  
iv) Some sarcasm may be ironic as in the case of extreme praise when we say 
‘that’s interesting’ and mean the opposite. Here a contrast is drawn between 
what someone finds genuinely interesting and what is not of interest.  The 
ironist may wish to underscore his or her scorn by a recognisable tone.  
v) Dramatic irony occurs when the audience or readership is privy to information 
(often of a tragic nature) of which the characters in the fiction are not aware. 
vi) Situational irony occurs when events communicate more than their appearance 
as when I am stuck in a traffic jam on a road with severe speed restrictions. 
vii) ‘Poetic justice’ occurs when virtue is seen to be rewarded and vice punished in 
a particularly fitting way. I remember a draconian college official (and former 
military man) twisting his ankle while demonstrating the goose step to his 
grandson. This incident would not be ironic if the injury had occurred playing 
badminton. 
 
I shall leave my account of irony flexible given that there are exceptions to essentialist 
accounts: Currie’s example of verbal irony in (i), (vi) and (vii) above show that the 
traditional Ciceronian account of irony ‘…when your words differ from your thoughts’ (De 
Oratore II. 67) is insufficient. Cases of (ii), (vi), (vii) together with ironic undercutting 
through allusion prove problematic for Currie’s recent pretence account of irony which 
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states that the ironist pretends to have a certain outlook in order to comment on a given 
target (Currie 2010: 150-158). While literary fiction may depict situational irony, my 
primary focus in what follows is the other forms of irony identified above. I shall make the 
case in what follows that unravelling irony in many instances of its various forms exercises 
understanding in the five senses identified in section (3.2). 
 
Recognising irony 
 
In Conrad’s short story ‘An Outpost of Progress’ the central characters Carlier and Kayerts 
are described as ‘two pioneers of trade and progress’ half way through the first part of the 
story. Yet there is implicit reference to these characters being ill-prepared and unsuited 
through their physical description, how they live together and how they are viewed by 
other characters. Take the following simile: ‘They were like blind men in a large room, 
aware only of what came in contact with them (and of that only imperfectly), but unable to 
see the general aspect of things’. There is also explicit reference to the characters’ 
‘stupidity and laziness’. One character says:  ‘Look at those two imbeciles. They must be 
mad at home to send me such specimens’.  It is standard practice in close analysis of 
literary fiction to read the text more than once so it may also be supposed that anyone 
reading the description of Carlier and Kayerts as ‘two pioneers of trade and progress’ will 
be aware that at the end of the story Kayerts shoots Carlier before hanging himself. The 
upshot of this is that the description that ‘Carlier and Kayerts are pioneers of trade and 
progress’ is not true. The statement is ironic. So why not state explicitly that Carlier and 
Kayerts are not pioneers of trade and progress and leave things at that?  
A literal, non-ironic description would not say as much as Conrad’s ironic statement. In the 
case of a straightforward declaration such as ‘Carlier and Kayerts are stupid and lazy’ the 
reader is given the information. Yet in stating the patently false Conrad engages the reader 
in a process of discernment, understanding in sense (i) above, as to how these characters 
see themselves and how they are seen by other characters. In the case under discussion, the 
reader asks why these characters are described in these terms despite evidence to the 
contrary. Perhaps this is how Carlier and Kayerts see themselves though with some latent 
doubts. Perhaps it is how the imperialist company that employs Carlier and Kayerts want 
us to see this kind of employee. Perhaps it is how Mokola, the native charged with looking 
after the store, appears to treat them while conducting illicit business behind their backs 
[131] 
 
including the selling of workers into slavery - a crime to which Carlier and Kayerts 
become accessories. The ironic description prompts these interpretations of the text and in 
so doing prompts consideration of these characters in a wider frame of reference. These 
readings result from careful design on the ironist’s part (we return to this point in section 
4.7 below) and require sensitivity to nuance, an openness to there being more than one 
reading and critical judgement as to which reading forms the best interpretation on the 
reader’s behalf. What is discerned can form part of an overall interpretation or reading of a 
text.  
 
Recognising more subtle irony 
 
Irony is not always as obvious as standard examples would have us believe: a standard 
example is stating ‘that’s interesting’ when it is not. Sometimes detecting more subtle 
examples of irony requires the nose and tenacity of a truffle hound to dig further. Peter 
Goldie’s comment, quoted above, draws our attention to the fact that irony may be 
embedded in other literary devices.  
Consider the line in Arthur Miller’s Death of a Salesman when Willy Loman says ‘the 
world is an oyster, but you don’t crack it open on a mattress’. In this example the irony 
occurs in the context of another literary device. The metaphor ‘the world is your oyster’ 
comes from Shakespeare’s The Merry Wives of Windsor when Pistol says ‘…the world’s 
mine oyster, which I with sword will open’ (Act 2 Scene 2 lines 4-5) and the first part of 
this line has entered popular discourse. Miller revitalises the cliché with the additional 
clause ‘but you don’t crack it open on a mattress’. I detect irony in Miller’s addition: the 
image of a mattress invites us to consider Loman’s goal of amassing material goods, a 
significant part of the American dream and the kind of wealth you’d ‘keep under a 
mattress’ but which Loman lacks.  Further, while ‘oyster’ carries sexual connotations as 
does Pistol’s suggestion as to how it will be opened, the stark image of an unmade bed 
reminds us that Loman is having an affair with an unnamed colleague who he gives 
stockings to that were promised to his wife. Loman’s womanising may be partly the result 
of having his ambitions fail. Certainly Loman does not follow the advice he gives to his 
sons at the time the metaphor occurs and such advice is framed ironically to comment on 
his own behaviour. The metaphor would not contain the same irony if the line ran ‘The 
world is an oyster but you don’t crack it open in your armchair’.  
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On one level, the reader discerns the meaning of the metaphor as it falls from the lips of 
Willy Loman who offers this as advice to his sons. On another level, the close reader also 
discerns the meaning of the metaphor as it works ironically in the context of the play. In 
the latter case of understanding, the close reader discerns the meaning of the ironic 
metaphor (sense i) and in discerning such a meaning is able to understand the play better 
through navigating the work’s complexities (sense iii) before forming a reading or 
interpretation of the play (sense v). Let me say a little more about how understanding in 
senses (i-iv) feeds into understanding in sense (v). 
 
Irony and interpretation 
 
One of the most common comments I see written in the margins of an annotated literary 
text is ‘ironic’. However, recognising that a line or phrase is ironic cannot be the sum 
cognitive benefit; the same applies to recognising a simile or that a line is alliterative. 
Detecting irony is only the first step in a cognitive process in which the careful reader 
needs to work out how X being ironic is significant. The cognitive potential of engaging 
with irony involves other skills such as: being able to chase an allusion, recognising the 
place of ironic comment in a repeated motif or, as Goldie suggests in his comment quoted 
at the start of this section, the detection of irony in other literary devices. In turn, the 
material gathered informs the reader’s overall interpretation of a literary work. 
In the following example, the prima facie dramatic irony does not add anything particularly 
relevant cognitively but does yield something interesting when we pay attention to one 
particular detail, namely the song lyrics. In Scene VII of A Streetcar Named Desire Stanley 
finds out about Blanche’s past and informs his wife Stella (Blanche’s sister) while Blanche 
takes a bath off stage unaware that her character is being denigrated by Stanley: 
STANLEY: Our supply-man down at the plant has been going through Laurel for years 
and he knows all about her and everybody else in the town of Laurel knows 
all about her.  She is as famous in Laurel as if she was the President of the 
United States, only she is not respected by any party! This supply-man stops 
at a hotel called the Flamingo. 
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BLANCHE (Singing blithely):                                                                  
  ‘Say, it’s only a paper moon, Sailing over a cardboard sea – 
  But it wouldn’t be make-believe if you believed in me!’ 
A reading of the irony of this scene would be compromised should Blanche have been 
humming in the bath or singing an insignificant song. The lyrics prompt the audience to 
identify where the make-believe lies in the story acted out before us: who in the world of 
the story is asking who to believe what?
33
 The answer to this question makes a comment 
on the play as a whole: the bond of trust never forms between Blanche and her hosts who 
find her unbelievable; fuelled by Stanley’s revelations quoted above. This mistrust 
culminates in Blanche being removed to an asylum in the final scenes. It is Stanley’s 
version of events, his make-believe that he didn’t try to rape Blanche, that is believed, 
largely owing to his insistent character. The audience are encouraged to form an 
interpretation of the play based on who they believe and on what grounds. In this example 
from A Streetcar Named Desire the reader is encouraged to look beyond the layer of 
dramatic irony to discover further ironic comment concerning mistrust and make-believe 
which in turn influences the reader’s interpretation of this play.  
 
Chasing an allusion 
 
Allusion is reference without explicit identification to: a person, place, event, or another 
work of art such as another literary work of art. Classical allusions and biblical allusions 
are frequent in literary fiction and we shall examine an example of the latter. Allusion 
opens up literary texts to a great deal of other material which helps the reader understand 
the literary work in the sense of forming an interpretation of the work (sense v). Hence the 
ability in a reader to be able to ‘chase an allusion’ successfully means that he or she is 
privy to the illuminating links between the literary work and what is alluded to. The 
cognitive potential is noted by one literary critic who says: ‘most allusions serve to 
illustrate or clarify or enhance a subject, but some are used in order to undercut it ironically 
by the discrepancy between the subject and the allusion’ (Abrams 1993: 8).  What I am 
                                                          
33 This theme of believing what is illusory is also reflected in Scene XI in the exchange between Stella and 
her neighbour, Eunice. 
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interested in pursuing is the benefit of allusion referring without explicit identification. 
Consider the following three extracts from Shakespeare: 
 
SECOND MURDERER: 
A bloody deed, and desperately dispatch’d! 
How fain, like Pilate, would I wash my hands 
Of this most grievous murder!   (Richard III I. 4. 269-271) 
 
MACBETH: 
Will all great Neptune’s ocean wash this blood 
Clean from my hand? No; this my hand will rather 
The multitudinous seas incarnadine, 
Making the green one red.      (Macbeth II. 2. 60-63) 
 
LADY MACBETH: 
 A little water clears us of this deed. 
 How easy it is then! Your constancy 
Hath left you unattended.   (Macbeth II. 2.67-69). 
 
All three references allude to Pilate’s hand washing and its associations: power above the 
law, manipulation, pragmatic self-serving, the ease of self-exoneration, the questioning of 
truth. Yet unlike the first allusion, which makes the comparison explicit, the further two 
examples do not name Pilate. Direct referencing may sound pedestrian to an ideal 
readership who understands (in the sense of discernment) what is meant anyway. The 
cognitive gain lies in understanding (in senses ii, iii and iv) why such an allusion is being 
made and this task may take the reader more time and effort. I might suggest that the words 
of the second murderer make us think of a comparison between the character of Richard 
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III, as depicted in Shakespeare’s play, and Pontius Pilate in terms of their shared isolation 
from the rest of the community and shared freedom from moral scruples to the extent that 
they both treat others as means and not ends. These thoughts are generated through the 
reader’s active engagement with the text; if the same thoughts were served up as additional 
propositions then the reader is denied the opportunity to practice the process of active 
discovery. 
If my general thesis applies to irony in literary fiction then I should be able to demonstrate 
that reading literary fiction and engaging with irony allows the reader to practise certain 
skills that relate to the senses of understanding above. I have argued that detecting simple 
irony allows the reader to practice discernment and, what is more, that more subtle cases of 
irony allow the reader to practice more subtle skills of discernment. Some, though not all 
cases, of irony allow the reader to navigate the literary work as a whole and reach a sense 
of what is going on in the bigger picture and how the literary work might be interpreted 
fruitfully. The resulting thought feeds into an interpretive hypothesis and I make the case 
that answering the question ‘why state this ironically?’ can form candidate interpretations 
of the literary text as a whole.  Finally, both allusion and irony have in common the fact 
that what is stated conveys more than is explicitly stated.  
 
4.2 Particularity and precision 
 
The term ‘particularity’ in this context refers to the specific details recorded in a literary 
fictional work while the term ‘precision’ refers to the careful choice of words selected by 
the literary artist to convey a specific tone or meaning.  Martha Nussbaum discusses 
particularity and precision in her Love’s Knowledge and I contend that both terms are 
worth further attention to strengthen my thesis. In one passage Nussbaum argues as 
follows: 
 
It is not surprising that we find in these novels a commitment to qualitative 
distinctions; one could hardly imagine a literary art without that commitment. But 
the novel is committed more deeply than many other forms to a multiplicity and 
fineness of such distinctions. The organizing vision of the novels shows that one 
thing is not just a different quantity of another, that there is not only no single 
metric along which the claims of different good things can be meaningfully 
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considered, there is not even a small plurality of such measures. The novels show 
us the worth and richness of plural qualitative thinking and engender in their 
readers a rich qualitative kind of seeing. The novelist’s terms are even more 
variegated, more precise in their qualitative rightness, than are the sometimes blunt 
vague terms of daily life; they show us vividly what we can aspire to in refining our 
(already qualitative) understanding. 
                                                                                                               (Nussbaum 1992: 36) 
  
Nussbaum claims that it is the full and fine detail, usually lacking in everyday description 
and in the concision of a philosopher’s thought experiment (a favourite contrast for 
Nussbaum 1990: 88, 160-161, 227-228, 390) that contributes to the reader’s cognitive gain. 
The qualitative distinctions standard to literary fiction enhances the cognitive gain of the 
reader in at least two ways: first by engendering ‘a rich qualitative kind of seeing’ and 
secondly by ‘refining our (already qualitative) understanding’. 
 
The analysis of understanding proposed in section (3.2) can shed more light on 
Nussbaum’s claim that full and fine detail contributes to the reader’s cognitive reward. In 
this section I want to say more about how the reader’s engagement with particular detail 
precisely expressed exercises the relevant senses of understanding. 
 
 
Particularity 
 
 
One benefit of including particular detail, as Kathleen Wilkes points out (see section 3.1 
above), is that the audience is privy to more information and consequently gains more 
knowledge about a particular situation. This is true whether the situation depicted is 
fictional or non-fictional. My cognitive argument based on understanding goes further than 
Wilkes suggests. Any cognitive engagement of the sort identified above (section 3.2) is 
relative to specific literary fictional texts but I hope that by exploring the opening 
description of Mr. Gradgrind from Dickens’s Hard Times that the reader will gain a sense 
of the cognitive benefits in question.  
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Recognising the significance of particular detail 
 
Consider the following description: 
 
The scene was a plain, bare, monotonous vault of a schoolroom, and the speaker’s 
square forefinger emphasized his observations by underscoring every sentence with 
a line on the schoolmaster’s sleeve. The emphasis was helped by the speaker’s 
square wall of a forehead, which had his eyebrows for its base, while his eyes 
found commodious cellarage in two dark caves, overshadowed by the wall. The 
emphasis was helped by the speaker’s mouth, which was wide, thin, and hard set. 
The emphasis was helped by the speaker’s voice, which was inflexible, dry, and 
dictatorial. The emphasis was helped by the speaker’s hair, which bristled on the 
skirts of his bald head, a plantation of firs to keep the wind from its shining surface, 
all covered with knobs, like the crust of a plum pie, as if the head had scarcely 
warehouse-room for the hard facts stored inside. The speaker’s obstinate carriage, 
square coat, square legs, square shoulders, -nay, his very neckcloth, trained to take 
him by the throat with an unaccommodating grasp, like a stubborn fact, as it was,- 
all helped the emphasis. 
 
                                                                                                      (Dickens 1989: 1-2) 
 
We learn, from reading the passage above, that Gradgrind lectured the schoolmaster on the 
importance of facts in a schoolroom, that Gradgrind was bald and wore a neckcloth on this 
occasion. Knowing what goes on in a story or what a story is about is some cognitive gain. 
However, knowledge of what happens in the story is not the kind of cognitive gain that I 
seek to defend. There follows some suggestions as to what a reader might make of the 
passage. Whether this is a good reading of Dickens’s description of Gradgrind is beyond 
the philosophical point, which is that it is a feature of literary fiction to include detail 
contrived by the author, in order to practice skills of close reading, which correspond to 
understanding in senses (i-iv) and the forming of an interpretation of a text which 
corresponds to understanding in sense (v). 
 
A close reader could note the irony in the setting for Gradgrind’s address; we expect to 
find intellectual vitality in a schoolroom yet the venue is described as an empty and 
tomblike ‘vault’.  A similar description is made of the ‘commodious cellarage’ behind 
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Gradgrind’s eyes and his head is described as a ‘warehouse-room for hard facts’. The close 
reader recognises certain conventions: that eyes symbolise the soul and that that the face is 
an indication of character. We are not informed as to what is held here but only where such 
food for thought might be stored. The phrase ‘as if the head had scarcely warehouse room’ 
suggests that it might not. Gradgrind’s forehead is likened to a wall suggesting 
obstructiveness, impediment and limitation.  Gradgrind’s hair is described in terms of a 
functional wind break in contrast to other foliage, mainly flowers, described in the novel as 
a source of aesthetic appreciation (1989: 8) and life-affirmation (1989: 15, 295). There is 
an understated humour in the implicit invitation to break open the pie crust to dine on the 
factual riches inside. ‘Emphasis’ forms a repeated motif in the passage and suggests that 
the speaker indulges more in a monotonous rhetoric of praising facts than in any 
worthwhile defence of this view of education. Gradgrind’s forefinger, forehead, coat, legs 
and shoulders are all described as ‘square’ and a further geometrical image is presented in 
his ‘underscoring every sentence with a line on the schoolmaster’s sleeve’. This repeated 
detail suggests a limited intellect, as when we might call someone ‘square-headed’, as well 
as suggesting conventionality, lack of elegance and a machine-like bearing. Gradgrind’s 
delivery is described as ‘inflexible, dry, and dictatorial’. However, the repetition of 
‘emphasis’ and the imagery of emptiness temper our initial judgement that Gradgrind’s 
speech is serious and raises the suspicion that he is more reliant on the force of rhetoric. 
Gradgrind’s necktie is neat and functional but restrictive to the fundamental act of 
breathing; here the thought is that Gradgrind and M’Choakumchild (as his name suggests) 
are as restricted by their views of education as much as their pupils.  A character’s name is 
seldom chosen by chance by a literary author and the name ‘Gradgrind’ carries 
associations of monotonous, mechanical drudgery. 
 
The fact that the close reader notices the kinds of details listed above constitutes 
understanding in the first sense, understanding as discernment, which may be necessary 
though not sufficient for the reader to develop other senses of understanding where further 
cognitive effort is required. Particular detail may be used, explicitly or more subtly, to 
juxtapose themes, characters or viewpoints in a way that invites the reader to draw 
reflective comparison. Close attention to detail also helps the reader to build up a picture of 
the fictional character as: monotonous, inflexible, dry, dictatorial, square-headed, 
unaccommodating, mechanical and the potential source of amusement, which helps 
develop understanding in sense (iv). Cognitive skills associated with juxtaposition are 
worth a little more attention given the prevalence of this device in literary fiction. 
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Following our close reading of the passage above, the reader is alerted to similar 
descriptions of Gradgrind elsewhere in Hard Times, so we note a parallel when Gradgrind 
approaches the subject of his daughter, Louisa, marrying Mr. Bounderby:  
 
The barriers were too many and too high for such a leap. With his unbending, 
utilitarian matter-of-fact face, he hardened against her again; and the moment shot 
away into the plumbless depths of the past, to mingle with all the lost opportunities 
that are drowned there.                                                                    
                                                                                                     (Dickens 1989: 132) 
 
A further parallel is invited between Gradgrind and Louisa in the following passage from 
Book Two: 
 
In face she was no less remarkable than in manner. Her features were handsome; 
but their natural play was so locked up, that it seemed impossible to guess at their 
genuine expression. Utterly indifferent, perfectly self-reliant, never at a loss, and 
yet never at ease, with her figure in company with them there, and her mind 
apparently quite alone – it was of no use “going in” yet awhile to comprehend this 
girl, for she baffled all penetration. 
                                                                                                    (Dickens 1989: 169) 
 
While both faces share the same inscrutability, the later passage suggests that there is more 
behind Louisa’s visage than that of her father. On occasion, juxtaposition is encouraged 
explicitly as when Bounderby is reminded of his wedding vows by Gradgrind with the 
same words that Bounderby dismissed Stephen Blackpool (1989: 324). On other occasions 
juxtaposition is encouraged in the slightest phrase as when Louisa, who earlier is portrayed 
as ‘so locked up’ and ‘never at a loss’, is said to have her ‘feelings long suppressed broke 
loose’ (1989: 291). Comparison is encouraged through implicit juxtaposition of detail and 
not explicitly drawn in the text by stating ‘Gradgrind had less emotional intelligence than 
his daughter’. Of course, readers may find instances where concealed themes are made 
explicit, for instance when Gradgrind draws a distinction between ‘wisdom of the head’ 
and ‘wisdom of the heart’ (1989: 297) in an embarrassingly simplistic way. Inviting 
comparison implicitly rather than making explicit comparison requires readers to move 
from an awareness of what is happening in the story to contemplation of the significance of 
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what is happening in the story. The fact that juxtaposition is often concealed provides for 
better practice in the skill of discerning significance which may be used to cognitive effect 
in extra-literary settings. 
 
A salient skill in recognising the significance of detail involves making connections 
between particular information. Here are two examples from Hard Times. Many details 
carry commonplace connotations: vault, square, the crust of a plum pie. Making such 
associations in each case is not the final word as the reader then draws links between the 
range of associations we have made, for instance, with the word ‘vault’. We then 
recognise, for instance, that there is a theme of emptiness running through the passage: a 
vault like school room, Gradgrind’s empty rhetoric and his head described as ‘warehouse 
space’. The reader is able to make connections between these points which lays important 
foundations for the reader’s final interpretation of the work. Secondly, it is common 
practice in close reading to spot repeated words, like ‘square’ and ‘emphasis’, but such an 
exercise on its own would seem a futile task without some speculation on the significance 
of these words. Having identified an initial repeated pattern of words, the reader continues 
to be on the look-out for the same word and in order to reflect on the similarities and 
differences in uses. Making connections and spotting patterns are examples of 
understanding in sense (iii), while ordering the material into some form of interpretive 
hypothesis is an example of understanding in sense (v). 
 
 
Particular detail and interpretation 
 
There are at least two distinctive senses of ‘interpretation’ at play during the close analysis 
of a literary work. First, we may say that a reader interprets a particular detail in a certain 
way, as we may say that a reader interprets a metaphor, irony or symbolism in a certain 
way. Secondly, we talk about the reader forming an interpretation of the work as a whole 
when he or she draws the interpretive threads, in the first sense, together. I shall use 
‘interpretation’ to refer predominantly to the second sense.  
 
It is standard practice to read a literary text with one’s mind attentive to the significance of 
detail; the reader approaches all detail included in a literary work with a view that it may 
be significant even if it does not turn out to be so. The potential significance of detail leads 
the reader to try out hypotheses concerning individual instances in order to see how fruitful 
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such an interpretation is (in the first sense identified in the preceding paragraph). Some 
points might be dropped from a broader interpretation if they exist in isolation, for example 
the reference to the schoolroom as a vault being funereal does not seem to link to any other 
major theme whereas the association with emptiness does forge connections with other 
points. Associating the schoolroom with funereal imagery is not wrong but is not obviously 
connected with other material so fits on the edge of the coherent web of interpretation (in 
the second sense identified in the preceding paragraph). The interpreter forms a coherent 
reading of a given work in such a way so as to acknowledge a work’s complexity but does 
not need to offer a comprehensive commentary on a work. 
 
So far, I have argued that the detail included in literary fiction does not only provide more 
information, this generic benefit of specifying detail occurs in manifold cases from 
archaeology to police work, but that particular detail in literary fiction is often contrived by 
the author to prove fruitful for the reader’s exercising a range of interpretive skills. The 
resulting material is then arranged in some kind of coherent order as the reader’s 
interpretation of the literary fictional work and may be tested against other reader’s 
interpretive hypotheses. I leave discussion of the link between cognitive gain and aesthetic 
appreciation to section (4.7) and shall continue to pursue how different features standard to 
literary fiction engage a range of generic skills to cognitive benefit.   
 
 
Precision 
 
A philosopher may be precise in argument and a scientist precise in taking measurements 
but neither is the relevant sense of precision for literary fiction. It is, rather, the selection of 
a specific word or phrase to capture a specific event, gesture, look or mood in a fitting 
way; to the extent that we might say that only that particular word will do (Nussbaum 
1990: 34, 154). The case has been made by Kathleen V. Wilkes (see section 3.1 above) that 
there is cognitive value in common sense psychological description owing to the precise 
use of descriptive terms. Subtle and nuanced differences in meaning are brought out by a 
close analysis of the connotations or commonplace associations of words or phrases such 
as ‘craving’, ‘hoping’, or ‘longing for.’ The etymology of ‘nuance’ shows that the word 
was first used as a description of judging between colours and sound.  As different words 
may be used to differentiate between slightly different colours so different words may be 
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used to differentiate and describe different meanings. The precise choice of words neither 
depends on the amount of descriptive terms we have at our disposal nor the fact that many 
words have many synonyms, but the use apparent synonyms can be put to in order to pick 
out important differences.  
I should acknowledge that not all literary fiction is read so meticulously all the time. For 
one thing, classic works are often so lengthy as to prohibit such detailed reading. For 
another, such a continuous close reading would distract from the overall flow. This 
observation about standard reading practice in no way diminishes the importance of the 
role of close reading. In fact, the observation underscores the importance of reading some 
passages closely. Likely candidates might be passages that appear early on in a work, 
passages which stand out as dense in detail and literary device, and passages which have at 
least obviously significant detail. The reader of literary fiction reads richer passages more 
carefully but is free to read other passages, which merely advance the plot, in a quicker and 
lighter manner. 
 
Sensitivity to association 
 
Consider the following passage chosen from Chapter Two of F. Scott Fitzgerald’s novel 
The Great Gatsby: 
 
The bottle of whisky – a second one – was now in constant demand by all present, 
excepting Catherine, who ‘felt just as good on nothing at all’. Tom rang for the 
janitor and sent him for some celebrated sandwiches, which were a complete 
supper in themselves. I wanted to get out and walk eastward toward the park 
through the soft twilight, but each time I tried to go I became entangled in some 
wild, strident argument which pulled me back, as if with ropes, into my chair. Yet 
high over the city our line of yellow windows must have contributed their share of 
human secrecy to the casual watcher in the darkening streets, and I saw him too, 
looking up and wondering. I was within and without, simultaneously enchanted and 
repelled by the inexhaustible variety of life. 
                                                                                     (Scott Fitzgerald 1979: 41-42) 
[143] 
 
 
It is a useful exercise in close reading to ask oneself why the author has chosen a particular 
word or phrase and then decide on how an answer fits into one’s overall interpretation of a 
work. This line is developed a little further in the next section on metaphor. The precise 
choice of words can be communicated by an author via hesitation or negativity (these 
devices are not used above): Was it awe, obsession or possession? No, it was enchantment.  
Fitzgerald chooses the word ‘enchanted’ over ‘possessed’, ‘entranced’, ‘awestruck’ or 
‘mesmerized’. To be enchanted is to be ‘bewitched’ or ‘spellbound’ in a way that fits 
smitten lovers. There is a suggestion in the use of ‘enchanted’ (brought out more in the 
noun ‘enchantment’) that the person is captivated against his will with consequences that 
are not beneficial; perhaps he fails to see things clearly in a way that affects his judgement. 
The choice of ‘repelled’ carries visceral connotations as when someone has a gut reaction 
to something. The word chosen is not as strong as ‘disgusted’, nor as pathological as 
‘sickened’ or ‘nauseated’ nor as cerebral as ‘snubbed’ nor as morally judgmental as 
‘offended’ or ‘appalled’.  
Precise use of language plays an important role not just in describing the character’s 
mental states but also their verbal and non-verbal behaviour. For instance, the argument 
that pulls Carraway back is described as ‘strident’, not violent or warring as this choice of 
words would indicate too much energy, neither ‘scathing’ nor ‘caustic’ as these terms 
focus too much on the content of what the argument is about, not ‘raucous’ either as this 
word is too associated with the volume of the discussion. The choice of ‘strident’ alerts us 
to a forcefulness and energy in putting one’s point to, or maybe ‘at’, one’s audience.  
Understanding in sense (i) is at work when the close reader discerns the subtle differences 
in meaning between words like ‘enchanted’ and ‘awestruck’. Specifying the exact sense of 
a word informs the reader’s understanding as to why a character said or did such and such 
and this understanding (in sense (ii)) can be applied to another passage in the same novel 
or play. Skills of navigation, understanding in sense (iii), are required in order to determine 
which commonplace associations are relevant in a given context. Further, words such as 
‘snubbed’ or ‘appalled’ resonate on an experiential level which assists the reader in 
understanding what it is meant to be like for the characters portrayed.  The author’s choice 
of words and phrases in a text generates this material which may be used in forming an 
interpretation of the literary work as a whole.  
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Association and interpretation 
 
The reader’s engagement with the precise choice of words used in literary fiction goes to 
further illustrate the relationship between understanding in senses (i-iv) and understanding 
in sense (v). Close analysis of a precise term exercises understanding in senses (i-iv). The 
connotations or associations of a particular word or phrase relies on how our language is 
generally used so may change over time. Also, some associations may be peculiar to 
individual readers or categories of readers. For instance a stork may represent birth to a 
reader from the West but represent death to a reader from the Far East. The material 
gathered from close reading then becomes the subject for the reader forming an 
interpretation of the material gathered from close reading. Let me end this section with two 
examples of forming an interpretation of the material which constitute instances of 
understanding in the sense (v) above. 
Magnets are attracted and repelled in unconscious movement and so Carraway, and to 
some extent Gatsby, are attracted to and repelled by the social circles that they move in. 
Nick’s attitude to the party mirrors that of the party’s host, Gatsby. So in understanding 
Nick’s attitude to the party one, concurrently, understands a little more about Gatsby’s 
attitude to the roaring festivities. We recognise that Gatsby’s concern isn’t the party per se 
but it’s potential to attract Daisy. A reader may judge that the comparison between 
Carraway and Gatsby is the most fecund line to pursue and a coherent way of arranging the 
material previously cited on the back of a close reading of the particular language used in 
this extract. As a consequence, one’s interpretation may run: ‘The eponymous hero, 
Gatsby, like Carraway in the extract, is attracted by the forceful energy of the party goers 
but is also removed. In part, this is owing to his manipulation of their pleasure for another, 
private end. Yet, like the party goers, Gatsby is under the spell of this private goal in a way 
that is restrictive, myopic and captivating to a potentially corrupting degree’. An analysis 
of this passage from Scott Fitzgerald shows how understanding in the sense of discernment 
(of association and tone) can feed into understanding in the sense of interpretation (sense 
v).  
One skill at work is the reader’s ability to make connections and discern a pattern in the 
carefully chosen words where the reader then speculates on their collective significance. 
This is not really exemplified in the Gatsby example so let us turn to the opening chapter 
of Jane Austen’s Emma (too long to quote here). The sensitive reader will note that the 
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words: ‘evils’, ‘alloy’, ‘danger’, ‘misfortunes’, ‘loss’ and ‘grief’, stand out as incongruous 
in paragraphs four and five by way of contrast to the apparently idyllic initial description 
of Emma and her ‘situation’. The reader might then speculate that Emma is overreacting to 
her governess Miss Taylor leaving the Woodhouse household to get married or believe that 
these strong terms signify an underpinning insecurity caused by Emma losing her mother 
when five and in spite of her material comfort. These possibilities or interpretive 
hypotheses are then carried through when reading the rest of the work and are either 
substantiated, modified or rejected according to what sort of textual evidence is 
encountered. The fact that this kind of work may be carried out on longer works of literary 
fiction, such as the two novels mentioned, shows that sensitivity to association and its 
place in an interpretation are not just ways of reading poetry but are applicable when 
reading literary fiction in general.  
 
4.3  Metaphor  
 
Metaphor is a figure of speech which invites us to think of one thing as or in terms of 
another thing where the two things are not usually associated with one another but where at 
least one common characteristic exists. L.P. Hartley’s The Go Between begins: ‘The past is 
another country, they do things differently there’. Talking or writing metaphorically joins 
giving an order, forming a hypothesis or telling a joke in the multiplicity of language 
games (Philosophical Investigations I. 23). Here the term ‘language-game’ brings into 
prominence the fact that language is part of a cultural activity. It is noteworthy that while 
one gives an order, forms a hypothesis or tells a joke, the speaker creates, devises or uses a 
metaphor. The choice of verbs suggests artisanship; which is to say there is a craft to 
turning a good metaphor. Aristotle identified the devising of metaphors as a good 
indication of intellectual capability of a sort that cannot be learnt ‘…since a good metaphor 
implies an intuitive perception of the similarity in dissimilars’ (Poetics 1459a). 
Metaphor occurs frequently in our communication. When philosophers talk about 
‘following the laws of logic to reach a conclusion’ they have used three metaphors. 
Metaphor is used to multiple ends in addition to enhancing understanding: they amuse, 
entertain, show off, bamboozle or parody metaphor itself. On occasion, metaphor and other 
related tropes may contribute nothing or even detract from cognitive value. I found the 
following simile excessive when reading Lionel Shriver’s We Need To Talk About Kevin: 
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It seemed so unfair. You were clearly choked up, filled to the back of your throat 
with wonderment that defied expression. It was like watching you lick an ice cream 
cone that you refused to share.                                                             
                                                                                                       (Shriver 2003: 97) 
 
This section limits discussion to how the rich metaphors and related tropes prominent in 
literature can help the reader develop a better understanding. I have simile, metonymy, 
synecdoche, anthimeria, anthropomorphism and personification in mind when I say ‘other 
tropes’.   
There are numerous accounts of metaphor: most recently Kendall Walton’s thesis that a 
metaphor is a stipulation that something serve as a prop in a game of make believe (Walton 
2015: 183-184) and James Grant’s Minimal Thesis which holds that what is compared 
must share some likeness (2013: 87). However, what I have to say about the cognitive gain 
from metaphor is not tied to any particular philosophical account of metaphor. My main 
contention is that a significant source of cognitive gain is found in a metaphor’s pragmatic 
and not semantic effects.   
The distinction between the semantics and pragmatics of metaphor is drawn in the 
Davidson-Black debate of the 1960s and 1970s (Black 1962: 30). The disagreement 
centred on three claims made by Black: that there are loose rules of language that 
determine whether an expression counts as metaphor (Black 1962: 29); that metaphor can 
extend the meaning of words (1962: 27, 31); and that something special occurs when a 
reader makes a connection between the elements of a metaphor (1962: 39). Davidson 
denies each of these claims, arguing that: ‘… understanding a metaphor is as much a 
creative endeavour as making a metaphor, and as little guided by rules…There are no 
instructions for devising metaphors; there is no manual for determining what a metaphor 
“means” or “says”…(Davidson 2001a: 245). Davidson offers an account of compositional 
semantics where: ‘What metaphor adds to the ordinary is an achievement that uses no 
semantic resources beyond the resources on which the ordinary depends’ (Davidson 2001a: 
245). The swans depicted in Yeats’ poem ‘Wild Swans at Coole’ may be a metaphor for 
the transience of beauty, the inevitability of exile or of romantic love but the semantic 
meaning of ‘swans’ in the title of the poem refers directly to the bird and not to these 
further associations in the same way that ‘Coole’ refers specifically to the stately home 
near Gort in County Galway. I want to start with some comment on how the game of 
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metaphor is played before attending to two examples of the reader understanding 
something better as a result of engaging with metaphor. 
 
The pragmatic analysis of metaphor 
 
Philosophers have puzzled over how a statement that is either patently false or trivially true 
can have such excellent communicative power. When Donne meditates that ‘No man is an 
island/ Every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main.’ He makes one statement 
that is trivially true and one that is literally false respectively but to draw this to our 
attention is to distract from Donne’s point that no human should be existentially isolated. I 
share Lakoff’s and Johnson’s concerns:  
[Metaphors] are typically viewed within philosophy as matters of “mere language,” 
and philosophical discussions of metaphor have not centered on their conceptual 
nature, their contribution to understanding, or their function in cultural reality. 
Instead, philosophers have tended to look on metaphors as out-of-the-ordinary 
imaginative or poetic linguistic expressions, and their discussions have centred on 
whether these linguistic expressions can be true.         
                                                      (Lakoff and Johnson  1980:159 italics in original) 
As a result, I suggest that we put patent falsehood and trivial truth to one side as to make 
too much of this is to miss how the game of metaphor is played. 
By way of illustration, consider the following exchange that took place when Michael 
Parkinson interviewed Richard Burton in 1974: 
BURTON (talking about his former heavy drinking): I’ve been there. I’ve seen that 
dark wood. I know how terrible it is. How frightful it is. How frightening it is. But I 
went there and came back. 
PARKINSON: What did you see when you were there? 
(Burton pauses, looks to the ceiling, shuffles in his chair and is temporarily lost for 
words) 
Of course Parkinson’s question attempts to move the conversation along, and he might 
even be joining in the game of metaphor in a pedestrian way, but his follow up question 
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strikes me, as it seemed to strike Burton, as odd. Of course there is nothing to see - it’s a 
metaphor. Burton uses the metaphor of looking into a dark wood to convey the primeval, 
even childlike, fear of being on the edge of encountering something unknown and 
potentially dangerous which motivates his timely retreat from such an encounter. It is 
possible to spoil a metaphor as one can spoil a joke. 
Donald Davidson says that: ‘Joke or dream or metaphor can, like a picture or bump on the 
head, make us appreciate some fact – but not by standing for, or expressing, the fact’ 
(2001a: 262). The analogy with humour is worth pursuing a little further to illustrate the 
game with language that is being played out.  Both metaphors and jokes: violate 
convention, are unpredictable, incongruous, awkward and playful. There is an assumed 
cognitive distance to humour; we take the falsehood that ‘such and such a man walked into 
a bar’ to deliver his lines as an attempt to entertain rather than deceive us. There is also a 
cognitive distance in metaphor and we assume that when L. P. Hartley says ‘the past is 
another country’ he is not making a mistake in history or geography. Metaphors and jokes 
are not intended to be woven into a backcloth of true or false propositions.  
The fictional status of metaphors and jokes does some work here. We are required to 
entertain or imagine that a chicken crossed the road or that nothing nurturing can stick to 
Caliban’s nature (The Tempest IV.1.189) but not believe these things; though such tropes 
may eventually help to establish beliefs. Setting truth conditions aside does not mean that 
jokes or metaphors cannot convey something insightful. We may laugh at the absurdity of 
what is depicted and laugh all the more in recognition of the accuracy of the portrayal. A 
metaphor may make us smile at its incongruity but the smile may also be in recognition of 
an insight. I shall argue, along with Davidson, that ‘What distinguishes metaphor is not 
meaning but use -’ (Davidson 2001a: 259) and attempt to say a little more about how 
metaphors are used to a cognitive purpose.  
Davidson accepts that metaphor has cognitive value: ‘No doubt metaphors often make us 
notice aspects of things we did not notice before; no doubt they bring surprising analogies 
and similarities to our attention…’ (2001a: 261). The point is that the cognitive gain from 
metaphor takes place as part of a pragmatic analysis of the metaphor and not from a 
semantic analysis of what the words in a metaphor mean. A semantic analysis of a sentence 
concerns the context-independent meaning of that sentence. When I say ‘the bar was lively 
last night’ I mean that ‘a designated social area was occupied by people carousing to a 
higher degree than average’. A pragmatic analysis of a sentence takes into consideration 
the context of that utterance including the speaker’s intention and the effect a given 
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sentence may have. An overworked and undervalued bar worker who says ‘the bar was 
lively last night’ may intend that the boss raises the worker’s salary. A member of the 
college’s rugby team may remind his teammate that ‘the bar was lively last night’ to 
encourage an embarrassing recollection for humorous effect. In what follows, I shall make 
the case that the cognitive capacities that lead to a better understanding arise from the 
pragmatic upshot and not the semantic effect of metaphor. 
This account should not neglect the emotional and experiential effects of metaphor. An 
emphasis on the pragmatics of metaphor takes the non-propositional into account. Towards 
the end of ‘What Metaphors Mean’ Donald Davidson says that: ‘What we notice or see is 
not, in general, propositional in character’ (Davidson 2001a: 263). Metaphors allow the 
reader access to experiences that are difficult to put into words. Consider the following 
example from a description of a celebrity visit to Kibera in Kenya for Comic Relief: 
Lenny Henry was with Sanusi and his family: eight children in a single bed, packed 
like dates in a box; all their wellbeing dependent on their dad’s ability to sell 
handmade samosas, cooked in a cauldron by the roadside. 
‘You’re always smiling,’ Henry said, humbled by Sanusi’s ostensible cheer. 
‘Always smiling.’ 
‘I smile – otherwise, what will my kids think?’ Sanusi said. ‘They must think there 
is hope. But I,’ he said, still smiling, ‘have given up hope.’ 
And you suddenly saw what that smile was, as you looked closer. It’s how a rabbit 
smiles in a field of foxes.                                                    
                                                                                                       (Moran 2012: 299) 
The metaphor of the last line carries emotional resonance despite being unoriginal, 
incongruous and unrealistic: a field of foxes is a freak occurrence and rabbits don’t smile. 
The metaphor works by encouraging a sudden flash of recognition in the reader. It conveys 
the anguish and bravery of this man by drawing to our attention to what kind of smile this 
really is: a smile of desperation. The emotional reaction comes after the kind of smile has 
been identified through figurative language. 
David Lodge helps us understand how this process of recognition through figurative 
language works and sets the scene as follows: 
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…literature is a record of human consciousness, the richest and most 
comprehensive we have. Lyric poetry is arguably man’s most successful effort to 
describe qualia. The novel is arguably man’s most successful effort to describe the 
experience of individual human beings moving through space and time. 
                                                                                                          (Lodge 2002: 10) 
There are many reasons why literary language is rich. In the course of Lodge’s discussion: 
metaphor, first person narrative and free indirect discourse are cited as examples of how 
literary devices are effective in communicating experience. We have already seen that 
carefully chosen words differentiate between apparent synonyms owing to a unique mix of 
associations. In addition, a word may have a particularly relevant etymology, allude to 
another literary text or be onomatopoeic. Lodge’s point builds on the premise that the 
choice of the right word is important by further arguing that it is not solely the choice of 
word that is important but how the word is used as part of the literary device.  Lodge says 
of metaphor and simile: 
Whiteness is white, coldness is cold. There is no literal, referential description of 
such things that is not tautological. But in literature, by describing each quale in 
terms of something else that is both similar and different – “a salt cave”, “a theatre 
of whiteness”, “like frozen waves”- the object and the experience of it are vividly 
simulated. One sensation is invoked to give specificity to another.  
                                                                                                          (Lodge 2002: 13) 
So, it is not just the meaning of the words chosen that assist our understanding but also the 
words’ wider associations. Authors of literary fiction play with language in a way that 
draws out associations that may not otherwise be made. In order for the reader to extract 
maximum cognitive benefit from many literary metaphors, he or she is required to compile 
commonplace associations and to decide which associations are relevant or not. This 
decision depends on context; to call someone a wolf might signify that they are fierce, 
clannish, hirsute or hungry.  
In contrast, to understand an idiom it is sufficient to possess propositional knowledge of 
what the phrase refers to, that ‘it is raining cats and dogs’ means ‘precipitation is heavy 
and prolonged’ and where any further knowledge of the etymology of this phrase is a 
cognitive bonus consisting in the same kind of propositional knowledge. Unlike metaphor, 
our understanding of this idiomatic phrase does not involve our identifying commonplace 
associations such as dogs are loyal and cats are independent. This is significant when it 
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comes to the reader identifying the relevant connotations to metaphor which, in turn, will 
feed into a reader’s overall interpretation of a literary work. I need to demonstrate that the 
reader’s engagement with the pragmatics of metaphor contributes to the reader’s 
understanding in the senses of discernment, application, know-how, experiential 
knowledge and interpretation.  
 
The close reading of metaphor: two examples 
 
Metaphors are legion and I shall concentrate on two heavily metaphorical passages from 
Shakespeare. The first passage is from Titus Andronicus:  
TAMORA: Know, thou sad man, I am not Tamora: 
She is thy enemy and I thy friend. 
I am Revenge, sent from th’infernal kingdom 
To ease the gnawing vulture of thy mind 
By working wreakful vengeance on thy foes.
34
 
 
This metaphor from Titus suggests that revenge is separate from an individual’s mental 
preoccupations and works towards alleviating such preoccupations. Shakespeare could 
have identified revenge with a gnawing vulture but chooses instead to portray revenge as 
offering short-lived, therapeutic respite and in so doing reconfigures a widespread 
perception about revenge. An important role is attributed in Catherine Elgin’s work to 
reconfiguration through ‘telling instances’.35  By ‘reconfiguration’ is meant the construal 
of something in a different way so as to produce hitherto unrecognised cognitive 
                                                          
34
 William Shakespeare, Titus Andronicus, ed. J. Bate (Walton-on-Thames: Thomas Nelson, 1995), V.2.28-
32. 
 
35 Elgin (1993: 17-1; 1996: 173-175, 200ff; 2002:3, 6-7; 2004: 125; 2007: 46). In a parallel move, Lakoff and 
Johnson (1980:81) talk about the metaphor ‘argument is war’ superimposing ‘the multidimensional structure’ 
of one thing, war, upon the corresponding structure of another, conversation. Elisabeth Camp mirrors Elgin’s 
point when she says in her discussion of extended metaphor from the Old Testament: ‘…what the story does 
is to cause [the reader] to restructure the relative prominence of these facts and the explanatory connections 
among them’ (Camp 2008 :10).  
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advantage. Part of the significance of Tamora’s metaphor concerns how a common 
perception is challenged by how the relations of the elements of the metaphor are set up 
and how our thinking about a given topic, in this case revenge, is reconfigured. Elgin says: 
[Metaphor] equips us to recognize new likenesses and differences, patterns and 
discrepancies both within and across domains. It enables us to draw on cognitive 
resources we have developed elsewhere to advance our understanding of a given 
realm. It provides resources for asking questions and exploring hypotheses that 
could neither have been framed nor motivated without then partition of the domain 
that the metaphor supplies. When these resources and abilities constitute or 
contribute to cognitive progress, metaphor advances cognition.  
                                                                                                              (Elgin 2002: 6) 
This quotation by Elgin suggests some of the skills pertinent to engaging with metaphor 
that also map on to my senses of understanding outlined earlier; for instance the capacity to 
call a default assumption into question falls under sense (ii) of understanding. 
There is a preliminary, ‘free association of ideas’ stage to close reading. Consider how a 
teacher of literature might encourage the process of creative speculation in students. He or 
she could draw up a list of associations of ‘A’ (vultures) and another list of associations of 
‘B’ (revenge) and then plot which are the significant associations and which are irrelevant. 
This initial free association of ideas enjoys an expansive domain though I would not want 
to overstate the case by claiming that an infinite number of connotations can be given as is 
claimed by Davidson (2001a: 263). Connotations are variously described as ‘commonplace 
associations’ (Black 1962) and ‘credence properties’ (Beardsley 1978: 8); the work done in 
establishing such is compatible with both Davidson’s and Black’s view of metaphor. Black 
points out that what is needed on behalf of the reader is not just knowledge of the semantic 
meaning of terms used in the metaphor but an acquaintance with the ‘system of associated 
commonplaces’ i.e. the main associations with such terms. Black describes acquaintance 
with associated commonplaces as ‘the common possession of the members of some speech 
community’ (1962: 40). When the relevant comparisons are chosen the teacher might draw 
an arrow from one element to the other and then explain how this link relates to a broader 
theme in the literary work.  
 
A close reader speculates on why the author presents such and such an image by 
contrasting the chosen image with what might have been chosen. The fact that a vulture is 
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chosen as opposed to another creature invites the reader to entertain the common 
connotations of the word ‘vulture’. Animals are popular subjects for metaphors as the 
author is able to make use of various folk associations, in this case that vultures are 
voracious scavengers and harbingers of death. It is irrelevant that neither vultures nor 
revenge are vegetables and that both words contain the letter ‘v’. The close reader 
identifies salient features of a given image before making some suggestions as to how what 
is salient about the imagery is salient for the literary work as a whole. The opportunity to 
exercise these kinds of capacities is missing in our reading a non-metaphorical paraphrase 
such as ‘revenge is therapy’. 
 
There are additional points to notice about this metaphor. Line 31 might have referred to 
the ‘gnawing vultures of thy mind’, but vulture is expressed as a singular noun making the 
connection between ‘vulture’ and ‘mind’ explicit. The trope does not refer to a vulture in 
the mind but the mind as a vulture, perhaps feeding off the individual’s preoccupations. 
The word ‘gnawing’, not a word usually associated with the tearing and ripping feeding 
habits of vultures, offers an additional metaphor of persistence and of ‘getting to the core’ 
of something. Line 31 might have referred to revenge as ending not easing the gnawing 
vulture of thy mind. Ease is a temporary abatement and it is ironic that such a promise of 
respite, however momentary, is delivered by a messenger from hell. Detecting layers of 
meaning in a metaphor in this way constitutes understanding in the sense of discernment. 
The cognitive skills involved in this process are the ability to freely associate in a thorough 
manner, to distinguish what is relevant in the comparison and to select material for a 
potentially illuminating reading of a literary text.  
 
In this example, the reader’s close reading of metaphor generates material for an 
interpretive hypothesis of the play. I might say that Titus Andronicus is a play about 
revenge and that reading the work teaches us, among other things, that it is possible to 
view revenge as something separate from what preys on my mind rather than as something 
that is preying on my mind. I might say that the play shows that revenge can offer 
abatement to anxiety, that this abatement is only temporary and that the existence of 
revenge then feeds off my anxiety. Of course, this will only be part of a much broader 
interpretation of the play but seems a salient part. Metaphors can make us see something in 
light of or in terms of something else, encourage new and surprising connections between 
things and bring out the importance of some things relative to others.  
 
[154] 
 
The second example is from Macbeth: 
MACBETH: Methought I heard a voice cry, ‘Sleep no more: 
Macbeth does murder sleep, the innocent sleep, 
Sleep that knits up the ravelled sleave of care 
The death of each day’s life, sore labour’s bath, 
Balm of hurt minds, great nature’s second course, 
Chief nourisher in life’s feast.36 
I draw the reader’s attention to this second metaphor as it shares the cognitive potential of 
the previous trope but in addition, carries further potential to stimulate understanding in 
sense (ii) through encouraging juxtaposition of characters and encourages understanding in 
sense (iii) through locating the metaphor in a wider pattern of imagery used throughout the 
play. The metaphor ‘Macbeth does murder sleep’ is both arresting and puzzling. The 
reader is invited to pose the question ‘whose sleep does Macbeth murder?’ and posit an 
answer such as ‘his own and that of his wife’. It might be that Macbeth’s crime is so 
heinous that it is described in terms of the destruction of some Platonic form of sleep or 
serenity but I shall take the line to mean that Macbeth has disturbed his conscience. The 
metaphor is ironic as Macbeth has just murdered Duncan and his aids while they were 
asleep but note that the present tense is used: ‘Macbeth does murder sleep’; Macbeth’s 
fated insomnia is an on-going predicament.  
For the reader to understand the significance of Macbeth’s murdering sleep, some 
comparison is required between the parallel cases of Macbeth’s and Lady Macbeth’s 
sleeplessness. The close reader exercises understanding in the second sense by working out 
why these characters cannot sleep. At the point in the play when Macbeth issues the 
metaphors recorded above, Lady Macbeth warns him to stop his deliberations as thinking 
too much in this way will result in a deviation from the task in hand and the potential for 
madness as a result of experiencing scruples. Both characters have their sleep disturbed but 
while Macbeth cannot sleep, his wife falls asleep but sleep walks. While the former cannot 
sleep as his conscience is pricked, the latter’s subconscious is not disturbed by moral 
scruples but desires to remove herself from an unbecoming situation. Further, an attentive 
reader or theatregoer would be struck by Lady Macbeth’s later reference ‘You lack the 
                                                          
36 William Shakespeare, Macbeth, ed. A.R. Braunmuller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 
II.2.38-43. 
[155] 
 
season of all natures, sleep’ (III. 4.141) after the uncomfortable dinner scene when 
Macbeth sees Banquo’s ghost. In this case the reader may be reminded of these earlier 
metaphors of sleep quoted above. It is not that Lady Macbeth is impervious to the effects 
of a guilty conscience rather that she is pragmatically manipulative of conscience as she is 
with everything else in order to achieve her ambitions. Metaphor supplies the means for 
the close reader to draw a comparison between Macbeth’s and Lady Macbeth’s 
sleeplessness to the benefit of gaining hitherto unnoticed aspects of both characters. This 
cognitive process in the reader is a case of understanding in the sense of being able to 
apply what is understood to similar cases, termed ‘application’ above. 
There is a widespread tendency when writing about metaphor, even when writing on 
metaphors that are more elaborate than the standard ‘A is a B’ kind, to ignore the role that 
metaphor can play in developing broader motifs that may run throughout the literary text.
37
 
Numerous literary metaphors form part of a much wider network of imagery. To ignore 
this fact is to miss something important about the effect that the metaphor has on its 
audience. Take as an example, the description of sleep as that which ‘knits up the ravelled 
sleave of care.’ This metaphor is not just an image of restoration along with the other 
comparisons of sleep as a bath or balm but points to some enhancement of a fabric. A 
footnote in the Arden edition of the play (1992: 54) suggests the word ‘sleave’ refers to a 
filament of silk obtained from a thicker strand or ‘coarse silk’. On this reading the 
metaphor compares sleep to the interweaving of silk through a garment in that both are an 
invisible source of durability, comfort and refinement though may not always be 
appreciated for these benefits.  The metaphor in line 40 forms part of a pattern of clothing 
imagery which runs through the play, and contrasts to various references to ill-fitting 
clothing: Macbeth asks the three weird sisters ‘why do you dress me in borrowed robes’ (I. 
3. 108-109) and Angus says of Macbeth ‘Now does he feel his title hang loose about him, 
like a giant’s robe upon a dwarfish thief’ (V. 2. 22). One might say that Macbeth is 
uncomfortable in his own clothes where clothes signify rank and role as we say someone is 
uncomfortable in their own skin. In this case, the reader directs and manages a complex 
and is able to draw on elements from that complex quickly and adroitly.  These skills fall 
under ‘understanding’ in sense (iii) identified above. 
In brief summary, I have suggested that the reader’s engagement with metaphor involves 
the following examples of close analysis: the identification and speculation as to the 
                                                          
37 Soskice (1985: 29) criticises Davidson’s tendency to favour metaphors of the ‘A is a B’ form; though 
Davidson’s comment on T.S. Eliot’s ‘The Hippopotamus’ (2001: 261) shows that he takes other forms into 
consideration. 
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significance of commonplace associations of a metaphor, reconfiguration of themes, 
placing metaphor in a wider pattern of imagery in a literary work and juxtaposition of 
characters. Understanding in the senses identified above as discernment, application and 
navigation provide a useful explanatory grammar as to what is going on in each case but 
how does the material generated from the close reading of metaphor feed into the reader’s 
interpretation of a literary work? In the case of the second metaphor from Macbeth, the 
reader might offer by way of an interpretation of the line ‘Macbeth does murder sleep’ 
that: ‘Sleep equates with conscience; Macbeth violates conscience as he does sleep. Both 
sleep and conscience are restorative which makes the violation more heinous. The 
violation is an on-going state of mind rather than a discrete act performed at a specific time 
and place. Macbeth cannot extricate himself from this state of mind as his wife attempts to 
do through an arch manipulation of conscience. As a consequence, Macbeth is a prisoner to 
his own rejection of conscience.’ 
Two things are noteworthy from the reader exercising understanding in sense (v), that is 
the development of a reading or interpretation. First, the reader’s interpretation is gained 
on the back of material gathered from exercising the previous senses of understanding. 
Secondly, the interpretive hypotheses of both metaphors in Titus and Macbeth are 
hypotheses on how revenge and conscience are presented in the respective literary fictional 
works while at the same time candidate hypotheses about revenge and conscience in 
general. I shall resist the obvious move which would be to say that reading literary fiction 
provides useful hypotheses to test against the world and rather argue that reading literary 
fiction allows me to practise useful skills that I can also exercise in the world, one of which 
is hypothesis formation and hypothesis testing. I leave discussion on how understanding a 
literary work relates to understanding the world beyond the literary work until the last 
chapter but flag up this issue in advance.  
 
4.4 Perspective  
 
The term ‘perspective’ or ‘point of view’ refers to the relation of the narrator to the story. 
As one literary critic puts it: ‘[point of view is] the mode or perspective established by the 
author by means of which the reader is presented with the characters, actions, setting, and 
events which constitute the narrative in a work of fiction’ (Abrams 1993: 165). Another 
literary critic describes the perspective from which a story is told as ‘…arguably the most 
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important single decision that the novelist has to make, for it fundamentally affects the way 
readers will respond, emotionally and morally, to the fictional characters and their actions’ 
(Lodge 1992: 26). It is standard practice for a reader of literary fiction to be attentive to 
whether the story is told from a first person standpoint, a third person standpoint, multiple 
perspectives or from the perspective of an omniscient narrator who enjoys privileged 
access to the past, future and the hidden thoughts of the central characters. It is also 
standard practice in reading literary fiction, less so in non-literary fiction, to award 
thinking time to the significance of a change of perspective.  
I want to draw attention to the fact that a reader’s engagement with perspective contributes 
to cognitive gain in ways that go beyond accruing more information. My arguments rest on 
the way literary fiction can play with perspective in ways that stimulate understanding in 
senses (i-v). Before we explore some examples of play with perspective and the respective 
cognitive gain, I wish to make the contrast between gaining knowledge from multiple 
perspectives and a reader’s exercising his or her understanding explicitly. Consider the 
following extract from Virginia Woolf The Waves: 
We have come together (from the North, from the South, from Susan’s farm, from 
Louis’ house of business) to make one thing, not enduring – for what endures? –but 
seen by many eyes simultaneously. There is a red carnation in that vase. A single 
flower as we sat here waiting, but now a seven-sided flower, many-petalled, red, 
puce, purple-shaded, stiff with silver-tinted leaves – a whole flower to which every 
eye brings its own contribution. 
                                                                                                                      (Woolf 1993: 80) 
In fiction, as in life, one is able to gather more information from adopting more than one 
point of view on a given subject. The standard analogy is perception through sight yet the 
analogy with sight does not capture enough of the process of active discovery found in the 
reader adopting different perspectives presented in a literary work. Novels can lead the 
reader through the details of how a character works out a given point of view. Further, and 
in the same way as a Platonic dialogue, a novel can present a range of conflicting points of 
view in a way that encourages assessment and commitment to one or other viewpoint on 
the part of the reader. This is still not sufficient to defend the cognitive benefits from 
engaging with different perspectives presented in a literary fictional text. My contention is 
that play with perspective is a standard feature of literary fiction and that such playfulness 
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encourages the reader to exercise certain pertinent cognitive capacities that relate to the 
senses of understanding outlined earlier.  
 
Play with perspective 
 
Let us turn to some examples of play with perspective from literary fiction to demonstrate 
how these literary devices stimulate understanding. 
In the case of unreliable narration the reader receives information from an unreliable 
perspective but is encouraged to recognise that the information provided is unreliable. I see 
two primary benefits to this: the reader discerns unreliability in a narrative and is 
encouraged to re-appraise the information provided in light of such discernment. First, the 
reader is required to recognise when the description is untrue, exaggerated, misjudged or 
naïve. Further, the process of recognition entails the separation of what is true in the fiction 
from why the fictional character takes some detail to be true. Here the gain is equally 
divided between an assessment of the fictional character and an assessment of the material 
being relayed.  For example, the fact that Nellie Deane in Wuthering Heights is of a lower 
social standing gives some credence to the unusual events depicted but also adds to the 
suspicion that the report might not be entirely factual. The close reader is then committed 
to reappraise what he or she has read in light of the revelation that what is read may be 
deliberately or unconsciously skewed. Discerning unreliable narration and reviewing what 
is accrued in light of unreliable narration are examples of developing understanding in 
sense (i). The reader’s establishing what is true in the fiction may not present anything 
useful about the world beyond the fiction, but the skills of recognition and review are 
applicable to extra textual reality (more of which in Chapter Five).  
Another case of re-appraisal occurs when there is a dramatic twist at the end of a literary 
work that forces the reader to reconsider the whole story. At the end of Ian McEwan’s 
Atonement the reader is made to review the work as a fiction penned by one of the 
characters, Cecilia, in a way that castes doubt over whether Cecilia and Robbie lived 
happily ever after. In this case the reader’s initial appraisal is de-stabilised and he or she is 
encouraged to reconsider and make sense of events in retrospect. In this case the reader is 
confronted with how one might misunderstand a situation, perhaps through lack of 
discernment, misapplication or failure to navigate through a complex effectively. Literary 
fiction creates more opportunities through linking perspective to other literary devices such 
[159] 
 
as tone, irony and symbolism, rather than basing misunderstanding on failure to spot some 
vital clue as might be the case in a detective novel.    
Play with perspective also helps the reader to build a set of data or a picture of what 
someone was like. Take, for example, cases where a significant character does not actually 
appear in a work: Caddy in Faulkner’s The Sound and the Fury or Captain Flint in Louis 
Stevenson’s Treasure Island. The reader is forced to construct a character from the points 
of view of other characters. In constructing such a portrait the reader needs to attend to 
detail as well as conflicting reports and agendas, hidden or otherwise, that these various 
sources harbour. For example, in Faulkner’s The Sound and the Fury Caddy’s story is told 
by Benjy, Quentin and Jason Compson. The perspectives of these characters flesh out the 
reader’s conception of Caddy and she emerges as the antithesis of the Southern lady: 
rebellious, elusive and tragic. In telling the tale in this way, Faulkner also shines the 
spotlight on the different narrators so that the reader gains a sense of their characters in 
respect of their views of Caddy. There are multiple senses of understanding at work when a 
reader discerns what is being said about a given character (understanding in sense i), 
constructs and navigates a complex of the various views (understanding in sense iii) before 
forming some overall interpretive judgement (understanding in sense v). 
As well as constructing a complex, play with perspective can also be used to blur 
boundaries and identities so that the reader is granted access not to a single point of view 
but many: from a character at different stages of their life, from the perspective of many 
characters or from the author’s perspective in addition to that of the other characters. Take 
for example, the final section of Virginia Woolf’s The Waves where the stories of six 
characters are mingled with the voice of the author. Through this forced comparison the 
reader is encouraged to entertain rival and conflicting hypotheses, which contribute to our 
understanding why something occurred or why someone acted in the way they did 
(understanding in sense ii). One advantage of this free movement of thought about 
characters’ motivations is that the reader can practise navigating a complex of ideas 
(understanding in sense iii).  
Authors frequently invite comparison between perspectives through juxtaposition, often 
flagging up a worthwhile contrast through parallelism in particular detail. At the start of 
Act Two and Act Three of Shakespeare’s The Tempest both Caliban and Ferdinand are 
depicted carrying a burden of wood for their master Prospero. While Caliban rails against 
his overlord, eliciting a punishment of magical spells: 
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All the infections that the sun sucks up 
From bogs, fens, flats, on Prosper fall, and make him 
By inch-meal a disease! This spirit hear me, 
And yet I needs must curse. (II. 2. 1-4) 
Ferdinand finds consolation in the thought that his slavery allows him to see his love: 
This my mean task 
Would be as heavy to me as odious, but 
The mistress which I serve quickens what’s dead, 
And makes my labours pleasures. (III. 1. 4-7) 
The ability to spot patterns, perhaps a repeated detail or motif, is a useful navigational tool 
(understanding in sense iii). In this case the reader has exercised some skill in discerning a 
relevant comparative point from the text which increases his or her understanding of the 
characters of Caliban and Ferdinand. During this deliberation, certain tensions may be 
drawn between perspectives and sized up in the Aristotelian sense of Sunesis. As the result 
of this assessment, the reader is able to reach a judgement concerning vested interests, 
misjudgement and motivation in the characters before them. Making such a judgement 
explicit denies the reader the opportunity to practise his or her skills of discernment, 
application, navigation or interpretation. 
Play with perspective helps the reader develop understanding in sense (iv) by encouraging 
empathy with a character perhaps by developing a detailed back story. The reader gains a 
feel for the subject of Joyce’s short story ‘Araby’ through, in part at least, the author’s use 
of free indirect discourse. The narrative moves from child’s play in the shadows, to a 
meeting with the girl who lives opposite, to the brooding over his first love that distracts 
from his school work and culminates in the stark, critical self-awareness in the last lines on 
his late arrival at the bazaar: ‘Gazing up into the darkness I saw myself as a creature driven 
and derided by vanity; and my eyes burned with anguish and anger.’ In many ways 
‘vanity’, ‘anguish’ and ‘anger’ are hyperbolic descriptions of what is going on but this 
does not matter as the salient feature of the story is the character’s coming to a degree of 
self-awareness of his situation. The cognitive claim is not that the literary fictional 
description is exactly what experience X is like, it may not be - at least not to you, but 
rather that engaging with the literary fictional description generates an interpretation that 
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may be useful to evaluate against really experiencing X (I say more on this in the final 
chapter).  
I have taken as read the fact that one gains more knowledge from more perspectives and 
have focussed on the fact that literary fiction affords the reader additional cognitive 
potential from its play with perspective. It is generally play with perspective that 
encourages the reader to exercise a range of skills comparable to those outlined in section 
(3.2) above. To finish this section I need to show how the gain from the reader’s 
engagement with perspective is useful to the reader’s overall interpretation of a text. 
 
Interpretation and perspective 
 
The following example is illustrative of how material gained from the reader’s engagement 
with perspective can shape the reader’s interpretation of a literary fictional text. In the first 
paragraph of Chapter Seven in Anthony Trollope’s The Warden omniscient narration is 
used to distinguish between Eleanor Harding’s demeanour and what the character is really 
thinking and feeling: what anyone would observe in ‘her look, her tone, every motion and 
gesture of her body,’ from what is going on in ‘her heart’. She rides off leaving Bold 
‘without a look of love or a word of kindness’ but we are told by the omniscient narrator: 
that ‘she had a natural repugnance to losing her lover’, that ‘she was not quite so sure that 
she was in the right as she pretended’ and later that ’she would have really liked to take 
him by the hand, to have reasoned with him, persuaded him, coaxed him out of his project, 
to have overcome him…to have redeemed her father’. The omniscient narrator reports 
Eleanor’s thoughts with brevity, subtle qualification and the insight of someone who has 
studied their subject thoroughly. The perspective presented through omniscient narration 
grants the reader privileged access to the intentions, concerns and preoccupations of the 
character and contrasts what is said and done, or not said and done, with what is believed, 
hoped for and imagined. Omniscient narration does not only supply more information to 
the reader but encourages the reader to think about the information supplied. In the 
Trollope example, the information may be used by the reader to form an intermediate 
hypothesis about the characters involved that is then carried over to subsequent chapters 
and open to review. Literary fiction may present a readymade interpretation of the events 
described. In such cases, the reader is not expected to take the interpretation at face value 
but to question such interpretations further. 
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4.5 Ambiguity 
 
 ‘Ambiguity’ refers to a word or phrase which conveys more than one meaning: on being 
told ‘the pig is cured’ I should ask whether this means made well again or into salami. The 
straw man portrait, one that requires finessing, is that while philosophers clear up lexical 
and structural ambiguities, for the sake of clarity, writers of literary fiction create 
ambiguity as a smokescreen to disguise lack of serious thought: 
Logicians and philosophers typically concern themselves with ambiguity either as a 
defect in the arguments of others or as a hazard from which their own serious 
discourse is to be protected.  Literary critics, alive to the rhetorical values of 
ambiguous expression, are not equally sensitive to the philosophical demands for 
clarity and system.                                                       
                                                                                     (Scheffler 1979: 11 my italics) 
There are cases of ambiguity which are also cases of vagueness as when I gesture 
indeterminately over there and it is not clear whether I am pointing to Bill or Ben. Clearing 
up this kind of ambiguity is good practice in philosophy as it is in any other field of 
communication. However, not all cases of ambiguity are the result of vague hand waving. 
Some ambiguity is carefully contrived and can yield cognitive reward on close analysis. In 
these cases, an author has taken time to construct ambiguity in order to encourage the 
reader to think about at least two issues and their relation. William Empson gives the 
following example of the sixth type of ambiguity (ambiguity by tautology, contradiction or 
irrelevance) in his seminal work Seven Types of Ambiguity (1930): 
CRESSIDA: I have a kinde of selfe recides with you:  
                       But an unkinde selfe, that itselfe will leave 
 (Troilus and Cressida III. 2. 155-156) 
It wouldn’t be ‘playing the game’ to find fault with Shakespeare for not specifying whether 
‘unkinde’ means ‘devoid of the virtue of kindness’ or ‘not of a certain type’. One assumes 
the author deliberately chose a word to carry both meanings where each meaning has 
individual and possibly joint significance. Empson in his famous study of ambiguity 
interprets this speech from Troilus and Cressida as follows:  
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‘Part of me will always be fixed in you; but I have also an unkind self which does 
not know what it is about, wants to leave the kind self with you for the moment and 
get away to be alone’.                     (Empson 1984: 179 quotation marks in original) 
 
So the answer to the question ‘does Cressida want to be with Troilus?’ is both ‘yes’ and 
‘no’ but this is no logical contradiction, rather a description of Cressida’s psychological 
state.  
 
Eileen John identifies lexical ambiguity as playing a role in helping the reader understand a 
literary fiction through conceptual inquiry. I quote the following passage in full as it helps 
us to distinguish the stages a reader progresses in his or her enquiry: 
 
The story [Grace Paley’s ‘Wants’] raises a question about what it means to want 
something partly by the literary technique of using a word with two standard 
meanings. When the ex-husband says, out of the blue, that she “didn’t want 
anything” and will “always want nothing,” the sentences can be read both in terms 
of wanting as desiring and wanting as lacking. Although it is fairly clear that the 
ex-husband is thinking of her as desiring nothing, the reader is left to wonder which 
meaning is most appropriate and, I think, is likely to feel confused about how 
distinct the two meanings are. We think about lack shading into need, and need 
shading into desire, and perhaps we compare the negative, inert connotation of 
want-as-lack to the somehow forward-looking connotation of want-as-desire. The 
relation and tension between the two meanings becomes an underlying question of 
the story, though it takes on a more concrete focus as we try to understand the 
narrator and the claim that she lacks desires.                                                      
                                                                              
                                                                              (John 1998: 337 italics in original) 
 
First, the reader understands the various meanings of the word or phrase in question in a 
basic semantic sense. Secondly, the reader is required to discern ambiguity in relevant 
words or phrases; this corresponds to understanding in sense (i) above. Thirdly, there may 
be recognition that there is a conventional reading perhaps one that moves the story along 
and a less obvious but potentially fecund additional reading. John talks about some 
potential confusion in the reader’s mind as to how any additional reading might fit the text 
which motivates the reader to develop a better understanding of the relevant themes at a 
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more abstract level and apply the result of this conceptual engagement (understanding in 
sense iii) to his or her interpretation of the text (understanding in sense v). I should also 
note that Paley’s short story provides a nice example of how ambiguity can develop 
understanding in sense (iv). The description of being wanting, in both senses of lacking 
and needing, must generate a feeling of low self-esteem in the lead female character.  
 
 
Identifying ambiguity 
 
 
While some cases of ambiguity stop the reader in their tracks as the meaning of the word, 
phrase or line is not immediately clear, other cases are not obvious until the readership has 
its critical ear attuned. Once the reader tunes in to the possibility of ambiguity, examples 
abound. Examples abound on reading Herbert’s ‘Affliction I’ (see appendix 2) which is 
cited by Empson as an example of the sixth type of ambiguity in his Seven Types of 
Ambiguity.
38
 ‘The service brave’ (line 2) is most likely to refer to bravery on the 
worshipper’s behalf but the line may also be read as bravery on the part of God in choosing 
to ‘entice’ a particular individual. Line 14 on first reading seems to refer to ‘joys’ as the 
speaker’s fellows but can be read in such a way as to make Christian fellowship the source 
of joy. The phrase ‘I scarce beleeved’ (line 29) is ambiguous as it might refer to the belief 
that the narrator is still alive or refer to religious conviction. There is a paradox in the ninth 
stanza where God’s motivation is unclear, ambiguously so, in inflicting more hardship 
when the sufferer benefits from hardship. Further, in the final verse, ‘though troublest me’ 
(line 61) at face value refers to physical affliction but also extends to mental preoccupation 
where the first sense is the cause of the second in a way that expresses the well-known 
problem of evil. I detect some teasing humour in the ambiguity of lines 63- 64: 
 
Well, I will change the service, and go seek 
Some other master out. 
 
Prima facie, some other master sounds like an alternative to God but may also be an 
alternative to the neophyte type of service described at the start of the poem. The phrase 
‘clean forgot’ in the penultimate line of the poem may mean ‘seems to have completely 
                                                          
38 A number of Herbert’s poems bear the title ‘Affliction’, the relevant piece has as its first line: 
‘When first thou didst entice to thee my heart.’ 
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escaped the mind of God’ but ‘clean’ also means purified and the verb ‘forgot’ may, 
perhaps more unusually, be read as the speaker declaring their mind is empty.  
 
In order to discern the viability of this last interpretation of such an ambiguous phrase, the 
reader needs to explore the theme of purification with reference to the rest of the poem. It 
may be the case that such a reading is subsequently rejected as not fitting quite so well, the 
point is that discerning the depth of meaning (understanding in sense i) involves applying 
the different meanings of words to other aspects of the work, understanding in sense (ii), 
and working out which common associations of words are most relevant (understanding in 
sense iii); both carry the potential to feed into an overall reading of a work (understanding 
in sense v).  
 
 
Interpretation and ambiguity 
 
 
As with irony, the skill of identifying ambiguity is only the first step to understanding the 
literary text better. The reader is also required to work out whether an instance of 
ambiguity is pertinent to a reading or not. The reader exercises critical judgement in being 
able to hypothesise over the significance of various ambiguities. For example, ambiguity 
surrounding joy and fellowship in line 14 may be drawn in contrast to the final sentiment. 
Whereas at the start of the poem the believer’s faith was bound up with delight, nature and 
fellowship, at the end of the poem it concerns a deeply personal relationship and God is 
addressed personally with an exclamation in line 65. 
 
Ambiguity works in much the same way as metaphor in that, while new knowledge is not 
directly provided, the trope encourages comparison between two senses of meaning 
including pragmatic meaning which enlarges the initial domain of what is known so that 
the reader’s vista is broadened. For example, the ambiguity of ‘love’ in the last line 
stimulates conjecture over what might be meant. One answer is that the sentiment 
expressed is ‘my reason for being is to love God’. There are two pieces of textual evidence 
that point in this direction: first, line 34 introduces the notions of use and usefulness which 
tie in with the speaker’s sense of his or her raison d’être. Secondly, the preceding stanza 
contains the reflection that if the speaker were a tree then he or she would have many 
distinct and worthwhile purposes. These individual references may be unified through the 
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Augustinian line from The Confessions: ‘Our hearts are restless, until they find rest in 
Thee’; the speaker’s purpose in life is to seek rest in God. This is an example of a 
‘readymade hypothesis’ where a close reading of a literary artwork reminds the reader of a 
well-known phrase that forms an interpretive hypothesis in the hope that using the phrase 
will shed some light on what is going on in the work under analysis. Using readymade 
hypotheses in this way resists the criticism that the literary art merely presents further 
evidence of what is known already, this was one of Stolntitz’s objections, as the readymade 
hypothesis is not the result of the reader’s interpretation but a tool that is used by the reader 
in his or her interpretive enterprise and it is the skill of ‘putting to use’ which I defend as 
an example of understanding in sense (v).   
 
A readymade hypothesis may be used in the course of a close reading but does not 
constitute the end result of close reading. The following passage is representative of the 
kind of literary interpretation I have in mind when I refer to understanding in sense (v) 
where such an interpretation is not reduced to a one line sound bite. Empson suggests the 
first ‘love’ is to be read in the future tense while the second ‘love’ is to be read in the 
present tense.  Then over the course of a couple of pages Empson offers his interpretation, 
here is a sample extract: 
 
‘If I have stopped loving you, let me go; do not make me love you again in the 
future, so that I shall regret it if I return to the world.  Allow me to be consistent, 
even though it means an entire loss of your favour.’ But one may also distinguish 
between the love of God which is an arduous effort towards a goal and the love of 
God which has achieved its goal, which being a mystical illumination has no doubts 
and is its own reward.  Allotting these meanings in the order given we have: ‘Do 
not let me spend my life trying to love you, loving you in will and deed but not in 
the calm of which so few are worthy.  Do not make me hanker after you if I would 
be better under some other master elsewhere; even though this would mean you 
must forget me altogether.’                              
                                                 (Empson 1984: 183-184 quotation marks in original) 
This interpretation demonstrates the cognitive potential of ambiguity to contribute to a 
larger, more considered interpretation of a work of literature. 
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4.6    Repetition 
 
My thesis, that literary devices play a significant role in the reader gaining understanding 
from literary fiction may still be met with some incredulity. Given that there are so many 
kinds of literary device do I really mean that all literary devices bear the potential to 
further a reader’s understanding? We have seen that tropes such as metaphor and irony can 
stimulate understanding in the senses outlined in section (3.2) but this seems an unlikely 
claim with other literary devices like rhythm, rhyme or alliteration. Such devices are 
prominent in poetry, present in drama and may be used, though to a lesser degree, in 
literary prose. My reply is that all literary devices can play a potentially important and 
often overlooked role in gaining cognitively from reading literary fiction. This section 
takes rhythm, rhyme and alliteration as some final examples. 
Prima facie, there is nothing about rhythm, rhyme or alliteration that precludes cognitive 
gain. Mnemonics can help us retain information by means of alliteration and rhyme hence 
we recite ‘red sky at night, shepherd’s delight; red sky in the morning, shepherd’s 
warning.’ The rhythm of recitation can help commit times-tables to memory. Yet neither 
fits the quinquepartite account of understanding advanced above. Rhythm, rhyme and 
alliteration are all examples of repetition and writers have frequent recourse to repetition to 
communicate something of significance to the reader. There is a distinction between 
repetition of content and repetition of form. The most uncomplicated version of repetition 
of content occurs when a word or phrase is repeated for emphasis like a refrain: ‘That 
moment she was mine, mine, fair’ (from Browning’s ‘Porphyria’s Lover’ line 36). 
Repetition of the word ‘mine’ draws our attention to the possessiveness of the male 
character.  In what follows I hope to show that repetition does not just work in terms of 
content but also in terms of form. I shall argue that while some literary devices based on 
repetition may be used predominantly for an aesthetic or rhetorical effect, one should not 
discount them from making a contribution to a reader developing the pertinent senses of 
understanding from engaging with a literary text. 
Rhythm 
When we read aloud we recognise the beat of repeated stresses in the stream of sounds and 
call this rhythm. If the rhythm is repeated in regular form we call this meter. Meter makes 
up verse and can be used to add fluency to narration. However, a break in the usual rhythm 
can be used by an author to signify an important detail or conjure an appropriate mood 
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which helps the reader discern what is communicated in the literary work. The opening 
caesura from the fourth stanza in Thomas Hardy’s ‘The Voice’ breaks the waltz-like 
rhythm of the previous verses: 
Thus I; faltering forward, 
Leaves around me falling, 
Wind oozing thin through the thorn from norward, 
And the woman calling. 
This break in rhythm calls the reader’s attention to the solitary ‘I’ of the grieving Hardy 
and contrasts his desolate feeling of loss to the consoling recollections in the first three 
stanzas. So, in this case, rhythm encourages the reader to draw a comparison between the 
fourth stanza and the rest of the poem in a way that necessitates the reader navigating the 
work as a whole (understanding in sense iii).  
Rhythm and breaks in rhythm are not the preserve of poetry. Consider the changes in 
rhythm that occur in the following lines:  
Othello:  My wife! my wife! what wife? I have no wife 
O insupportable! O heavy hour! 
Methinks it should be now a huge eclipse 
Of sun and moon, and that th’affighted globe 
Did yawn at alteration.                 (Othello V. 2. 100-104) 
The first line quoted above suggests a rare moment of recognition on the part of Othello 
before the self-indulgent and rhetorical ‘Othello music’ resumes.  
In some novels, a change in rhythm may accompany the move from the general to the 
particular. Take, for instance, the opening chapter of D.H. Lawrence’s Sons and Lovers 
which moves from a description of the mining area to dialogue: ‘ “Can I have my dinner, 
mother?” he cried, rushing in with his cap on “cause it begins at half-past one, the man 
says so”’.  In literary fiction as in everyday speech, and unlike statements in maths and 
logic, the tone of how a line is delivered affects its meaning. A nuanced inflexion in how 
something is put, like a fleeting gesture or facial expression, can make the utterance sincere 
or insincere, sarcastic or straightforward, shocking or matter of fact. A reader’s attention to 
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how rhythm or rhyme influence tone assists the reader’s discerning the meaning of what is 
said; understanding in sense (i) above. 
Repetition can act as evidence that there is something worth pursuing in a text and does so 
in a distinctive way that appeals to our aesthetic sensibilities. We appreciate repetition, 
notice its presence and speculate as to why the author of a given literary fiction uses this 
device. Shakespeare uses stichomythia to break the sycophantic poetry of Goneril’s and 
Regan’s speeches to Lear and show that Cordelia’s answer breaks with the norm of what 
was expected: 
Cordelia:  Nothing, my lord. 
Lear:   Nothing!  
Cordelia:   Nothing. 
Lear:                 Nothing will come of nothing. 
 Speak again.                             (King Lear I. 1. 86-89) 
In this instance, the form of rhythm contributes to the psychological portrait sketched of 
the relationships between Lear and his daughters which is established so crucially in the 
opening scene. In addition, the motif of ‘nothing’ is woven through the work and 
contributes to a general reading of King Lear: a portrait of someone who has to be reduced 
to his most minimal state before he starts perceiving who is just and loyal. This theme is 
mirrored in the sub plot, so a reader who is looking out for references to nothing will be 
sensitive to Gloucester’s line: ‘I have no way and therefore want no eyes, I stumbled when 
I saw’ (King Lear IV. 1. 20) and may speculate on the parallel in personality and 
predicament between Lear and Gloucester; a case of understanding in sense (ii). 
Rhythm may also be used to communicate the non-propositional. Here is a chilling 
example where rhythm may be used by the author to communicate something of the 
unfeeling and mechanical mind-set of a murderer. The example, as earlier, is taken from 
Robert Browning’s poem ‘Porphyria’s Lover’. Browning describes the moments prior to 
Porphyria’s murder by her lover and the murderer’s thoughts immediately after this 
curiously passionless crime. The reader may expect a break in rhythm at the point when the 
crime is committed but the rhythm between lines 39 and 43 is not disturbed which is 
incongruous given the disturbing nature of the event:  
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In one long yellow string I wound 
Three times her little throat around, 
And strangled her. No pain felt she; 
I am quite sure she felt no pain 
As a shut bud that holds a bee, 
The lines run in the same unbroken rhythm as if the perpetrator’s train of thought runs 
unbroken. 
Rhyme 
There are many variations on rhyme: sight rhymes repeat the look of a word, half rhymes 
repeat an approximation of how the word sounds and an internal rhyme repeats the same or 
similar sound, usually a vowel sound within the same line. In the case of end rhymes the 
last stressed vowel is repeated. The single-minded determinism of Porphyria’s lover is 
portrayed in the rhyme scheme which has predominantly masculine endings throughout 
Browning’s poem. For instance, the rhyme ‘knew, grew, do’ over lines 32 to 35 suggest a 
singular subject and purpose in contrast to the rhyme ‘endeavour, dissever and for ever’ 
over lines 22-25 which describes Porphyria’s inner turmoil. The poem flows in an 
unbroken narrative description of the murder where concealed stanzas have an ABABB 
rhyme scheme which marks an unswerving structure to mirror the perpetrator’s fixed and 
resolute action. The murderer has his actions controlled in the first half of the poem: his 
arm is placed by Porphyria around her waist and his cheek drawn close to her hair. In a 
similarly deterministic fashion, the murderous lover’s actions are subject to controlling 
forces in the second half of the poem. 
Unlike everyday conversation, when I rarely spend time selecting what I deem to be the 
right word but think aloud, it is tradition to rewrite a work of literary fiction and to build up 
layers of complexity and significance. Authors of literary fiction experiment with literary 
devices. Tennyson talks about changing the rhyme in the opening lines of his poem ‘The 
Lotos-eaters’ to create a more soporific effect: ‘“the strand” was, I think, my first reading, 
but the no rhyme of “land” and “land” was lazier’ (footnote 3 in Tennyson 1987: 468). The 
final version reads: 
‘Courage!’ he said, and pointed toward the land, 
‘This mounting wave will roll us shoreward soon.’ 
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In the afternoon they came unto a land 
In which it seemèd always afternoon. 
I would conjecture that the repetition of ‘afternoon’, the assonance of line 2 and choice of 
the indefinite article over the definite article in line 3 also contribute to the feeling of 
laziness in these lines. Understanding the mood of the poem from a close reading of these 
lines combines discernment of meaning (understanding in sense i) with understanding as 
experiential knowledge (understanding in sense iv).  
Alliteration 
Alliteration or ‘head rhyme’ is repetition of initial, identical speech sounds in a sequence 
of nearby words which are usually consonants and usually appear in a prominent place, for 
instance at the start of a sentence. Repetition of form can be used to communicate non-
propositional knowledge to the reader. Consider how sibilant alliteration is used by D. H. 
Lawrence to convey the slithering movement and sound of a snake: 
He sipped with his straight mouth, 
Softly drank through his straight gums, into his slack long body, 
Silently.                                (From ‘Snake’ by D.H. Lawrence) 
Alliteration can manifest in several different patterns where such patterns make 
connections between themes. Of course alliteration may be used for exclusively aesthetic 
effect and it may be a matter of trial and error to detect whether alliterative phrases are 
written in such a way as to reward cognitive gain as well as aesthetic sensibility. A reader 
might recognise the cognitive potential between lines 23-28 of Browning’s poem 
‘Porphyria’s Lover’ in the words: passion, pride, prevailing, pain and pale. There is a 
further alliterative connection later on between the words ‘perfection’ and ‘purity’ in line 
37. It is significant that all these descriptions relate to Porphyria; a parallel description of 
her lover’s mental states is conspicuous by its absence. The reader may then conjecture 
what the relation is exactly between these descriptions of Porphyria: that despite her 
weakness (signified by the alliteration ‘pain’ and ‘pale’) she nevertheless experiences a 
psychomachia where passion in the end prevails over pride and this culminates in love 
which her murderous lover wants to prevent as he admires Porphyria’s stainless innocence. 
The ability to spot the kind of rhymes that may generate a further point of insight works in 
the same way: love and prove, breath and death are frequent cases. 
[172] 
 
 
Repetition and interpretation 
 
Some instances of repetition flag up elements of interest that may be fed into a broader 
interpretation of a literary work. There may even be examples where one can construct an 
interpretation of a literary work around one instance of rhyme, rhythm, or in the example 
which follows, alliteration. In line 48 of Browning’s ‘Porphyria’s lover’ alliteration is not 
so much used for the purpose of making connections between themes but rather flagging 
up words that are worth the reader spending some time over in order to formulate a reading 
or interpretation of the literary work. The line runs:  
Blushed bright beneath my burning kiss. 
‘Blush’ is a reminder of Porphyria’s innocence, now lost. ‘Bright’ is ironic as what shone 
has been extinguished. ‘Beneath’ fits the dominance-subjugated dichotomy running 
through the poem and ‘burning’ points ambiguously to both passion and destruction. The 
resulting interpretive comment on the line feeds into a broader literary interpretation of the 
poem. In this respect, an analysis of the alliteration yields an interpretive hypothesis so 
metaphor, irony and ambiguity are not the only literary devices to assist in developing 
understanding in sense (v). 
 
4.7 Aesthetic Effectiveness 
 
This chapter ends by drawing the reader’s attention to two significant implications of 
sections (4.1-6): the first is that my criticism of literary non-cognitivism as set out in 
section (2.3) is strengthened and the second is that the examples provided throughout this 
chapter help to answer a challenge implicit in Martha Nussbaum’s Love’s Knowledge. 
In the first case, my argument against literary non-cognitivism runs as follows. The 
prevalence of literary devices is a standard feature of literary fiction. A reader’s aesthetic 
appreciation of the literary arts includes many factors including admiration of a literary 
author’s facility with language. The literary author’s facility with language extends to the 
author’s use of literary devices: making ironic comment, turning a choice metaphor and 
developing a repeated motif. I argue in this chapter that engaging with literary devices can 
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increase the reader’s cognitive gain in respect of five senses of understanding. Creating 
literary devices that stimulate the reader’s understanding demonstrates a facility with 
language. Facility with language is admired aesthetically. Let us call the literary author’s 
facility with language, when applied to literary devices that contribute to cognitive gain, 
‘aesthetic effectiveness’. Admiring aesthetic effectiveness is part of the readership’s 
overall aesthetic appreciation of a literary artwork; to deny this is to draw an arbitrary 
distinction between something that the reader admires aesthetically which can count in an 
overall aesthetic judgement and something which cannot count. I defined literary non-
cognitivism as the thesis that cognitive gain is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition 
on a reader valuing literary fiction as literary fiction. My case against this view depended 
on my being able to demonstrate that gaining cognitively from literary fiction affects my 
aesthetic appreciation of a work and I have argued that this is indeed the case. So, literary 
non-cognitivism in its separating cognitive gain from literary appreciation gives us an 
inaccurate account of the phenomenon under discussion. 
It might be helpful at this point, by way of a recap, to provide some examples of aesthetic 
effectiveness: 
Irony: it is difficult to invent a sophisticated and cognitively rewarding example of irony 
cold.  A default is to state ‘that’s clever’ when the opposite is meant but this simple kind of 
irony offers limited cognitive resources. As a consequence not every remark annotated as 
‘ironic’ in the margins of a literary text by the reader is a candidate for the type of 
cognitive value I seek to defend. It is more plausible that a writer recognises potential for a 
sophisticated ironic comment in a word or phrase and capitalises on this fact by crafting 
the ironic statement or episode into something that links with important themes in that 
play, poem or novel. The reader’s close reading is then rewarded when they analyse this 
contrived irony. 
Particularity: take the many cases of names having significance. In the opening scene of 
Tess of the D’Ubervilles Parson Tringham informs Jack Durbeyfield that he is a 
descendent of Sir Pagan d’Uberville from Normandy and in so doing raises the reader’s 
awareness of issues concerning lineage, destiny and the rural-urban divide (field versus 
ville). Particular detail contrived in literary fiction is contrived, through the artistry of the 
author, to yield to the reader’s close analysis.  
Precision: time and effort is expended over selecting the right word to sum up what the 
literary artist wants to say. An early draft of the first stanza of ‘The Dry Salvages’ shows 
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T.S. Eliot replacing ‘suburbs’ with ‘garden’ before suggesting ‘dooryard’ and ‘backyard’ 
in parentheses and finally settling on the former. One commentator suggests that he chose 
the less dull Americanism ‘dooryard’ ‘…to echo Whitman’s famous poem ‘When lilacs 
last in the dooryard bloom’’ (Gardner 1978: 122-123). 
Metaphor: the author’s choice of imagery and the accompanying commonplace 
associations can reward close attention. If Miller had chosen an item other than a mattress 
or Shakespeare a bird other than a vulture then the sense of their metaphors would be 
utterly altered to the detriment of the accompanying cognitive reward from close analysis.   
Perspective: I have argued that the benefits of different perspectives through literature is 
not so much the supply of more information from a perspective but rather how the literary 
author’s playfulness with perspective stimulates thoughtfulness in the reader. It is a 
standard feature of literary fiction to have the author play with perspective in an innovative 
way. For example, the first chapter of The History of the World in Ten and a Half Chapters 
retells the story of Noah’s Ark from the first person perspective of a woodworm. 
Ambiguity: as with irony, the author may come across the potential for ambiguity in their 
writing when one phrase has two relevant meanings that should the reader detect these 
readings will increase the reader’s understanding of the literary work. The first line of 
paragraph six in the opening chapter of Jane Austen’s Emma runs: ‘The event had every 
promise of happiness for her friend’. Where the ‘friend’ in question may be Miss Taylor or 
Mr Weston, conveying the thought that Emma views Mr Weston as merely a potential 
friend or substitute for Miss Taylor but not a romantic match. 
Repetition: a skilful author is able to engineer a subtly conspicuous rhythm, rhyme or 
alliteration so that the reader, on detecting and interrogating the use of this device, will 
draw a link to a theme in the work as a whole. This is exemplified in the rhythm of 
Browning’s poem ‘Porphyria’s Lover’ suggesting determinism. 
These cases show the skill of the literary author in his or her crafting literary devices that 
are indispensable to the literary work of art and in gaining understanding, in the senses 
outlined above, form the literary art. I chose the opening quotation from Plato (on the title 
page of this thesis)
39
 for the primary reason that it focusses on a defence of literature from 
literary properties and because poetry (poesis) in the ancient world conveys the sense of a 
text being fashioned into literature. I argue that the skill of the literary author is necessary 
to craft a work in such a way as to enable literary devices to generate cognitive gain and, 
                                                          
39 The translation is by Desmond Lee: Plato. 1987: The Republic. London: Penguin p. 376. 
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consequently, how the aesthetic and cognitive are not separable as the literary non-
cognitivist would have us believe. Instead, the reader’s cognitive gain is dependent on the 
aesthetic effectiveness of the text. 
The second implication of my argument relates to a theme in  Love’s Knowledge (1992) 
where Martha Nussbaum argues that sensitivity to literary expression encourages sensitive 
moral perception (1992: 148-167). Nussbaum cites a number of literary devices to this end: 
salient imagery (1992: 151), free indirect discourse, ‘nuance and fine detail of tone’, 
specificity of detail (1992: 154), use of chorus (1992: 157), metaphor and perspective 
(1992: 161-162). In the course of her discussion of James’s The Golden Bowl, Nussbaum 
poses the following question: ‘How can we hope to confront these characters and their 
predicament, if not in these words and sentences, whose very ellipses and 
circumnavigations rightly convey the lucidity of their bewilderment, the precision of their 
indefiniteness?’ (Nussbaum 1992: 149 my italics). Nussbaum’s challenge, as we might call 
it, is how to explain the indispensable role that the literariness of literary fiction plays in 
our gaining cognitively from a text where a non-literary paraphrase does not provide the 
same cognitive value as its literary counterpart. Nussbaum says: 
Furthermore, a paraphrase...even when reasonably accurate, does not ever succeed 
in displacing the original prose; for it is, not being a high work of literary art, 
devoid of a richness of feeling and rightness of tone and rhythm that characterize 
the original…The only way to paraphrase this passage without loss of value would 
be to write another work of art.                                       (Nussbaum 1992: 154-155)  
One critic, generally unsympathetic to Nussbaum’s project, is sympathetic to her claim 
against paraphrase: ‘Nussbaum is rightly keen on the closeness, or indissolubility, of form 
and content in the novel and in the lives with which it deals’ (Tanner BJA 33, 1993: 298). 
As it stands, however, Nussbaum’s challenge rests on a claim without argument. What is 
needed is a more substantial defence of the indispensability of literary devices and my 
account of literary cognitivism is well placed to offer such a defence. I have demonstrated 
that literary devices perform important work in developing a range of abilities constitutive 
of our five senses of understanding. The effectiveness of each literary device in generating 
this cognitive gain is down to the author’s skill in selecting the right word, tone or image.  
In sum, I have identified a range of specific capacities which may be developed through a 
close reading of a literary fictional text, where these capacities contribute to the various 
senses of understanding identified above. My claim is that the skills that contribute 
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understanding in senses (i-iv) feed into understanding in sense (v). While understanding in 
these senses require a general competence in reading (following the storyline and the 
characterisation) these skills are distinguishable from a general competence in reading.  
There are two main benefits in developing the relevant forms of understanding. First, the 
reader gains an interpretive hypothesis of a literary work that may be a useful interpretive 
hypothesis in the world beyond the work. Secondly, readers of literary fiction gain practice 
in exercising specific skills. I wish to carry both these benefits over to the final chapter 
where I shall then make the case that the second benefit, that of practising understanding, 
is more important than the possession of readymade interpretive hypotheses in a reader’s 
conceptual repertoire. 
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Chapter Five: How Understanding 
Literary Fiction relates to the World 
beyond Literary Fiction 
 
Plato objected to drama and poetry as a source of knowledge as both forms of literary 
fiction can mislead the reader ‘…misrepresenting the nature of gods and heroes, like the 
portrait painter whose portraits bear no resemblance to their originals’ (The Republic 
377e). The scenes in Tom Stoppard’s play Jumpers that depict George preparing his 
lecture strike me as an unconvincing representation of the kinds of things philosophy 
professors say and do.
40
 In the course of this project, I defend literary fiction as a source of 
cognitive gain on the grounds that literary texts encourage five kinds of understanding 
resulting from the reader’s close reading and interpretation of a literary work. In this final 
chapter I shall explore the implications of my argument in relation to Plato’s concern that 
literary fiction can misrepresent the world. I want to examine the standard model of 
checking fictional representations against the world in a little more detail before casting 
some suspicion on this view. I shall end by drawing a contrast between the ‘checking’ 
model and my alternative cognitivist model. 
 
5.1 The standard account of checking literary fiction against the world 
 
The challenge presented to literary cognitivists rests on the distinction between: 
 a) the content of a literary fictional work and 
 b) the actual world beyond the literary fictional work. 
 Literary cognitivists need to say how an understanding of (a) can help develop the reader’s 
understanding of (b). Two strident claims seem equally wrong. 
 
                                                          
40 In this play A. J. Ayer and G. E. Moore are the ‘gods and heroes’ in question. 
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The first strident claim is that we do not need to move from (a) to (b) at all and that 
learning about (a) is sufficient to claim that the reader gains cognitively from literary 
fiction. For instance, I know that it is true-of-the-fiction that Sherlock Holmes lived in 
221b Baker Street. However, to claim that what we learn from literary fiction never needs 
to apply outside the work swims against the tide of many readers’ experiences. Pettersson 
(2012: 173) cites the Charlton study (2001) which records 57.9% of the readers surveyed 
saying they read literary fiction in order to learn ‘something about other people’. I take it 
that learning about other people is learning about the actual world beyond the fiction. The 
fact that details in Conan Doyle’s novel are made up, and that no one called Sherlock 
Holmes appears on the electoral register for 221b Baker Street at that period, does not 
preclude the work of fiction from depicting the kinds of things people say and think and 
do. We learn that works of fiction are open to the actual world when we learn how the 
language game of story-telling from fiction works. Sartre’s play The Flies tells the fictional 
story of Orestes and Electra but offers a thinly veiled attack on the Nazi occupation of 
France.  
  
An equally strident claim is that literary fiction is a source of cognitive gain only if the 
literary fiction tracks the world accurately. According to this view, we come to knowledge 
of the world through the indirect means of reading a literary fictional work: 
 
Advocates and opponents of the view that art has cognitive value tend to agree on 
one point. They agree that, if art is a source of knowledge, it is so in the same way 
as science is. …Each of these fundamentally distinct forms of inquiry corresponds 
to a basic sort of representation.                                                              
                                                                                                    (Young 2001: 65)
41
 
 
Young argues that art and science share the same cognitive value, which rests on 
representation of some kind, although art and science work in different ways. According to 
this view, the reader gains from the literary arts if a given work accurately depicts the 
world beyond the literary work. This second strident claim is my target in this chapter 
where I want to caution against adopting such a model of checking a representation against 
the world.  
 
                                                          
41
 In fairness, Young acknowledges a skills-based model of cognitive gain later in his Art and Knowledge 
(2001: 95) and I only cite this quotation as an example of the second strident claim. Other examples of the 
second claim include: Gaskin (2013: 285) and Hepola (2014: 79, 85). More moderate claims include: 
Robinson (2005: 178) and Gaut (2007: 153-154). 
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The checking model dominates the literary cognitivist debate; in both the literary anti-
cognitivist camp (Plato Republic 377e and Stolnitz 1992) and in the literary cognitivist 
camp (Kivy 1997 and Pettersson 2012): 
…the institution of fiction, since antiquity, has contained a strong epistemic part in 
the form of the readers’ propensity for thinking about, and attempting to confirm 
and disconfirm thereby, the live hypotheses that may be proposed to him in the 
general thematic statements, either explicit or implied.                                
                                                                                                      (Kivy 1997: 129)
42
 
The non-cognitivist authors of Truth, Fiction and Literature set out the checking model in 
their description of the Propositional Theory of literary truth:  
…the literary work contains or implies general thematic statements about the 
world which the reader as part of an appreciation of the work has to assess as true 
or false. The theory presents two claims. First, a literary work implies propositions 
which can be construed as general propositions about the world. Second, these 
propositions are to be construed as involved in true or false claims about the world. 
                                                    (Lamarque and Olsen 1994: 325 italics in original) 
Whether the truth-value of a work counts as part of the reader’s aesthetic appreciation need 
not detain us though, for the record, I think it can for reasons discussed in sections (2.3) 
and (4.7). 
It is worth noting that ‘thematic statements’ are identified as the relevant subject matter in 
both quotations cited immediately above. It seems right that we check what the literary 
fictional work ‘is about’ in the most general sense rather than checking particular details. 
We check themes from The Great Gatsby about conspicuous consumption, certain male 
attitudes of possessiveness towards women, individualism and the American Dream rather 
than whether rich people party in the ways described in the novel. To this end, it does not 
matter that a fiction is unrealistic or outlandish as we can still check the work’s central 
themes against the world; for example what Mary Shelley’s novel Frankenstein tells us 
about hubris and vulnerability. 
 
                                                          
42 Kivy has since distanced himself from this position and I include the quotation as a further example of a 
philosopher adopting checking or ‘confirmation and disconfirmation’ as the standard model. 
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5.2 Concession to the standard account  
 
I do not deny that literary fiction can inform the reader about the world and acknowledge 
that, in cases where an extra literary setting corresponds to a setting described in a literary 
work, then the reader of the relevant literary fiction is at an advantage in understanding the 
world. Instances where the reader gains cognitively from checking something from the 
literary fiction against the world may be separated into two types of case: ‘prospective’ 
cases when we read a literary work and then find confirmation or disconfirmation and 
‘retrospective’ cases when we read a literary work and recognise something from our past 
experience. In the latter case, reading the literary fiction may make us aware of something 
of significance that we had previously overlooked.  
Consider the following example of a prospective case: I read Shakespeare’s Macbeth and 
find the character of Lady Macbeth provides a useful guide to my boss’s character given 
that she seems impervious to any scruples of conscience and manipulates her conscience 
pragmatically as she does everything else in order to fulfil her somewhat childish 
ambitions. Of course, I may be misreading the situation but the potential to be mistaken is 
not exclusive to reading literary fiction. The cognitive gain from reading literary fiction 
does not need to be infallible but only reliable enough to count as some epistemic success. 
So how reliable is ‘reliable enough’? This is a question for exponents of the checking 
account but there is a parallel problem for my account of cognitive gain based on the 
various senses of ‘understanding’ outlined above. It seems implausible that reading literary 
fiction refines understanding, in the senses of discernment, application, cognitive 
competence, emotional and experiential knowledge and the ability to form an interpretive 
hypothesis from complex data, where these forms of understanding do not translate to 
another context beyond the literary fiction. However, further empirical evidence is required 
to defend the claim that understanding from reading literary fiction translates and I hope 
this project suggests a direction for future empirical research. 
Martha Nussbaum provides an example of retrospective checking in the course of her 
discussion of the relationship between Maggie and her father in Henry James’s The Golden 
Bowl. Nussbaum says that the reader can learn about this relationship from reading the 
fictional account and may, in addition, think about how the fictional account relates to ‘the 
particular history of one’s very own relationship to one’s particular parents’ where 
‘…readers become, in Proust’s words the readers of their own selves’ (Nussbaum 1992: 
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39). The kinds of checking described in prospective and retrospective cases are not 
contentious - my quarrel is with accepting such a view as the norm. I contend that the 
checking model is not explanatorily fundamental; which is to say that these kinds of 
checking do not happen that often, and they are not as important as the senses of 
understanding outlined above.  
  
5.3 Objections to the standard account 
 
There are at least three reasons why we should be cautious about adopting the checking 
model as the standard model for cognitive gain from literary fiction. 
My first objection to the standard model of checking is that this model encourages a 
reductive approach to literary fiction which is misguided given the complexity of literary 
texts. I argued (in section 1.2) that a preponderance of literary devices such as metaphor or 
symbolism is a standard feature of literary fiction as literature. In corollary, an 
interpretation of a literary fictional work is generally a lengthy and sophisticated statement 
and not a paraphrase (see 3.3 and chapter 4 above). Yet the checking model invites 
telescoped paraphrases of literary fiction like ‘the course of true love never ran smooth’ or 
‘too much ambition is self-destructive’. These sound bites may be cited for the sake of 
brevity but do not do justice to the literary fictional work as a whole.
43
 As Peter Lamarque 
says in The Opacity of Narrative: 
…the trouble with the whole quotation industry – is that propositions are wrenched 
out of context. If we are looking to make a speech or reflect more deeply on some 
subject or merely impress with our literary knowledge, we might well appropriate 
“sayings” from great works…But none of this has much relevance to literary value 
as such. If literary works are to be valued for their truth, then the truths had better 
be integrally connected to the works.                                             
                                                                                              (Lamarque 2014: 134) 
Admittedly, we may learn from a quotation, the kind found in Victorian anthologies of 
Shakespeare or an opening citation to a philosophy paper, but this does not equate to the 
cognitive gain from reading the relevant literary fiction. Some authors of literary fiction 
pepper epigrams amidst the prose but the practice of extracting such epigrams and taking 
                                                          
43 An example of the kind of paraphrase in question may be found in (Young 2001: 95). 
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these statements as the cognitive gain in question ignores the widespread practice of close 
reading outlined above. If we take these sentence summaries to be what the reader is 
checking then we shall paint a one-dimensional portrait that does not fit the literary 
phenomenon under investigation just as the adage ‘It is better to outmonster the monster 
than to be quietly devoured’  does not tell us much about Nietzsche’s moral philosophy.  
There are several examples of the tendency towards reduction with characters from literary 
fiction that have entered popular discourse: Mr. Gradgrind, Don Quixote, Romeo and 
Scrooge. In such cases the popular use of a character’s name only equates in part with the 
literary fictional representation. In popular usage ‘Gradgrindian’ refers to an assiduous, 
materialistic and philistine devotion to hard facts and numbers and in so doing misses the 
volte face of the character of Dickens’s novel as well as his occasional warmth, good 
intentions and naivety. So the use of ‘Gradgrindian’ on behalf of the close reader is 
different from that of someone who has learnt the general meaning of this term without 
having engaged with the relevant literary fiction. One of Flaubert’s literary achievements 
in creating Madame Bovary was a character who resisted reduction. Of course, an 
interlocutor may suggest that we check myriad propositions from the text against the world 
rather than a telescoped paraphrase yet this approach falls foul of two further worries. 
A second objection to the dominant model of checking is based on the diversity of extra 
textual reality which renders checking a trivial activity. Human beings form a motley 
pageant and display multifarious ways of acting and interacting. In consequence, there 
must be some state of affairs that will fit whatever the reader seeks to check from the text 
between here and Addis Ababa. To take the whole interpretation of literary work, in its 
variety, and to try to find a set of affairs where there is a neat match becomes pointless. 
The result is a blow to those seeking a neat account of confirmation and disconfirmation of 
what we understand better from literary fiction.  
In place, a philosopher defending the checking model can say that readers of literary 
fiction are in the same cognitive business as social psychologists in that both groups search 
for general patterns of human behaviour. Yet literary fiction may depict exceptional cases 
and still carry cognitive value. This social psychological approach of testing hypotheses for 
general patterns of behaviour is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition on gaining 
cognitively from literary fiction; a point brought out in our third concern.  
A third objection rests on the inadequacy of the checking model to account for readers who 
expect more from literary fiction than a depiction of a familiar predicament. Consider the 
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case of Person D, a friend who struggled with paternal responsibilities despite his initial 
excitement. On one occasion he said ‘there just isn’t anything in literature about this’. The 
first thing to note about this comment is that ‘literature’ does not refer to the non-fictional 
body of popular psychology or self-help manuals on this issue; there may well be many 
such books available. Person D did not mean fictional representation either as he wanted to 
be made to think about the issue rather than imagine a further instance of the issue arising. 
Person D was, of course, already familiar with his own thoughts and feelings and did not 
need these played back to him in a fictional format but sought to gain some intellectual 
purchase on what he already knew.  He wanted literary fiction to challenge, shed light on 
and to reconfigure his beliefs about what he was thinking and feeling.
44
 Yet according to 
the checking model the best Person D can hope for is a restatement of what is already 
known so that he realises that there are further instances of his predicament in the world. In 
cases of confirmation no new gain is achieved but rather consolidation. If the reader 
notices something new in the world beyond the literary work then this gain goes beyond 
the checking model. I contend that this model of confirmation and disconfirmation presents 
too limited a picture. 
In summary, I do not reject all confirmation and disconfirmation by way of ‘checking’ 
only its status as the standard account. I accept that checking may happen but I am 
suspicious of the view that this process often happens or is especially significant in my 
gaining a better understanding of the world from reading literary fiction. My contention is 
that mapping a correspondence between text and reality need not happen at all and that this 
fact does not compromise the reader gaining cognitively from reading literary fiction. The 
standard account places too much emphasis on the fictional status of a literary fictional text 
and is too insistent on establishing a match between the fictional and non-fictional 
scenario. I want to play down the ‘checking’ model where what is checked is generally 
something singular (an isolated hypothesis); where the process of checking is a 
straightforward yet stringent case of verification and where the cognitive gain is taken 
from the literary work qua description of a fictional state of affairs. In contrast, I propose 
that no single ‘hypothesis’ needs to be derived from a work but rather that the reader works 
towards a complex interpretation. I also propose that direct tracking is neither a necessary 
nor a sufficient condition on the cognitive gain that I seek to defend but rather that the 
most significant cognitive gain from literary fiction comes from the readers’ engagement 
                                                          
44 This is not a unique case, in his talk ‘Is Death Changing?’ given at Clare College, Cambridge (27/1/11) 
George Steiner said ‘literature has not responded to heart transplants’. I take him to mean that literary fiction 
has failed to explore this issue rather than there have been disappointingly few cases of depiction. 
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with literary devices. I advocate a shift away from checking propositions against the world 
and towards understanding in the senses outlined in section (3.2) above. 
 
5.4 My thesis as an alternative model 
 
A prominent distinction in my thesis is between literary fiction as fiction and literary 
fiction as literature. I argue that while the fictional status of literary fiction does no harm to 
a text’s potential for cognitive gain, it does little significant good either and the real work 
takes place when readers engage with the work as literature. I also argue that the pertinent 
cognitive gain is understanding in the following five senses:  
i. By ‘understanding’ the literary cognitivist might mean discerning the layers of 
meaning to be found in a given utterance in a literary fiction, for example that an 
office in-joke was particularly well used. 
ii. By ‘understanding’ the literary cognitivist might mean application of knowledge 
accrued from literary fiction to similar cases. I may apply my understanding of why 
person S is motivated to do such and such to another (fictional or non-fictional) 
setting. 
iii. By ‘understanding’ the literary cognitivist might mean knowledge of how to 
exercise a range of skills or competences in reading a literary fiction; for example 
knowledge of how to chase an allusion or repeated motif in a given text. 
iv. By ‘understanding’ the literary cognitivist might mean knowledge and articulation 
of an experience; such as being jilted. 
v. By ‘understanding’ the literary cognitivist might mean forming a coherent 
interpretation or ‘reading’ of a literary fiction. This entails marshalling the 
marginalia of a close reading of a text into some coherent order. 
 
The process of close reading develops understanding in senses (i)-(iv) while the reader, 
through forming an interpretation of a literary text from the material generated from close 
reading, develops understanding in sense (v). In some cases the sense of understanding 
stands in binary opposition to a lack of understanding as when you discern a hidden 
meaning that I miss. At other times the sense of understanding exists in degree as when my 
interpretation of a given literary work is a little more coherent than yours. We have already 
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seen this model in action throughout Chapter Four but here is a brief example by way of a 
reminder.  
 Consider what the reader understands when he or she reads or hears the following lines: 
Caesar’s  no merchant, to make prize with you 
Of things that merchants sold. Therefore be cheer’d;  
Make not your thoughts your prisons. No, dear Queen;  
For we intend so to dispose you as Yourself shall give us counsel. Feed and sleep. 
           Antony and Cleopatra V. 2. 181-186 
The line ‘Make not your thoughts your prisons’ enjoys an aphoristic charisma yet runs into 
the concerns outlined above (5.3). In contrast to the reader who checks this aphorism 
against the actual world, the ideal close reader notices the plurals in ‘thoughts’ and 
‘prisons’ and concludes that the metaphor is not saying that we are imprisoned by our 
thinking but that some thoughts can act as prisons through imposing boundaries and in 
punishing the thinker. The close reader also notes the irony of Caesar addressing this 
comment to Cleopatra when she is his prisoner. There is further irony in this comment 
given the transactional way that Cleopatra treats Caesar’s servant in Act Two Scene Five 
when she rewards his good news with her jewellery. There is ambiguity in the word ‘prize’ 
which may refer either to Cleopatra’s chattels or to Cleopatra herself. The reader is invited 
to decide whether this is how Antony views Cleopatra and whether this is how Cleopatra 
views Antony? Reference to prizes occurs elsewhere in the play, for example when 
Octavia is referred to as a ‘blessed lottery’ (II. 2. 254) and encourages the reader or listener 
to juxtapose the characters of Cleopatra and Octavia. The tone of Caesar’s promise enjoys 
the assonance of a lullaby ‘…be cheer’d’, ‘dear Queen’, ‘feed and sleep’ and invites us to 
ask whether Caesar’s promise is genuine given his consistently expedient pragmatism and 
arch manipulation.  
The cognitive gain I wish to defend is based on the reader’s careful engagement with the 
literary text. Any checking against the world is neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition on the reader benefiting from this cognitive reward. By my lights, the reader 
approaches the world beyond the text well practiced in discerning meaning, comparing 
ideas, following allusions, gauging tone and forming a judgement of an event.  My thesis 
runs contrary to the standard model of confirmation and disconfirmation in two important 
respects. First, my model focusses on cognitive capacities that fall under five senses of 
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understanding rather than propositional knowledge as the gain at stake. On my view, the 
cognitive gain has already taken place once the reader has analysed a given work and 
constructed his or her interpretation. In fact the cognitive gain that I defend may take place 
without the reader directly seeking this result in his or her reading. The ideal reader then 
approaches the world beyond the work in possession of various things: a keener ear for 
nuance and eye for detail and enhanced skills of conceptual navigation. Confirmation and 
disconfirmation may occur on occasion but do not constitute the main way in which we 
understand the world from our understanding of a literary fictional work. 
Secondly, my model puts emphasis on the work as literature and not as fiction. One 
advantage of my account is that it escapes any accusation that the fictional status of the 
source of cognitive gain detracts from the gain. My alternative model suggests that the 
reader understands better how to apply useful practices given a sufficiently rich, literary 
text. These practices, exercised through close reading or practical criticism, may be further 
exercised on other fictional or non-fictional texts and, further still, in the world beyond the 
text. 
Of course, a literary text may distort what happens in the world on occasion but, as Elgin 
points out, distortion may constitute a literary device that yields some cognitive reward:    
In everyday life we do not encounter the simple goodness of Alyosha in The 
Brothers Karamazov, or the unadulterated evil of Iago in Othello, or the blind 
obsession of Ahab in Moby-Dick. But by devising a suitable context, the authors 
can investigate the characters and their impacts on others in a way that reflects back 
on reality, perhaps enabling us to recognize the less pure cases we are apt to 
encounter in fact. Nor is the plot the only refractive lens. 
                                                                                                             (Elgin 2002: 9) 
My understanding a literary fictional work and my understanding the world beyond the 
literary fiction enjoys a more complex relation than is depicted in standard models of 
checking. I concede that there may be instances when a literary fiction mirrors events in 
the world which means that a close and penetrating engagement with the literary fictional 
work puts the reader in a more insightful position when examining the non-literary 
fictional case. However, my argument is that the skills developed from close reading and 
the forming of a coherent interpretation of a close reading puts the reader at a more general 
advantage in an extra literary setting.  
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5.5 Truth-tracking v truth-trailing relations 
 
I want to avoid the claim that a close reader’s interpretation of literary fiction has nothing 
to do with what is true in the world and at the same time avoid the claim that it has 
everything to do with what is true in the world. In what follows, the predicate ‘true’ refers 
to the world beyond the literary work rather than to the literary work itself. I use the 
predicate ‘true’ to mean correct or actual as when I point out that there are four glasses on 
the table, direct you to the nearest shops or state my date of birth.
45
 Talk of ‘true’ in this 
platitudinous sense does not commit me to any theoretical account of truth. In this final 
section I am interested in locating my analysis of reading literary fiction into a general 
schema of finding out whether something is true in the actual world. The above account 
equates four of the five senses of ‘understanding’ with some form of knowledge. If 
knowledge stands in some relation to what is true, as it is widely held to do although the 
exact relation will depend on the kind of knowledge at stake, and if the four senses of 
‘understanding’ equate to types of  knowledge then the four senses of  ‘understanding’ 
stand in some relation to what is true. There is a fifth sense of understanding identified 
above that does not equate to any form of knowledge, I term this ‘understanding as 
interpretation’, and want to say that this sense of understanding stands in some relation to 
what is true as well. 
On occasion, we are provided with true statements, that ‘copper burns with a forest green 
flame’, and such statements are called ‘truth-tracking propositions’ (Morton 2003: 94-95). 
A truth-tracking relation is a property of a proposition. A statement is truth-tracking if it 
provides an accurate description of the world beyond the statement. There is nothing that 
precludes truth-tracking statements from appearing as part of a literary fiction and 
consequently for a reader of that fiction to gain an understanding of the world from this 
information. However, being supplied with true statements in this way is not the interesting 
thing about gaining cognitively from reading literary fiction.  
There are further, more roundabout ways of getting at true judgements that deserve at least 
acknowledgement by way of a separate descriptive term; I suggest ‘truth-trailing’. A 
‘truth-trailing’ relation is a property of either a proposition or, more usually, any practice 
that advances the establishment of truth. Propositions or practices are truth-trailing if they 
contribute to the wider enterprise of finding out what is true. Synonyms for ‘truth-trailing’ 
                                                          
45 The ‘set of platitudes’ supplied by Crispin Wright captures what I have in mind (Wright 1992: 34). 
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may be ‘truth-finding’ or ‘truth-seeking’.46 Truth-trailing relations are still constrained by 
how the world is. 
Some false propositions may get us closer to what is true. Catherine Elgin gives the 
example of a child’s belief that ‘human beings descended from apes’ which though not 
true, as apes and humans have a shared ancestor, nevertheless is cognitively better than the 
belief that ‘humans did not evolve at all’ or ‘human beings evolved from butterflies’ (Elgin 
2009: 7-8). Another example is our entertaining the central claim in Copernicus’s theory of 
planetary motion which though false ‘constitutes a major advance in understanding over 
the Ptolemaic theory it replaced’ (Elgin 2009: 8).  The interest here is how ‘truth-trailing’ 
applies to practices or activities. 
Of course, not all activities are truth-trailing; for example my enjoying a roller coaster ride. 
Of those practices that are truth-trailing, some result directly in truths about the world, that 
is to say that an individual is able to make true judgements about the world as a result of 
these truth-trailing practices. My being able to exercise a database to find out the ages, 
qualifications and course choices of students under my care is an example of a direct truth-
trailing practice. I do something that, fairly immediately, results in my possessing 
propositional knowledge that is true. In other cases, truth-trailing practices may contribute 
indirectly to our finding out what is true; as when we learn by our mistakes. I believe that 
reading literary fiction stands in an indirect relation to what is true and so we should look 
at these cases a little longer. Elgin provides some nice examples of what, in my 
terminology, constitutes indirect truth-trailing practices: thought experiments in science 
and philosophy (Elgin 1993: 24), the ability to form the right question (Elgin 2002: 11) and 
the dislodgement of unfounded claims in a way that provokes reassessment (Elgin 2007: 
52). According to Elgin, literary fiction is well qualified to supply any and all of these 
indirect truth-trailing practices.  
However, Elgin has fiction in mind when she defends the cognitive potential of literary 
fiction: ‘I suggest that literary fictions are extended, elaborate thought experiments…Like 
an experiment, a work of fiction selects and isolates, manipulating circumstances so that 
particular properties, patterns, and connections, as well as disparities and irregularities are 
                                                          
46 A parallel exists between truth-trailing activities and what Karen Jones refers to as ‘reason responding’ in 
her philosophy of action. Jones identifies the benefits of reason responding as having a greater degree of 
reflectiveness, flexibility and sensitivity than reason tracking (Jones 2003: 189-190). 
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brought to the fore’ (Elgin 2007: 48, 49). Fiction, like a thought experiment in science, 
philosophy or everyday life, can advance the reader on his or her way to cognitive success 
without supplying a true judgement about the world directly; hence reading fiction can be 
an indirect truth-trailing practice. I acknowledge Elgin’s analysis of the cognitive gain 
from fiction but hope to add a broader conception of understanding (in contrast to Elgin 
2009:1-2) and seek to play down the importance of testing fictions against the world (in 
contrast to Elgin 2007: 53) while, in light of my thesis above, play up the importance of a 
reader’s developing understanding from his or her engagement with literary devices. 
My thesis is that reading literary fiction closely, and forming an interpretation of a literary 
fictional work as a result of close reading constitutes a cognitive advance and one that may 
be classed as an indirect truth-trailing practice, as the reader can use these skills to find out 
what is true in the world; though not through the same means as entertaining a fiction. The 
value of reading literary fiction closely is spelt out above in terms of discernment, seeing 
the bigger picture, applying one’s conclusion to other cases, navigation and the 
development of emotional or experiential knowledge which in turn feed into a reader’s 
interpretation of a work. The joint process of close analysis and forming an interpretation 
of a work is transferrable to our learning about the world beyond the literary fiction and in 
this sense indirectly trails what is true in the world beyond the literary fiction. I admit that 
one may gain a better understanding of the world from reading truth-tracking material in 
literary fiction. However, the more important practice to the cognitive gain defended here 
is how I read literary fiction. This way of reading literary fiction may be practised on texts 
that do not seem, on first acquaintance, to be relevant today. 
Take the earlier extract above from Antony and Cleopatra (V. 2. 181-186). When the close 
reader analyses a passage from literary fiction, the reader notices: significant detail, is able 
to rule out a misreading, juxtaposes characters and events, is sensitive to the tone of the 
character that is speaking, recognises a repeated motif (of ‘prizes’ in this instance), detects 
irony and ambiguity. While we may not usually view sensitivity in terms of exercising a 
practice skilfully, there are cases where we can talk about ‘sensitivity to tone’ or 
‘sensitivity to nuance’ as a skilful practice leading to better understanding. In becoming 
well practiced in these ‘arts’ of reading literature, the reader becomes better skilled in an 
extra-textual setting where he or she is able to notice details, interpret the significance of 
details, draw comparisons and detect tone, irony and ambiguity in what is said or done. 
These practices may yield propositions that track the world but the practices themselves 
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are truth-trailing and are indirectly truth-trailing as they are gained from reading a literary 
fictional work.  
In sum, reading literary fiction helps readers to exercise certain truth-trailing practices that 
yield understanding that can be applied to the world beyond the literary fictional work to 
cognitive benefit. These practices bridge the gap between the literary fictional text and 
extra textual reality more consistently than our checking propositional knowledge.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
This project began with a distinction between the standard features of fiction and the 
standard features of literature. I argued that literary fiction shares the standard features of 
both literature and fiction and that the standard features of literature present a plausible but 
under-explored candidate for cognitive gain. I drew attention to the presence of literary 
devices in the wealth of philosophical literature on cognitivism. I showed that anti-
cognitivist arguments against the role of literary devices in the reader’s cognitive gain were 
of a questioning rather than persuasive nature and that the view that cognitive gain is 
irrelevant to valuing literary fiction has too much wrong with it to merit allegiance. Next, I 
argued that the term ‘understanding’ has a plurality of meanings, but that the most likely 
senses in the context of any gain from reading literary fiction is discernment, explanation, 
navigation, articulation of experience and interpretation. I argued that a common sense 
psychological component to interpersonal understanding carries a significant cognitive 
reward independent of any scientific psychological component. I then concentrated on the 
nature of the cognitive reward from reading literary fiction and distinguished between the 
close reading and interpretation of a text. These processes of close reading and 
interpretation apply to literary fiction as literature and not as fiction. I countered two 
potential objections: that gaining a cognitive reward from reading is for an elite literati and 
that reading literary fiction is ‘merely subjective’. In order to substantiate my claim, I spent 
some time showing how various literary devices can help develop the five senses of 
understanding specified. I ended by arguing that it is the reader’s development of these five 
senses of understanding that help him or her to develop a better understanding of the 
world; in contrast to propositional knowledge that is checked against the world.  
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Have I done enough to answer the anti-cognitivist sceptics? 
In section (2.2) literary anti-cognitivism was characterised by the following four concerns 
and I shall end by a brief summary statement of how I see my version of literary 
cognitivism meeting these concerns. 
1. What has the skill of writing in a manner standard to literary fiction got to do with 
understanding something better? 
 
The skill of the author, termed aesthetic effectiveness above (section 4.7), is crucial to the 
cognitive gain that I defend in this project. The reader gains a better understanding through 
engaging with the results of the author’s playfulness with perspective, clever use of 
metaphor and apt choice of words, to cite just three examples. I have given specific case 
studies in Chapter Four of how individual literary devices can stimulate understanding in 
senses (i-v). 
 
2. How does the status of a literary fictional text as literature help with our 
understanding of the world outside the text? 
 
Throughout the course of this project, I acknowledge but play down the popular picture of 
gaining propositional knowledge that one checks directly against the world. Instead, my 
answer is that the skills gained as a result of the close reading and interpretation of literary 
fiction are superior to any skills gained when reading non-literary fiction, or non-fictional 
literature where literary devices are present but used sparingly. It is these skills of reading 
closely and forming an interpretation, which prove useful in understanding the world 
beyond the text. 
 
3. If literary fiction enhances understanding then why hasn’t literary fiction exerted 
more influence beyond the study of literature? 
 
These other disciplines are theoretical, but as I argue in section (3.1), the domain of literary 
fiction is part of common sense psychology. As a result, the third challenge is ill-conceived 
and should run: why isn’t literary fiction better recognised as a source of cognitive gain? 
Pettersson (2012) provides some empirical evidence that such gain is recognised although 
further empirical work needs to be carried out in this area. I hope this project’s emphasis 
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on the skills of close reading and forming an interpretation shows what future research 
should examine. 
 
4. How are readers of literary fiction any better at understanding people, if at all, than 
those who do not read literary fictional works? 
 
This sounds like an empirical question but in light of what I have said it is not clear that 
any of the current empirical studies come close to testing what is at stake. One is looking 
for the reader exercising a range of skills gained from a close reading and interpretation of 
literary fiction and exercised in the world where this whole process may be exercised over 
a considerable period of time. My thesis is compatible with empirical research and I 
suggest two words of constructive comment. First, in the spirit of social anthropological 
fieldwork, we should observe and record the beliefs and practices of actual reading groups. 
Secondly, there is a wealth of literary criticism available and reader’s engagement with this 
material is worth investigation. It is down to another project to identify the brain activity 
that corresponds to the five senses of understanding and to test whether this brain activity 
is stimulated when we read. 
This project defends reading literary fiction as a potential source of cognitive gain. If I am 
right then the mass of literary fiction at our disposal, penned over thousands of years across 
diverse cultures, provides a great cognitive resource which we pay a disservice to if we 
don’t take it seriously. I hope what I argue here provides at least another excuse for us to 
read some literary fiction.  
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Appendix 1.    it may not always be so; and i say 
 
it may not always be so; and i say 
that if your lips, which i have loved, should touch 
another’s, and your dear strong fingers clutch 
his heart, as mine in time not far away; 
if on another’s face your sweet hair lay 
in such silence as i know, or such 
great writhing words as, uttering overmuch, 
stand helplessly before the spirit at bay; 
 
if this should be, i say if this should be - 
you of my heart, send me a little word; 
that i may go unto him, and take his hands, 
saying, Accept all happiness from me. 
Then shall i turn my face, and hear one bird 
sing terribly afar in the lost lands. 
e.e. cummings 
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Appendix 2.        The Affliction (I) 
 
When first thou didst entice to thee my heart,  
I thought the service brave:  
So many joys I writ down for my part,  
Besides what I might have  
Out of my stock of naturall delights,                                            5 
Augmented with thy gracious benefits.  
 
I looked on thy furniture so fine,  
And made it fine to me:  
Thy glorious household-stuffe did me entwine,  
And 'tice me unto thee.                                                                   10 
Such starres I counted mine: both heav'n and earth  
Payd me my wages in a world of mirth.  
 
What pleasures could I want, whose King I served,  
Where joyes my fellows were.  
Thus argu'd into hopes, my thoughts reserved                                15 
No place for grief or fear.  
Therefore my sudden soul caught at the place,  
And made her youth and fiercenesse seek thy face.  
 
At first thou gav'st me milk and sweetnesses;  
I had my wish and way:                                                                  20 
My dayes were straw'd with flow'rs and happinesse;  
There was no moneth but May.  
But with my yeares sorrow did twist and grow,  
And made a partie unawares for wo.  
 
My flesh began unto my soul in pain,                                             25  
Sicknesses cleave my bones;  
Consuming agues dwell in ev'ry vein,  
And tune my breath to grones.  
Sorrow was all my soul; I scarce beleeved,  
[195] 
 
Till grief did tell me roundly, that I lived.                                      30 
 
When I got health, thou took'st away my life,  
And more; for my friends die:  
My mirth and edge was lost; a blunted knife  
Was of more use than I.  
Thus thinne and lean without a fence or friend,                              35 
I was blown through with ev'ry storm and winde.  
 
Whereas my birth and spirit rather took  
The way that takes the town;  
Thou didst betray me to a lingring book,  
And wrap me in a gown.                                                                 40 
I was entangled in the world of strife,  
Before I had the power to change my life.  
 
Yet, for I threatned oft the siege to raise,  
Not simpring all mine age,  
Thou often didst with Academick praise                                         45 
Melt and dissolve my rage.  
I took thy sweetned pill, till I came neare;  
I could not go away, nor persevere.  
 
Yet lest perchance I should too happie be  
In my unhappinesse,                                                                        50 
Turning my purge to food, thou throwest me  
Into more sicknesses.  
Thus doth thy power crosse-bias me, not making  
Thine own gift good, yet me from my wayes taking.  
 
Now I am here, what thou wilt do with me                                     55 
None of my books will show. 
I reade, and sigh, and wish I were a tree;  
For sure then I should grow  
To fruit or shade: at least some bird would trust  
[196] 
 
Her household to me, and I should be just.                                     60 
 
Yet, though thou troublest me, I must be meek;  
In weaknesse must be stout.  
Well, I will change the service, and go seek  
Some other master out.  
Ah my deare God! though I am clean forgot,                                 65 
Let me not love thee, if I love thee not.  
 
George Herbert 
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